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“We are now faced with the fact that tomorrow is today. We are confronted with the
fierce urgency of now. In this unfolding conundrum of life and history there is such a
thing as being too late. Procrastination is still the thief of time. Life often leaves us
standing bare, naked, and dejected with a lost opportunity. The ‘tide in the affairs of men’
does not remain at the flood; it ebbs. We may cry out desperately for time to pause in her
passage, but time is deaf to every plea and rushes on. Over the bleached bones and
jumbled residue of numerous civilizations are written the pathetic words: ‘Too late.’”
Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., “Beyond Vietnam: A
Time to Break the Silence,” Riverside Church, New
York City, April 4, 1967
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ABSTRACT
FOUNDATIONS OF INEQUALITY: CONSTRUCTION, POLITICAL ECONOMY, RACE, AND THE
BODY IN PALESTINE/ISRAEL, 1918-1973

Nimrod Ben-Zeev
Eve Troutt Powell
This dissertation is a history of construction work and the construction industry in
twentieth-century Palestine/Israel, from British rule after World War I, through the first
twenty-five years of Israeli statehood and Palestinians’ ongoing Nakba (catastrophe). It is
primarily a study of the relationship between the history of construction work and the
construction industry in the literal sense, and between social and cultural processes
frequently understood through construction as metaphor: nation- and state-building, and
the construction of social difference. The dissertation examines these histories of
construction in Israel/Palestine through multiple lenses, combining histories of labor, the
body and the senses, race, political economy, and material culture. It analyzes the shifts
from Zionist-Palestinian competition over work, resources and production under the
British Mandate; through the transformation of the construction industry’s workforce into
one based on marginalized and racialized Mizrahi Jews (Jews from Muslim lands), and
Palestinian citizens in Israel in the decades following Israel’s establishment and the
Nakba in 1948. I trace these shifts and their implications using sources from archives in
Israel/Palestine, the United Kingdom, and the United States, newspapers, literature, film,
workers’ songs, trade publications, and oral history interviews. The dissertation argues
that political economy, ecology, and culture alike made cement factories, quarries,
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construction sites, and workers’ bodies into sites of Zionist and Palestinian nationbuilding, conflict, domination, and resistance. Meanwhile, workers’ and their
communities’ use and understanding of these sites often defied and challenged an
increasingly racialized and nationalist social order. Construction work and the
construction industry thus played a pivotal role in the formation of racialized social
hierarchies within Palestine/Israel.
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1

INTRODUCTION
“We do not come to Palestine as to a colony to benefit here
by the labour of others. We have no intention of forming a
skilled labour aristocracy by the side of native labourers to
be looked upon as the ‘hewers of wood and drawers of
water.’”
General Federation of Jewish Labour in
Palestine Memorandum to the British High
Commissioner, February 17, 1929
“They told me I’m lucky to even find a job. During the
economic crisis, the Arab workers were the first to be
thrown out. I’m lucky…. How did they call it in bible class?
‘Treasure cities,’ right? Treasure cities in Egypt. Gibeonites.
Hewers of wood. That’s also from the bible. I have enough
examples.”
Ahmad Yusuf Masarweh, “I am Ahmad,”
1966
“[W]ho erected the buildings, paved the roads, dug and
planted the earth of Israel, other than the Arabs who
remained there?”
Emile Habiby, The Secret Life of Saeed the
Pessoptimist, 1974

This dissertation is a history of construction work and the construction industry in
twentieth-century Palestine/Israel, from British rule after World War I, through the first
twenty-five years of Israeli statehood and Palestinians’ ongoing Nakba (catastrophe).
Defining it as such, however, may set expectations it will not be able to meet. That is to
say, it is primarily a study of the relationship between the history of construction work
and the construction industry in the literal sense, and between social and cultural
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processes frequently understood through construction as metaphor: nation- and statebuilding, and the construction of social difference.
The dissertation examines these histories of construction in Israel/Palestine
through multiple lenses, combining histories of labor, the body and the senses, race,
political economy, and material culture. It analyzes the shifts from Zionist-Palestinian
competition over work, resources and production under the British Mandate; through the
transformation of the construction industry’s workforce into one based on marginalized
and racialized Mizrahi Jews (Jews from Muslim lands, pl. Mizrahim), and Palestinian
citizens in Israel in the decades following Israel’s establishment and the Nakba in 1948.
I trace these shifts and their implications using sources from archives in
Israel/Palestine, the United Kingdom, and the United States, newspapers, literature, film,
workers’ songs, trade publications, and oral history interviews. The dissertation argues
that political economy, ecology, and culture alike made cement factories, quarries,
construction sites, and workers’ bodies into sites of Zionist and Palestinian nationbuilding, conflict, domination, and resistance. Meanwhile, workers’ and their
communities’ use and understanding of these sites often defied and challenged an
increasingly racialized and nationalist social order. Construction work and the
construction industry thus played a pivotal role in the formation of racialized social
hierarchies within Palestine/Israel.1

Whenever discussing the period after the Palestinian Nakba and Israel’s independence in 1948, I refer to
the territory historically identified as Palestine (or Eretz Yisrael in Hebrew) as “Israel/Palestine” and
“Palestine/Israel” interchangeably, to recognize both identifications of the land without granting preference
or precedence to either.
1

3

Contesting Construction
Construction became a contested sphere in Palestine during the first half of the twentieth
century because of its cultural and material importance for Zionists and Palestinians
alike. In Zionist thought, construction’s importance was manifested in two nationalist
myths – “Hebrew labor” (‘avoda ‘ivrit) and “building the land” (binyan ha-aretz).
“Hebrew labor,” the principle according to which Jews in Palestine were meant to engage
in all forms of labor, particularly manual productive labor, was considered a crucial
component in the creation of a “new Jew”, able-bodied, masculine and wholly antithetical
to the frail “diaspora Jew”. As competition with Palestinian Arab workers over
employment became a major concern for the second wave of Zionist settlers in Palestine
during the late Ottoman period, Hebrew labor evolved, fostering a call for the “conquest
of labor” (kibush ha-‘avoda). It thus gained a more concrete economic role as well. In
pushing for the exclusive employment of Jews by Jewish employers, the proponents of
labor Zionism, a strand of Zionist thought which merged socialist ideals with Eastern
European nationalism aimed to buttress the creation of a separate, independent Jewish
economy, and the foundations of a state. “Building the land”, was equally important: to
transform an allegedly barren Palestine into a Jewish homeland, it would have to be built
anew. This aspect of the Zionist project required not only Hebrew construction workers,
but a Hebrew industrial apparatus and the capital to establish and support it.2

See: Anita Shapira, Ha-Ma’avak ha Nikhzav: ‘Avoda ‘Ivrit, 1929–1939 [Futile Struggle: The Jewish
Labor Controversy, 1929–1939] (Tel Aviv: ha-Kibbutz ha-Meukhad, 1977); Gershon Shafir, Land, Labor,
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Whereas most Zionist settlers and ideologues approached construction work as a
novel realm to be “conquered,” in Palestine there was already an established building
trade. Palestinian master builders (mu‘allim al-bina’), known for their distinctive styles,
operated throughout the land, the products of their expertise populating Palestine’s
coastal towns and the hilly areas of its interior. Rural lime kilns and stone quarries
produced the mortar, plaster, and a variety of building stones – finely distinguished by
kind and by finish – which builders then used. Construction was also deeply embedded in
Palestinian culture and social life. In villages, the building of the family home was a
collective effort and celebration, a “chief festive [event] (faraḥ).” The home itself was an
object of desire (ghayat al-mana), a provider of security and stability, and a signifier of
social respectability and economic standing.3
Prior to the wide-scale adoption of Portland cement and concrete during the
1920s, rural limekilns (Arabic: al-latun) were the primary producers of mortar and plaster
for Palestine’s stone-built architecture. Several forms of kilns were in use in the first half
of the twentieth century. The earliest and most basic were stone-built structures fueled by
brushwood. Diesel, crude oil, and coal-fueled kilns capable of industrial-levels of output
and intended for commercial production, first came into use in the mid-to-late 1920s,
ushered in by Palestinian capitalists such as the Haifa-based Tahir Qaraman. While
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Portland cement (Arabic: asmant or shimento, Hebrew: meleṭ) did eventually become the
dominant mortar and concrete increasingly displaced stone, various forms of kilns, big
and small, continued to operate throughout the period of British rule and beyond 1948.4
Alongside these established institutions, other ways of thinking about construction
also emerged. Beginning in the late 1920s, Palestinian champions of “prosperity”
(‘umran), “progress” (taqaddum, or ruqiy), and “development” (taṭawwur) – Palestine’s
“men of capital” – started viewing construction as an integral component of a larger
developmental project necessary for Palestine’s future.5 More specifically, they
envisioned an independent, national, and modern construction industry, radically
different than the land’s existing building trade.
Contestation over labor between Palestinian Arabs and Zionist Jews, and, as
Chapter 1 shows, Zionist attempts to reshape Palestine’s construction industry, dated to
the final decades of Ottoman rule. But it was only after Palestine came under British rule
following World War I, that construction fully emerged as a locust of competing
Palestinian and Zionist ambitions. This emergence was partially the result of
developments in the construction industry itself, which I will describe below. However, it
was also rooted in some of the broader changes that British rule, and specifically the
British Mandate over Palestine introduced.
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large contracting firms. D. Zaslavsky, “Migdal Tzedek,” Davar, April 6, 1937, 3.
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Palestine Under the Mandate
British forces occupied Palestine in late 1917, following roughly 400 years of Ottoman
rule in the land. The Mandate for Palestine, formed as part of the League of Nations’
post-World War I system of mandates, was allocated to Britain at the April 1920 San
Remo conference and officially commenced in 1923. Although it shared considerable
similarities with other such mandates, particularly former Ottoman territories in the
Middle East classified as “Class A” mandate states, the Mandate for Palestine was unique
in important ways.
Like the other mandates, the Mandate for Palestine’s formal goal was to prepare
local populations, eventually, for self-rule. The anticipated path to such self-rule was
determined in accordance with then dominant civilizational and racial hierarchies which
constituted the “global color line.” The Class A mandates were viewed as relatively close
to meeting the conditions for independence. Class B and C mandates, primarily former
German imperial territories in Africa and in the Pacific, respectively, were considered
less prepared – either due to the perceived inferiority of their populations, their
“sparseness,” their “remoteness,” or all of the above. Their periods of tutelage,
accordingly, were to be longer.6
What set the British Mandate for Palestine apart from all its contemporaries,
however, was that it incorporated a pre-existing document, the 1917 Balfour Declaration,
into its preamble and thus its legal structure. The inclusion of the Balfour declaration
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meant that while the mandatory would safeguard the “civil and religious rights” of local
Muslim and Christian populations, “political rights” – foremost of which was the future
establishment of a “national home” – were reserved for the “Jewish people.” These rights
referred not to a local Jewish population, but to the “Jewish people” as a whole. The
mandate thus endorsed Zionism’s project of settlement and colonization. Muslim and
Christian Palestinians, rather than being regarded as a national community or
communities, were defined as “existing non-Jewish communities.”7
Although British administration of the Palestine Mandate was often inconsistent,
for most of its existence it remained bound to this commitment to establishing a Jewish
national home, ambiguous a term as that may have been. This granted the Jewish
population in Palestine, and primarily the organized Zionist European settler community
known as the New Yishuv (ha-Yishuv ha-Hadash, roughly translated as “the new
community” or “settlement”) distinct advantages over the local Christian and Muslim
population. It also placed the latter in a legal bind throughout their interactions with the
Mandate’s administration. Furthermore, the Mandate’s structure, alongside British
imperial racial thought, meant that while European Jews were considered capable of
marching Palestine forward toward the Mandate’s economic and political goals,
Palestinian Arabs were by and large not.8

Susan Pedersen, “Settler Colonialism at the Bar of the League of Nations,” in Settler Colonialism in the
Twentieth Century: Projects, Practices, Legacies, eds. Caroline Elkins and Susan Pedersen, (London:
Routledge, 2005), 124-129, cited in Seikaly, Men of Capital, 5; Rashid Khalidi, The Iron Cage: The Story
of the Palestinian Struggle for Statehood (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 2006), 32-3.
8
Khalidi, The Iron Cage; Seikaly, Men of Capital.; Jacob Norris, Land of Progress Palestine in the Age of
Colonial Development, 1905-1948 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).
7

8
The period of British rule over Palestine was a period of immense political, social,
economic, and technological changes. While these changes certainly did not come out of
nowhere – many of them had their roots in the final decades of Ottoman rule – the pace
of change during the British Mandate was often furious. Dramatic shifts were driven by
the incorporation of Palestine into the British empire’s rapidly changing imperial
formation, unprecedented waves of internal and external migration, large capital flows
into the territory and world historical events.9
The flows of people and capital into Palestine, growing urbanization, and private,
public, and government infrastructure and industrial projects meant that throughout the
Mandate, construction constituted an uncharacteristically significant part of Palestine’s
industry and economy. As construction work expanded, the industry itself also changed
rapidly. Competition over labor between Jewish immigrants and Palestinians, a growing
number of whom were forced into the urban workforce after Zionist land purchases
pushed them off their tenant farms, increased.10 Zionist Hebrew and Palestinian Arabic
newspapers closely followed the pace, or movement, of construction (Arabic: harakat al-
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bina’; Hebrew: tnu‘at ha-binyan) – frequently dividing it neatly into “Jewish” and
“Arab” building activities.11
Palestine’s building materials industry also witnessed upheavals. Portland cement,
a hydraulic cement patented in England in the early nineteenth century and produced by
the fusing of limestone and aluminosilicates, was first imported into Palestine in the
1890s. Cement introduced unprecedented advantages to the building sector, allowing to
erect buildings that were cheap and considered durable, at a rapid pace. As architectural
critic, Or Alexandrovich, has argued, the significance of construction materials is never
intrinsic to physical properties alone; rather, it is derived from how they have been
employed historically and from the contexts that undergird their use – what
Alexandrovich calls a “politics of building materials.”12 Amidst several initiatives and
calls for broader use of cement in the land during the initial decades of the twentieth
century, it was such a politics that defined the attempts of some Zionist entrepreneurs to
seek in cement and concrete a replacement for Palestinian stone and quicklime mortars,
one that would grant a decisive advantage to Jewish laborers.13
In the first years after World War I, the volume of imported cement steadily
increased. Then in 1923 the Russian-born Jewish industrialist Michael Pollak (18641954) established the Nesher Portland Cement Company. The company selected a plot of
land outside the city of Haifa, which would soon become Palestine’s main port and a key
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British imperial hub. Nesher then set upon building what was to become Palestine’s
single largest industrial plant and its sole producer of cement.14 Nesher’s monopoly,
abetted by British policy, was met with Palestinian ventures to establish an alternative to
the Jewish-owned factory. Palestinian capitalists turned outwards to “Arab cement”
beyond Palestine’s boundaries, demanding the British reduce the tariffs protecting
Nesher’s product. They also launched multiple endeavors to established competing
factories within Palestine itself. These ventures, discussed in Chapter 1, formed one part
of the Palestinian project of “building the land,” overshadowed in the historiography by
its lauded Zionist counterpart.
Cement and concrete’s rise did not mean stone’s demise. Palestinian stone masons
and stone dressers were severely hurt by the decline of building stones as structural
elements in building due to the growing preponderance of concrete.15 However, stone in
various forms – from the limestone necessary to feed Nesher’s kilns, through façade
cladding, to the smallest aggregate required to make concrete – remained an essential
material. Here, in contrast to in cement production, the established Palestinian Arab
quarrying industry clearly had the upper hand. Zionism’s “conquest of stone” (kibush ha-
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even), the attempt to unseat Palestinian dominance in the industry, which is the subject of
Chapter 2, began in earnest in the early 1920s. The “conquest” took multiple forms: from
individuals who studied quarrying and stonework under local Palestinian masters, to
capital-intensive attempts at mechanizing existing quarries and establishing mechanized
Jewish-owned quarries. The conquest of stone’s consistent frustration revealed Zionism’s
dependence on Palestinian expertise and sensibilities, as well the limits Palestine’s
geology – the tangible, material land – set for Zionist ambitions.

The Nakba and the First Decades of the Israeli State
The end of British rule brought dramatic, and tragic, changes as well. In late 1947,
following the United Nations’ (UN) approval of a plan to partition Palestine, proposed by
the UN’s Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP), civil war erupted. Already as the
British gradually withdrew, Jewish militias – most of which would morph into the Israeli
Defense Forces’ regular army following Israel’s declaration of independence when the
Mandate terminated on May 14, 1948 – forced hundreds of thousands of Palestinian
Arabs from their homes through violence and intimidation. Palestinian’s forced migration
continued as the civil war transformed into a regional one, when the standing armies of
neighboring Arab countries intervened after the British had departed. By the time the war
concluded in March 1949, over 750,000 Palestinians Arabs became refugees, spread
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across the areas of Palestine which remained under Arab rule – the Jordanian-controlled
West Bank and Egyptian-controlled Gaza Strip – and neighboring Arab states.16
The events of 1947-1949, the Palestinian Nakba and Israel’s War of Independence
(milḥemet ha-‘atzama’ut), generated immense demographic changes, which made
construction once again a priority across the land. In the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and
neighboring countries, the need to shelter hundreds of thousands of Palestinian refugees
led to the construction of a network of refugee camps.17 At the same time, the new Israeli
state had to house the hundreds of thousands of Jews, primarily Holocaust survivors from
Europe and Mizrahi (Middle Eastern and North African) Jews, who arrived in the country
in its initial years and roughly tripled its Jewish population. To do so, the state engaged in
massive construction projects throughout its territory.18
Because of construction’s central role in what many in Israel saw as the state’s
primary mission in its initial years – immigration absorption (kliṭat ‘aliya) – “building the
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land,” continued to be a national objective during the 1950s and 1960s. At the same time,
however, Israel’s economy became increasingly defined by an “ethnic division of labor,”
relegating Mizrahi Jews and Palestinian citizens to the bottom of the occupational
ladder.19 The more physical tasks involved in construction, many of which were
classified as so-called “unskilled” or “semi-skilled” labor, and which as Chapter 3 shows,
were already declining in status by the early 1940s, became “low-status” occupations.20
By 1957, Mizrahi Jews made-up roughly 40% of the construction workforce. By 1962,
Palestinian citizens in Israel were more than twice as likely as Jews to work in
construction.21
Mizrahi immigrants were driven into construction work, agriculture, and other
forms of manual labor as a result of economic necessity and European-Jewish elites’
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racialized conceptions of Mizrahim’s affinity for unskilled, physical labor, an affinity
they supposedly shared with Palestinians due to their “Arabness.” Palestinian workers,
under a military administration which restricted their movement and employment in
Israel before 1966 and in the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip after 1967, navigated
the contradictions between their self-perceptions, subjugated position, and trauma at the
hands of the state, and the needs of survival. Some were able to harness construction
work for social mobility and the physical reconstruction of their homes and communities
despite state restrictions - subverting the Zionist ideal of “to build and to be built” by
claiming it themselves.

Relational History and Stepping Outside of Nationalism’s Shadows
Scholarly and popular understandings of the Zionist-Palestinian conflict often overstate
its history as driven chiefly by clashing ideologies, narratives, or other abstractions.
There are, of course, bodies of literature which have been more attentive to the material
aspects of this history. These include labor and economic histories, sociological studies,
and most recently, histories of capitalism, science, and technology. Works within these
bodies of literature have occasionally dealt with various moments in the history of
construction work in twentieth-century Palestine/Israel through a variety of prisms:
national and labor politics, concepts such as ethnic divisions of labor and dual economies,
and discourses of development and modernity. Yet, for all the insight these works
provide, the picture they portray can be alarmingly fragmentary. It is that of a history
divided into neatly separated periods, and a society (or societies) divided into discreet
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groups. This is also largely a history divorced from construction work as physical labor,
from work’s materials and processes, and from the lives which workers and their
communities built.
The works of Zachary Lockman and Deborah Bernstein on the labor history of the
British Mandate period are obvious touchstones for this dissertation.22 Both works break
away from an earlier, primarily Zionist, body of scholarship which treated the histories of
Arabs and Jews in Palestine as entirely separate and regarded interactions between both
societies as external factors impacting their otherwise independent paths of development
and change.23 Instead, Lockman and Bernstein, building upon the earlier works of Baruch
Kimmerling, Gershon Shafir, and Michael Shalev, view the interactions and the colonial
“encounter” between Palestinian Arabs and Zionist Jews as integral, indeed, defining
elements of both communities’ development. Lockman and Bernstein differ from
Kimmerling, Shafir, and Shalev, in that they take yet another step further away from the
Zionist historiography whose primary object was always the Yishuv.24 The “relational
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history” Lockman and Bernstein pursue – a term Lockman adopted and which has since
inspired a body of work which focuses on late-Ottoman and Mandate-era Palestine – is
equally interested in the ways both Palestinian Arab society and the Zionist settler
community were shaped, the boundaries between them constructed and defined by their
interactions and relationships.25
Lockman and Bernstein’s studies were not the first works to eschew nationalist
frameworks in their treatment of the Mandate era, nor the first to take seriously the role
of factors beyond nationalism in their analyses.26 However, the impact of Lockman’s
work in particular, has extended well beyond studies which take up the mantle of
“relationality” directly, ushering in a wave of studies which sought to “move beyond
nationalism.”27 This desire to explore what lies outside of nationalism’s shadow, has
brought forth critical histories of political economy, development, infrastructure and
materiality, like Jacob Norris’s study of Ottoman and British development policy in
Palestine, Sherene Seikaly’s history of Palestine’s evolving capitalist nahda (renaissance)
during the 1930s and 1940s, and Fredrik Meiton’s work on the history of Palestine’s
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electrification, all of which touch upon aspects of the construction industry with which
this dissertation is preoccupied.28
This dissertation embraces the fundamental aspects of the relational approach to
the history of Israel/Palestine, while expanding its scope to the years after 1948 and
remaining attentive to some of the critiques which have been directed at relational history
since its introduction into the field of Palestine/Israel Studies in the mid-1990s. I view
Zionist and Palestinian history and Zionist and Palestinian self-perceptions as coconstitutive. While the beginnings of each may perhaps be traced separately, they
nonetheless became deeply entangled throughout the twentieth century.29
With Lockman and Bernstein, and Shafir before them, I see labor in Mandate
Palestine as a central arena for the formation of national self-perceptions and boundaries
between communities in Mandate Palestine. At the same time, I agree with Rebecca Stein
and Ted Swedenburg’s call for a “relationality that works more expansively in both scale
and kind.”30 This dissertation attempts to achieve such “expansive” relationality in two
ways. First, through pursuing what Stein and Swedenburg call “transnational
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relationality,” by drawing Israel/Palestine into broader conversations about racialized
bodies and global racial politics. That is, by considering how Palestinian Arabs, Zionist
Jews, and others located themselves along what W.E.B. Du Bois called “the color line.”31
And second, through a examining a relationality that is arguably different “in kind” –
how building materials, geology, and political economy all took part in forming
Palestine/Israel’s relational matrix. Doing so, I believe, also addresses two additional
critiques of the relational paradigm. The first, that it continues to portray Palestinians as
essentially reactive. The second, that it risks obfuscating the structural power differential
between Zionism’s settler colonial national movement, and Palestinians’ indigenous
one.32

Jewish Physical Regeneration and Palestine’s Labor Question
When late-nineteenth-century Zionist thinkers such as Max Nordau (1849-1923),
Theodor Herzl (1860-1904), and others articulated their vision for Jewish nationalism and
national regeneration, they did not operate in an ideological vacuum. Alongside
Zionism’s unique components, their thinking also drew upon contemporary European
nationalist discourses.33 Among those elements drawn from European nationalisms was
the notion that the Jewish people’s national regeneration was dependent in part on the
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physical reform of individual Jewish bodies.34 As Todd Presner has argued, the figure of
the “new Jew” (ha-yehudi ha-ḥadash) and the accompanying ideal of “muscular
Judaism,” characteristic of the Zionism of Nordau, Herzl, and some of their peers,
demonstrated “an affinity with some of the more unsavory ‘regenerative’ discourses of
the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, particularly Social Darwinism, eugenics,
nationalism, and colonialism.”35 This affinity, Presner claims, arose “precisely because
Zionism was both a Jewish response to- and extension of these very same discourses.”36
Like the “muscular Christianity” popular in the United States and Britain, the
Lebensreform (life reform) movement in Germany, and parallel movements in the Middle
East, such “muscular Judaism” encouraged young Jews in Europe to engage in
gymnastics and serve in their homelands’ militaries.37 In Palestine, meanwhile, physical
labor constituted a crucial component of this regenerative project. There, Zionist thinkers
argued, the renewed symbiosis between Jewish workers and the land itself would propel
forward the process of regeneration. By working the land of Palestine, bettering it, and
building upon it, “new Jews” and a revitalized Jewish nation would emerge.38
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The project of physical regeneration through manual labor, however, encountered
significant difficulties. As mentioned above, beginning with the first wave of European
Zionist settlement in Palestine at the end of the nineteenth century, Jewish employers
found Palestinian Arab workers were often willing to perform identical work for
considerably lower wages than their less experienced and skilled European Jewish
counterparts. Accordingly, employers often showed a distinct preference towards hiring
the former. In response, members of the second wave of Zionist immigration from
Eastern Europe in the early 1900s, many of whom were property-less and in dire need of
employment, embarked on what became known as the “conquest of labor.” Their goal
was to guarantee the exclusive employment of Jews by Jewish employers.39
Contemporary Zionist observers construed this “conquest,” as an uphill battle.
The reasons for this, they argued, were the different bodily and economic needs, cultural
capacities, political acumen, physical abilities and professional skills of Eastern European
Jewish immigrants and Palestinian Arabs. While Eastern European Jewish immigrants
sought wage labor as their primary source of livelihood, Zionist thinkers and public
figures claimed, Palestinian workers often used wages as supplemental income alongside
subsistence farming. Palestinians were therefore willing to work for shorter periods of
time than immigrants looking for permanent employment, a boon to employers in
seasonal agriculture as well as in the construction industry. Moreover, Palestinian
workers were often willing to work for lower wages than Eastern European Jews.
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This wage differential was naturalized by the Zionist leadership and others, by
linking it to Palestinians’ supposedly lower “standard of living” compared to Eastern
European Jewish workers – a concept which, as Chapter 2 shows, came under Palestinian
criticism for its racial nature. Employers also saw Palestinian workers as less inclined to
demand rights through the language of organized labor than their Eastern European
Jewish counterparts and thus as easier to exploit. Finally, Zionist observers perceived a
difference in skill between Palestinians and Eastern European Jews across various forms
of labor. Gershon Shafir cites Zionist descriptions of “Arab workers” who worked from
childhood, and thus embodying the skills necessary for labor in “all [their] limbs.”40 The
Eastern European Jewish immigrant, meanwhile, was often inexperienced, required
training, and was frequently regarded as “[lacking] the physical strength and stamina
required for agricultural labor.”41
Zionist functionaries often portrayed Mizrahim too as “natural workers,” using
similar racializing terms to those they applied to Palestinian Arabs. They described
Mizrahim as better suited for physical labor but lacking in intellect, technical capacities
and culture, and their material and cultural needs – that is, their “standard of living” – as
lesser than those of Eastern European Jews. Therefore, the argument went, like
Palestinian Arabs, Mizrahim could be paid lower wages.
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As early as 1911, this notion of similarity between Mizrahi Jews and Palestinian
Arabs – which extended also to understandings of their climatic suitability to Palestine –
animated the mission of the labor Zionist activist, Shmuel Yavnieli, to Yemen. The
purpose of Yavnieli’s mission, promoted by Arthur Ruppin’s Palestine Office and the
Planter’s Union, which represented the planter class of the first wave of Zionist
settlement, was to encourage Yemeni Jewish immigration to Palestine. New Yemeni
immigrants, the mission’s architects argued, could join the existing Yemeni community
in Palestine, many of whom had immigrated in 1881, roughly concurrently with the first
groups of European Zionist settlers. As “Hebrew labor,” they could then substitute
Palestinian Arab workers, while receiving similar wages and working conditions to those
of the latter. That is, they would provide a path towards a conquest of labor which
accorded with the planter class’ economic interests.42

After 1948: Colonial Continuities
Looking beyond the Mandate to the period after the Nakba and Israeli independence, the
early decades of the Israeli state and specifically the state’s relationship with the
Palestinians who remained within its boundaries have long constituted, in Shira
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Robinson’s words, a “black hole” in historical scholarship.43 Robinson correctly points
out that especially in the aftermath of the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza
Strip in 1967, the nineteen years which passed between 1948 and 1967, began to be
viewed through rose-tinted glasses. Liberal critics of Israel’s occupation, both within and
outside of Israel, came to see the years before 1967 as the state’s “period of innocence.”
And yet, as mentioned above, between 1948 and 1966, the majority of
Palestinians within Israel were governed under a military administration, which
drastically curtailed their freedoms and rights and Mizrahi Jews suffered harsh
discrimination. For a significant period, works that critically examined Israel’s first
decades, including the military administration, were few and far between.44 However, the
past decade has seen a surge of innovative scholarship dedicated to their study. Hillel
Cohen’s Good Arabs and Robinson’s, Citizen Strangers, were arguably the harbingers of
this wave, followed by works by Yael Berda, Leena Dallasheh, Maha Nassar, Arnon
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Degani, Lana Tatour, and others.45 Much of this scholarship, as the introduction to
Chapter 3 discusses, is dedicated to examining the continuities of colonial government
policies toward Palestinians between the British Mandate and Israeli rule, as well as the
Israeli state’s continued commitment to the settler colonial nature of the Zionist project in
Palestine. This dissertation contributes to this emerging literature by demonstrating how
such colonial continuities manifested in the realm of labor. The division of labor which
developed in Israel’s initial decades, I argue, was largely the outgrowth of colonial and
racial hierarchies established during the Mandate.

Divisions of Labor in the Israeli State
That Israel’s labor market was a segmented one already in the early 1950s, is hardly a
novel argument. Mizrahi Jews and Palestinian citizens in Israel were disproportionately
tracked into “unskilled” manual labor, dominating lower-tier jobs in branches like
construction and agriculture. However, the scholarship on the period has, for the most
part, discussed it as though there existed two parallel and separate divisions of labor: an
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intra-Jewish division, between Ashkenazim and Mizrahim; and a second “external”
division, between Jews and Palestinians.
Israeli government officials, social scientists, and frequently also public discourse
justified and explained Mizrahi Jews’ proletarianization during the 1950s and 1960s by
relying on then-popular modernization approaches. Such approaches argued that Mizrahi
immigrants were overrepresented in low-status, manual labor because of their need to
adjust to the transition from the “traditional” societies from whence they came, to the
already developed Israeli society. These approaches were paired with discourses of
physical and spiritual regeneration, like those applied previously primarily to European
Jews. The core idea of forming “new Jews” through manual labor remained similar, but
Mizrahi Jews were now its primary wanting objects.46 However, as Bernstein and Swirski
have shown, 1950s Israel was hardly a developed industrial economy which would
require such an adjustment process. Rather, it was precisely the proletarianization of
Mizrahi Jews which allowed the state to industrialize and develop rapidly during its early
decades.47
State officials and the advocates of modernization theory applied a similar
explanation to the proletarianization of Palestinian citizens in Israel during those decades,
albeit stripped of most of its redemptive dimensions, since Arabs remained essentially
inassimilable. The products of “traditional” Arab rural society, their proletarianization
was a phase in their acculturation to the modern Israeli one.48 However, despite these
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affinities, Bernstein and Swirski’s work and later investigations of the emergence of an
ethnic division of labor among Jews in Israel rarely consider the place of Palestinian
citizens in this division. Similarly, studies of the proletarianization of Palestinian citizens
seldom mention the parallel process of Mizrahi proletarianization.49
This tendency to treat each of these histories as though they were separate, has
had serious repercussions for our understanding of the formation of social hierarchies in
Israel/Palestine after 1948. Alongside the tendency of scholarship on the ethnic division
of labor to define the establishment of the state as the division of labor’s starting point, it
is partially responsible for what Yehouda Shenhav has described as the tendency of
critical scholarship on Mizrahim in Israel to “miss out… on the colonial history”
undergirding it.50
To recapture both this colonial history and “the contemporary colonial reality,”
Shenhav’s The Arab Jews studies the interactions between Zionist emissaries, Iranian and
Indian workers, and Iraqi Jews, which took place on the backdrop of the construction
projects carried out in Abadan, Iran by Solel Boneh, the contracting arm of the Palestine-
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based Histadrut (the Zionist General Federation of Trade Unions). Between 1942 and
1944, Solel Boneh carried out construction at Abadan after receiving a tender from the
British army. Alongside the works, the Yishuv’s leadership used the project as cover for
sending Zionist emissaries to Iraq, to build ties with the longstanding and deeply rooted
local Jewish community. Shenhav argues that the circumstances which surrounded the
Abadan project – a meeting point between an explicitly imperial task on behalf of the
British, and the nationalist task of engaging with Iraq’s Jewish community – made it a
“terminus a quo [“zero point”] of relations between Zionism and the Arab Jews.”51 These
relations, he claims, were historically defined precisely by such a meeting point, between
Zionism’s colonial and nationalist facets. From the Zionist perspective, Arab Jews were
both racialized, “ethnic subjects” and “possible candidates for integration into the Zionist
project.”52
That Shenhav locates this “zero point” at the construction sites of Abadan is, I
would argue, more than merely fortuitous. Rather, it indicates the pivotal role which
construction work and the construction industry played in the nexus between nationalism,
colonialism, empire, and race in the twentieth-century history of Israel/Palestine – a role
which extended even beyond the geography of the land itself.53 Many of the themes
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which Shenhav describes as unfolding in Abadan – Zionism’s need to navigate between
nationalism’s valorization of manual labor and the colonial denigration of such labor;
European Zionists’ often uneasy attempts to situate themselves in relation to a colonial
racial hierarchy and division of labor and their conditional position as “white”; and the
strains political economy placed on both – were, as Chapters 2 and 3 show, at stake
already in Mandate Palestine as early as the 1920s.54

Racialized Bodies, Racial Politics, and Colonial Legacies
Race and racial politics have had a strange career in discussions of modern
Palestine/Israel. The categories are seemingly everywhere. Yet the ways in which they
have operated historically remain opaque, even if examining them is no longer entirely
taboo.55 The question of “racism” – often encoded primarily as group discrimination
disconnected from ideas about race per se as well as their histories – has featured
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prominently in popular and scholarly discourse about Palestine/Israel.56 The history of
racial thought is at the heart of studies of Jewish, Zionist and Palestinian early
engagements with bio-racism.57 Questions of racial politics animate applications of the
settler colonial framework to the study of Israel/Palestine and analyses of the racial
underpinnings of the land’s twentieth-century citizenship regimes.58 Much of the critical
scholarship on the experiences of Mizrahim, too, elucidates the racial components of their
discrimination in Israel.59 Most recently, activists and scholars have explored historical
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and contemporary networks of global Black-Palestinian solidarity rooted in anti-racist
and anti-colonial politics.60
Outside of a few notable exceptions, however, historicizing the processes of
racialization in Palestine/Israel – that is, how Palestinian Arabs and Ashkenazi and
Mizrahi Jews came to be regarded as possessing different physical, intellectual, and
cultural qualities – has remained largely beyond the purview of most of this scholarship.
The same is true for the historical relationship between racial thought and racial politics:
how racialization has shaped and sustained social hierarchies in Israel/Palestine over
time.61
By examining the racialization of construction labor in Palestine/Israel from the
period of British rule to the early decades of the Israeli state, this dissertation argues that
racialized conceptions of difference between and among Jews and Arabs were
foundational to the formation of twentieth-century Palestine/Israel’s social hierarchies.
The dissertation demonstrates how concepts of Arab and Mizrahi suitability for physical
labor as opposed to European Jewish intellectual superiority, and of Arabs’ and
Mizrahim’s lesser material and cultural needs, shaped Mandate Palestine’s and the Israeli
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state’s divisions of labor, relegating Palestinians and Mizrahim to “inferior” labor and
social status. In doing so, I follow scholarship which argues that, at its core, racialization
operates upon and marks physical bodies, and works examining the racialization of labor
in the Middle East and elsewhere.62
The dissertation shows that these racializing processes, and the racial projects of
which they were part, were embedded in regional, imperial, and global discourses about
race, culture, and the body.63 These ranged from European-inspired Zionist ideas about
collective and individual degeneration and regeneration, through British racial attitudes
toward laboring bodies, to the transnational engagements of Jews and Arabs with the
concepts of whiteness and racial hierarchy and appeals to anti-racist politics. The
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dissertation thus demonstrates how local actors in Palestine/Israel placed themselves and
others along a global “color-line” defining hierarchies, alliances, and divisions of labor.64

Dissertation Structure
Chapter 1 traces cement’s biography in Palestine/Israel through its formative stage, the
period of British rule, from 1918 to 1948. First, it examines Zionists’ continued attempts,
rooted in the late Ottoman-period, to claim cement and concrete as materials of exclusive
Jewish expertise. Then, it surveys cement’s political economy, shaped by the interplay
between British interests, the Mandate’s legal structures, the Jewish-owned Nesher
Portland Cement Company, and the initiatives of Palestinian capitalists. Analyzing the
latter in the context of a broader Palestinian discourse about construction, the chapter
demonstrates the crucial role accorded by Palestinians to building as part of a national
and anti-colonial project. The repeated unraveling of such materialist nation-building
endeavors, meanwhile, was the product of the very real vicissitudes of Palestinian
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history, the abstractions of British racial thought and ideas about corporate personhood,
and Palestine’s underlying geological substrata. Finally, the chapter discusses the
transformation of cement from a material imbued with future promise to a “mournful
commodity” – one which embodied the civilian crises of World War II in Palestine and
the years immediately following.
In a similar vein to the first chapter, Chapter 2 centers on the history of a specific
building material and its production during the Mandate period. The chapter exchanges
stone for cement, quarries for cement factories, and a focus on work processes and the
body for political economy. It begins by following a photographic controversy that stirred
Palestine in Summer 1931, as the images at its center blurred the lines between two
different kinds of machines – quarry drills and machine guns. The chapter’s second
section then explores how British racial thought, Palestinian anti-racist critiques, and
labor Zionism’s shifting stance towards colonial divisions of labor came to frame
competition over employment during the construction of the Haifa harbor and work in its
Athlit quarry, between 1928-1931. The third and fourth sections examine the evolution of
the Zionist “conquest of stone,” from the early 1920s to the 1940s. They demonstrate
how Zionist fantasies about reviving an immediate connection between Jewish bodies
and the physical land of Eretz Yisrael (the Hebrew name for Palestine) depended first on
the adoption of Palestinian knowledge, skills, and sensibilities, and then on the wide scale
use of machinery to displace and replace Palestinian workers. The chapter concludes with
a brief study of a critique of mechanization published in 1935 in the Palestinian economic
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journal, al-’Iqtisadiyyat al-‘Arabiyya, which offers an almost diametrically opposite
approach to the one eventually embraced by Zionism’s conquest of stone.
Chapter 3 moves away from the sites of production and into the rooms in which
Histadrut officials and the Yishuv’s leadership debated and planned the management of
labor. The chapter traces Israel’s post-1948 racial division to historical processes and
ways of thinking which originated in the final decade of British rule. Accordingly, it is
the sole chapter in the dissertation which focuses almost entirely on Zionist discourse and
relies mostly on Zionist sources. The chapter opens with a 1942 Histadrut Executive
meeting, in which some members expressed concern regarding the declining numbers of
Jewish construction workers and the preponderance of exploitative employment of
Palestinian Arabs by Histadrut-owned companies, while others brushed such concerns
aside, citing “survival” over moral obligations and institutional strength over ideals.
These discussions framed Histadrut-owned companies’ increasing reliance on cheaper
Arab labor in relation to distinctly racialized notions of colonial exploitation and “coolie”
labor. At the same time, they also suggested a shift in the sense of the Yishuv’s coercive
potential to affect such labor regimes, on the one hand, and in the political calculations
which informed the Zionist leadership’s attitudes towards them.
The second half of Chapter 3 examines the work of the politicians, administrators,
and academics, which the Yishuv’s Emergency Committee (Va‘adat ha-Matzav) charged
with planning a Ministry of Labor for a future Jewish state following UNSCOP’s
September 1947 recommendation to partition Palestine. Specifically, I focus on the
discussions and the plans various experts proposed for managing what they referred to as
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the “Arab labor problem,” in the future state. These were plans for a state that never came
to be: a Jewish state with a population which was roughly forty-five percent Palestinian,
and which was bound by UNSCOP’s proposal to instituting open borders with the new
Arab state which was planned to be set up alongside it. The war of 1947-1949 and the
Palestinian Nakba nullified partition and decimated the Palestinian population in the
eventual Israeli state. However, planners’ approaches to solving the theoretical
“problem,” shed considerable light both on these appointed experts’ perceptions of the
place of Palestinians in a Jewish state and economy, and on the measures of labor control
and coercion which were eventually adopted by the Israeli state.
Chapter 4 returns to the sites covered in the second chapter, Palestine’s – and now
Israel’s – stone quarries, in the aftermath of the Nakba and Israeli independence. The
chapter shows how the alignment between Palestine’s geological substrata, Zionist
patterns of settlement and colonization, and Palestinian strategies of struggle and survival
rendered many stone quarries stubbornly Palestinian, even after the catastrophic events of
the Nakba. Quarries stood at the center of several of the period’s most crucial junctures:
from Palestinian citizens’ struggles against land confiscations and the state-directed
policies of spatial “Judaization,” to the discriminatory incorporation of recent Mizrahi
immigrants into the workforce, often as part of the same Judaization policies and
explicitly at the expense of Palestinians. The chapter focuses on the tumultuous history of
the stone quarries of the Shaghur valley (known in Hebrew as Beit ha-Kerem valley) in
the Western Galilee between 1948 and 1964, while also drawing upon reports and events
recorded in other quarries. During these years, I argue, stone quarries emerged as
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political, social, and economic flashpoints between the state and its military
administration, business interests, and the country’s most marginalized populations. At
the same time, quarries became bastions of Palestinian and Mizrahi self-sufficiency and
the backdrop for reimagining self-perception, community, and culture.
The dissertation’s final chapter explores the experiences of Palestinian citizens in
Israel’s construction industry in the twenty-five years following 1948. The chapter relies
primarily on the narratives of thirteen Palestinian individuals who were construction
workers, foremen, contractors, organizers, and activists, as well as their family members,
all of whom I interviewed in October 2018. Since the chapter is methodologically
different to the other chapters in the dissertation, its first section is dedicated in part to a
methodological and practical discussion of how I approached conducting and analyzing
these interviews. The chapter then combines my interlocutors’ oral history narratives with
archival and secondary sources to examine four facets of their experiences in Israel’s
construction industry: 1) the conditions and considerations which drove Palestinian
citizens, many of them teens, to effectively become migrant workers in the Israeli job
market, and specifically in the construction industry; 2) workers’ attempts and
experiences of creating spaces of safety and intimacy away from home with their peers
and, at times, even with Jewish employers; 3) the pressures workers felt to conceal
themselves in Jewish spaces because of their racialized hyper-visibility, on the one hand,
and their experiences of the conditions of social invisibility which made their exploitation
possible, on the other; and 4) how workers, their families, and their communities made
use of the knowledge, skills, and material resources they gained in an industry into which
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many of them were driven out of necessity, to rebuild and reimagine their own
communities and to resist the state’s social and physical stranglehold on their
development.
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CHAPTER 1: BUILDING TO SURVIVE

“These people are really committing suicide . . . why [they] deprive us and
themselves of cement baffles me.”
– Emile Boutagy, February 26, 1941

“[I]f the subject of this letter (the vexed question of cement) does not
come within your schedule, would you pass it on, with my apologies, to
the officer who deals with the affairs of this mournful commodity.”
– Ivan Lloyd-Phillips, December 14, 1946

“Oh cement, oh beloved/you are always on my mind”
– Islam Ayoub, “The Cement Song (Longing, Oh, Beloved),”
Gaza, 2014

Portland cement, a hydraulic cement first patented in England in the early nineteenth
century produced by fusing limestone and aluminosilicates, has played a crucial role in
the history of Israel/Palestine for almost a century. From the first sacks unloaded in Jaffa
in the 1890s to those clandestinely transported into the besieged Gaza Strip through
tunnels from the Egyptian border area since 2007, cement has stood at the center of two
of the defining experiences of Palestinian society: modernity writ-large and the encounter
with Zionism.65 Cement, and concrete for which it is a key constituent, have had far“Concrete in Palestine,” Cement Age 10, no. 5 (May 1910): 371; Jon Donnison, “Gaza Tunnel Trade
Squeezed by Egypt ‘Crackdown’,” BBC News, August 21, 2012, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middleeast-19320135 [accessed: July 7, 2020]. For simplicity’s sake, I refer to Portland cement – by which I mean
the form of “modern Portland cement” produced beginning in the late nineteenth century, and which
remains the most widely used form of cement used today – as “cement” throughout. In this context, it is
65
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reaching impact on infrastructure, the built environment, and the building professions
globally.66 However, cement, in presence and absence, has also intertwined in unique
ways with Palestinians’ everyday lives and political horizons: Its abundance has defined
the changing landscapes of Palestinian towns and, after 1948, refugee camps; its scarcity
– the product of Israeli restrictions – has caused contemporary Gaza’s constant state of
disrepair; its malleability has shaped the experiences of Palestinian construction workers
in Israel and the settlements; and its solidity has wrought the separation wall.67
This chapter focuses on the period of British rule (1918–48), which I argue was
the formative stage of cement’s biography in Palestine/Israel.68 During this period
construction was a central component in both the Zionist and the Palestinian nationbuilding projects. In the process, the consumption and production of cement became
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indexical of the ability to construct not only modern built structures but also
communities. While tracing cement consumption became one method of quantifying “the
movement of construction” (Arabic: harakat al-bina’; Hebrew: tnu‘at ha-binyan), its
production was understood as crucial to the prospect of economic independence and
liberation from colonial domination.69
As part of the broader narrative of this dissertation, which posits construction and
construction work as central pillars of the structures of inequality and domination in
twentieth-century Palestine/Israel, the chapter illuminates cement’s role in the formation
of these structures and in the strategies of struggle and survival Palestinians would deploy
in their shadows. The first two sections follow the failed attempts to make cement and
concrete an exclusive object of Hebrew labor through specialization and expertise, which
coalesced with British racial ideologies and foreshadow the central role Palestinian men
would eventually come to play in constructing the Jewish state.70 The subsequent sections
examine the formation of the Nesher cement company’s monopoly over cement
production, abetted by British support, and the thwarted attempts of Palestinian capitalists
to establish an Arab cement company during the Mandate. These developments set the
stage for Nesher’s ability to maintain its monopoly, largely unabated, well beyond 1948.
The struggle over cement production also presents new questions regarding the history of
corporations and race in Mandate Palestine. The chapter’s final section binds together
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these layers. The accumulation of cement’s various significances meant that in times of
scarcity, such as during World War II and in its aftermath, cement emerged as an object
eliciting intense emotion, intimately connected to life itself and to the possibility of
survival.

“It Has No Other Experts”
As Or Alexandrovich has shown, Early Zionist efforts to transition from the “traditional”
construction materials of Palestine, such as gravel and limestone, to “modern” materials,
in particular cement and cement bricks, were an essentially political transition linked
directly to the idea of Hebrew labor.71 Focusing on the construction of the first “modern”
Hebrew neighborhood, Ahuzat Bayt, just north of Jaffa in 1909, Alexandrovich describes
an emerging consensus in Zionist circles whereby Palestinian construction workers were
considered more skillful, indeed “naturally inclined,” toward construction in local
materials and methods. They were imagined as having known the local stone “for
generation upon generation,” making them “greatly preferable” to Jewish laborers.72
Zionist contractors and entrepreneurs viewed the construction of Ahuzat Bayt as an
opportunity to introduce a new set of building materials and methods to unsettle this
hierarchy of expertise. The material chosen to foster this shift by the neighborhood’s
Alexandrovich, “Kurkar, Melet.” As noted in the introduction, in early twentieth-century Labor Zionism,
“Hebrew labor” was considered a crucial component in the creation of a “new Jew,” which was ablebodied, masculine, and antithetical to the frail “diaspora Jew.” It also had a more concrete economic role.
Zionist institutions pushed for the exclusive employment of Jews by Jewish employers, to create a separate,
independent Jewish economy. See: Gluzman, ha-Guf ha-Tziyoni; Shapira, ha-Ma’avak ha-Nikhzav; Shafir,
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contractor, Akivah Aryeh Weiss (1868-1947), and his business partner, David Arber
(1861-1924), was the concrete brick (also referred to as a “cement brick”), to be made of
imported Portland cement in Arber’s new factory.73 Their goal was to ensure that Jewish
hands would construct Jewish houses.74
Weiss’s and Arber’s foray into replacing local stones and local workers was
unsuccessful. In Or Alexandrovich’s telling, it was only after World War I, with the mass
production of silicate (sand lime) bricks starting in 1922, that a serious contender to stone
and masonry emerged.75 However, the underlying logic of Weiss’ initiative – the
suggested affinities among specific kinds of labor, materials, and race – continued to
resonate strongly in Zionist circles. As the use of cement and concrete proliferated, the
materials themselves were incorporated into competing visions of the land’s future. Like
Hebrew labor and “building the land,” cement and concrete held a unique place in
idealized visions of building. This is perhaps most famously captured in Nathan
Alterman’s “Morning Song” (1932), where dressing the land “in a gown of concrete and
cement” becomes central to performing the love of the land.76
In this climate, the idea that Jewish laborers were more adept at work in modern
materials, particularly concrete and cement, took on additional weight. British racialized
conceptions of the different capacities of Jews and Palestinian Arabs further bolstered
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this line of thought. In 1929, the British high commissioner John Chancellor weighed in
on the increasingly contested matter of the unequal division of labor in Palestine, arguing
that “the rivalry between the Jews and Arabs [in the matter of the division of labor and
wage inequality],” was “mitigated by the fact that the two races tend to become naturally
segregated in different kinds of labor.”77 Juxtaposing the “superior physique” of Arabs to
the “greater intelligence” of Jews, he used concrete work, among other things, as a case
in point for this contradiction-riddled racial ideology, stating that

By reason of their greater intelligence and manual skill the Jews are
economically superior to the Arabs in some of the more modern forms of
skilled and semi-skilled work, such as reinforced concrete, care of
machinery and electrical work [emphasis mine].

Champions of Hebrew labor seized upon these distinctions, effectively mirroring earlier
frustrations with the inadequacy and disadvantages of Jewish hands working in local
Palestinian stone. In place of the Palestinians’ “natural” or “traditional” affinity, Jewish
labor offered expertise and specialization. The right-wing newspaper Do’ar ha-Yom
reported with unconcealed glee that, following the devastation of the 1927 earthquake,
Arab employers increasingly saw Hebrew construction, particularly in concrete, as more
durable. As a result, the paper stated, Arab contractors in the Jerusalem area increasingly
employed Jewish laborers. Prior to the earthquake “a small number of [Jewish]
professionals in concrete work had worked . . . for Arab employers.” Now, it was in

77

The National Archives (United Kingdom) (TNA): Colonial Office (CO) 733 (Colonial Office: Palestine
Original Correspondence from 1919-1965)/165/2, 91.

44
concrete work in particular, “which among the Arabs has no specialists,” that Arab
contractors in and around Jerusalem sought to employ Jews.78
Opportunities to celebrate Jewish dominance of concrete work were found even
when bemoaning the hardships of the Hebrew labor struggle. In March 1929, the
newspaper Davar, identified with mainstream labor Zionism, complained that due to
Arab laborers’ low salaries, Jewish workers were entirely blocked from the Jerusalem
Electric Company’s works. The article took some solace however in “a small concrete
work [as part of the electric company’s projects] that employs several Jews, since it has
no other experts.”79
Jewish mastery of cement was frequently juxtaposed with Arab failures to do so.
In 1931, Davar complained that the Jerusalem municipality hired an Arab contractor to
build the city’s new refuse incinerator and slaughterhouse. The contractor was “of course
employing only Arab laborers in all simple labors.” However, Davar remarked, his
attempt to boycott Hebrew labor “in the professional work as well” proved unsuccessful:
the quality of the incinerator’s walls, “cast” – indicating they were made of concrete –
initially by Arab laborers, was so poor, that Jewish laborers were hired to rebuild them.80
A striking example of this trope is found in a book dedicated by the Construction
Workers Union to one of the Jewish construction industry’s pioneers, Chaim Flexer
(1902-1979), celebrating his seventieth birthday. In an undated speech before the
Construction Workers Association in Jerusalem, Flexer reminisces of his days working in
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the city, first in stone masonry, then in concrete: “As I passed the Shaykh Jarrah
neighborhood, I was reminded of the Mufti – Hajj Amin al-Husayni (1895-1974) – who
invited Jewish laborers in 1934 to fix the concrete ceiling that had collapsed in his office,
immediately after it was cast by Arab laborers.”81
The crux of Flexer’s recollection, apocryphal though it may be, is clear: that a
nationalist figure of al-Husayni’s standing invited Jewish laborers to fix the shoddy
workmanship of his compatriots is ultimate testimony to what the discourse of Jewish
expertise rendered an almost “natural” Jewish superiority in cement and concrete work
and beyond. Flexer’s memory may have already been tinged by the widespread
association in Jewish Israeli culture between “Arab labor” and poor work, but it might
also point us toward some of its origins.82 This neat narrative of exclusive Jewish
expertise in cement and concrete and the corresponding depiction of Palestinian
construction as always falling apart, fell apart readily itself. Throughout the Mandate
period, Palestinian contractors and laborers carried out projects, large and small, that
made extensive use of concrete and cement.83
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The idea that Portland cement and its products could restructure the building trade
was not unique to Palestine: from the early nineteenth century, part of what made these
materials appealing to capitalist and socialist visionaries alike was their potential to do
just that. In both Europe and the United States, construction in concrete was supposed to
facilitate a redistribution of skill within the building trades. However, rather than
fostering a new class of expert laborers, it was perceived as circumventing established
building crafts, permitting cheaper, “unskilled” labor to engage in the manual work of
construction, while emphasizing the skills of engineers and other technical experts.84
From the perspective of labor, Hebrew or otherwise, the introduction of cement
and concrete as materials of expertise was fraught to begin with. Working in a
“deskilling” material, most Jewish construction workers seem to have had very little
actual advantage over their Palestinian peers. At the same time, despite the capacity of
Palestinian contractors and workers to incorporate the new materials into their repertoire,
the introduction of cement and concrete on a large scale had considerable adverse impact
on Palestine’s established building crafts. As early as 1930, the Hope-Simpson report
noted that Palestinian stonemasons and stone dressers were severely hurt by the
expanding use of “cement, reinforced concrete and silicate brick, all manufactured by
Jews.”85
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Cement transformed construction work in Palestine, but not in the ways the
Hebrew press or Zionist entrepreneurs imagined. Its wide-scale introduction succeeded in
weakening the standing of Palestinian craftbuilders. That in itself could not guarantee
Zionist dominance in construction. Labor, however, was not the only area in which the
ability to construct in Palestine was contested.
Attention to Zionist preoccupations with material acts of building as part of a
nation-building project, studied from perspectives as diverse as literature, political
philosophy, and architecture, may have occluded the importance Palestinian anticolonial
projects conferred upon construction, evident already during the Mandate.86 In the press,
in their interactions with the British, and in business correspondence, Palestinians
articulated visions of national futures bound together by cement. These visions came up
against a considerably more substantial obstacle than Zionist claims for labor
specialization, however, one shaped in no small part by British policy: the Jewish
monopoly over cement production.

Empire’s Monopoly
The Nesher Portland Cement Company, founded in 1923 by the Russian-born
industrialist and entrepreneur Michael Pollak, maintained throughout the Mandate and
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beyond a monopoly over cement production.87 The Nesher factory’s establishment was
the realization of plans laid by a group named the Palestine Portland Cement Syndicate.
By the time Michael Pollak became involved, the syndicate, led by several prominent
British Jews, had already selected land near the town of Yajur, southeast of Haifa, for the
factory and its quarries. Once conditions of the land’s purchase were agreed upon, Pollak
registered the new “Portland Cement Company ‘Nesher,’ Ltd.” in London, so a viable
legal entity could make the purchase. London remained the center of Nesher’s financial
operations until Pollak sold his stake in the company and its London holdings were
liquidated in 1945.88
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Nesher’s increasing profits and the company’s strengthening hold over Palestine’s
cement market, beginning in the late 1920s, coincided with a steady increase in the use of
cement in the land. In 1922 and 1923, cement imports into Palestine – approximating
consumption in the absence of local manufacture – totaled roughly thirty thousand tons
annually. By 1929, consumption was estimated at nearly sixty-two thousand tons.89
Although British ideologies of racial and civilizational hierarchy contributed to
the Mandate administration’s more favorable view of industrial endeavors led by
European Jews than ones led by Palestinian Arabs, Nesher’s ability to maintain its status
as a monopoly seems also to have been rooted in its management’s ability to navigate
British local and imperial interests and discourses.90 Pollak’s efforts in the summer of
1925, immediately before beginning production, to institute duty-free admission for raw
materials for exporting industries were instrumental to the company’s success. Here, the
reasoning Pollak provided was entirely local: without concessions, the company risked
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collapse, resulting in loss of jobs.91 However, earlier that year, Pollak had attempted to
convince the British to raise the tariff on imported cement to protect Nesher’s product
using a more “imperial” argument. Unlike imported European cement, Pollak contended,
Nesher’s production would rely solely on British coal, thus contributing to the Metropole.
When authorities formed a committee to discuss the tariff on cement in May 1926, Pollak
again justified protection not only because the firm employed “250 Jewish workers and
100 Arab workers,” but also because it provided a living for “about 200 English workers
in coal mining and transport. [And] England is now in dire need of exporting coal.”92
The decision to employ Palestinians in the company’s quarry, despite the protests
of the advocates of Hebrew labor, which Chapter 2 discusses in detail, was in line both
with economic considerations, given the wage discrimination between Arabs and Jews,
and with the ongoing prevalence of ideas regarding the suitability of certain bodies for
certain forms of labor and materials. Yet Pollak’s outward reasoning also brought
together political expediency and economy, demonstrating attention to British and
regional sensitivities and to the struggle over cement’s identity. The employment of
Arabs, he argued, was intended to prevent accusations by consumers in Palestine and
beyond that Nesher’s cement was “Jewish.” Furthermore, a company registered in
England should rightly employ both peoples.93 Whether or not Pollak’s reasoning was
genuine, Norris notes that for the British, the makeup of Nesher’s workforce was a
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decisive factor in directing the Haifa harbor’s construction – the largest construction
project in Palestine until that point – to utilize Nesher’s cement.94

Cement: To End Colonial Domination
Despite the profound differences between a settler movement and an indigenous one, the
objective of “building the land” in a material sense and as part of a national project – for
so long perceived as a uniquely Zionist project and concern – was also shared by
Palestinians. Palestinian capitalists, builders, and others took note of cement’s growing
popularity. By the late 1920s, they began to see the material not only as an economic
opportunity, but potentially an important factor in economic and national emancipation.
Discussions about Palestinian access to cement, the prospects of “Arab cement,” and
Nesher’s stranglehold over the local market emerged alongside increased attention to the
act of building itself. Throughout the 1930s and 1940s, the Palestinian press frequently
covered the “movement of construction” (ḥarakat al-bina’) in various Palestinian cities,
reported on the changing costs of construction materials and labor, featured articles about
construction methods and the economics of construction, and closely followed
governmental building schemes, the availability of housing, and the granting of building
permits.95
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The records and correspondence of Palestine’s Chambers of Commerce and the
contemporary Arabic press prove key sources for unearthing Palestinian visions of
national futures. These sources further reveal the centrality of construction, and in
particular of cement – a material which became identified with modernity and national
liberation – to these visions. The chambers, as an increasingly important hub for the
activities of Palestine’s “men of capital,”96 were often closely involved in initiatives to
introduce “Arab cement” into the Palestinian market, either through regional cooperation
or through local manufacture.
The press, meanwhile, served as a platform for highlighting cement’s centrality,
benefits, and emancipatory potential. Newspapers also placed Nesher at the center of
their critiques of British protection of Jewish industry and sought to encourage
alternatives. Opposition to the government’s preferential treatment of Nesher seems to
have emerged forcefully toward the end of 1929. Nesher’s success after initial
difficulties, the sharpening contours of conflict in the wake of the violent clashes of
summer 1929, and the British decision (succumbing to Nesher’s pressures) to raise the
tariff on imported cement to 850 mils per ton all likely played a role in the timing.
Furthermore, the establishment of the Syrian National Cement Manufacturing Company
in Damascus in early 1930 meant that there was now a self-styled Arab national
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alternative to Nesher, and the Syrian company’s founders specifically courted Palestinian
investors through the press.97
Perhaps unsurprisingly, given the emphasis on cement and concrete as decidedly
“scientific” materials at the time, one of the earliest written responses to this call for
Palestinian investors was a two-part article describing the benefits of cement “from the
chemical perspective.”98 Its author, Majdi al-Shawa (1899-1979), a Gazan doctor of
chemistry, specifically stated his objective was not to comment on whether Palestinians
should invest in the Damascene firm, since “all were convinced of the necessity of
cooperating in and assisting the national economy.” Rather, he provided readers with a
history of cement’s evolution, Portland cement’s invention, the differences between
natural and industrial cements, and between non-hydraulic and hydraulic cements. The
article’s second installment discussed the benefits of cement in the face of structural
threats, focusing on earthquakes and drawing on examples from concrete construction in
Japan – no doubt a pertinent focus given the disastrous impact of the 1927 earthquake
still fresh in the local memory. Despite his initial claim not to opine on investing in the
Syrian factory, al-Shawa concluded this second part by clarifying that initiatives like the
Arab cement factory were crucial for the Arab lands’ economic independence, and that its
founders sought no less than to end colonial domination.
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Al-Shawa’s writing stands out among other contemporary discussions of cement
in its materials science approach. However, the tone of much of the discourse,
particularly among those Palestinians calling for tariff reform and the end of preference
for Jewish industry, was often framed as scientific in a different fashion: it was anchored
in economic calculations. In December 1929, Mir’at al-Sharq estimated that the tariff on
imported cement cost Palestine’s government fifty-two thousand pounds a year,
accounting for the customs lost on imports, the losses of shipping, and of porterage
income at the ports.99 In February 1930, the prominent Palestinian accountant Fu’ad Saba
(1902-1984) sent the acting chief secretary of the Mandate administration an evaluation
of the government’s cement tariff policy in light of Nesher’s 1927 and 1928 financial
reports. Saba concluded that given Nesher’s already “very fair return” in 1928 there was
no justification for the 1929 tariff increase. Saba’s evaluation, of which his firm kept a
copy in a folder titled “Government Neglect of Arab Industry” (ihmal al-ḥukuma lilṣina‘a al-‘Arabiyya), included calculations that demonstrated that Nesher’s “heavy
protection” was not economically viable, but rather part of a pattern of neglect and
preference, accorded to Arab and Jewish industries respectively.100
The press continued to follow the progress of the Damascus factory, and to
critique the tariff policy on cement during the period from 1930 to 1931.101 In one article,
a “prominent” Haifa merchant told Filastin that the degree of Nesher’s “tyranny” could
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be revealed by posing different questions: instead of asking why European cement is so
expensive in Palestine, the merchant suggested, one should ask how Nesher could sell its
own cement in Syria at a lower price than in Palestine, despite additional transportation
costs. The tariffs, in the merchant’s view, encouraged precisely this sort of behavior,
since they meant that Palestinian consumers had little alternative to Nesher. To combat
this, he continued, the Arab Executive and the other national bodies should demand the
government force Nesher to sell its produce in Palestine at the same prices as in Syria.
Failing this, the alternative was simple – the same national bodies should call for the
establishment of a national cement corporation. Supporters and investors were sure to
approach immediately, since cement “was a necessary material, and the profit in it was
without doubt.” He added, “Palestine’s people have had their fill of meetings and
statements, it is time for action.”102
Perhaps here the idea of a Palestinian Arab national cement factory was born. By
early 1935, reports appeared of Arab and Jewish initiatives to compete with Nesher. The
coincidence of initiatives by “a group of people from Bayt Jala who had recently returned
from America” to establish a cement factory in the Nablus area, and a Jewish
entrepreneur who established a company named the Shimshon Cement Company in the
‘Artuf area west of Jerusalem, indicates that it was likely the economic boom of 1934–35
was motivating both.103 The Bayt Jala initiative seems to have dissipated quickly.
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Shimshon would remain in a perpetual state of commencing operations “shortly” for two
decades.104
For Palestinian consumers, the 1936 general strike seems to have made appeals to
products’ “Arabness” particularly attractive and concerns that products were secretly
benefitting Jewish investors graver. Two articles from al-Difa‘ and an advertisement for
Syrian cement, all published in January 1937, demonstrate this. The first al-Difa‘ article
discusses the rising enthusiasm of Arab consumers for Arab goods and its impact on
Nesher, whose sales were increasingly threatened by the Syrian National Cement factory
in Damascus and the Chekka factory near Tripoli.105 In the second article, the same
Chekka factory responded to rumors that the company was owned by Jewish investors by
affirming that Chekka was a pure (ṣarifa) Arab company, its cement made by Arab hands
(maṣnu‘a bi-ayadi ‘Arabiyya), and that among its five hundred workers and its
shareholders “there is not a single Jew.” In an advertisement in Filastin, Chekka’s
Damascene competitor used similar language, stating that the company’s cement was
made “entirely by Arab hands” and of “good Arab soil,” and that all company shares
were owned by Arabs. Ownership of capital, the laboring bodies involved in production,
and the soil from which the cement was made all played a role in defining it as properly
Arab.106
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Also in early 1937, the first Palestinian Arab initiative to gain considerable
momentum toward establishing a cement factory took shape. This plan likely sought to
capture some of the revolt’s energy, but it was the revolt that would ultimately undo it.107
A group of prominent Palestinian capitalists, including Ahmad Hilmi Pasha (1883-1963)
of the Arab Bank and later the Arab National Bank, Hajj ‘Abd al-Rahim al-Tamimi,
Fakhri al-Nashashibi (1899-1941), Elias Gelat, and George Khader led the initiative.
Having struck a partnership with the German MIAG firm, the new company began
conducting scientific surveys of suitable sites in the Nablus, Jerusalem, and Haifa areas,
eventually settling on a site near ‘Artuf – where the Shimshon company had also planned
its location. However, the arrest and exile of Ahmad Hilmi and others during the revolt
put an end to the project, and all its documentation was lost when Fakhri al-Nashashibi
was murdered in Iraq in 1941.108

The Binds of War
The severe economic downturn in the latter part of the revolt seems to have stymied
Palestinian initiatives, while the Histadrut took advantage of these circumstances to gain
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a foothold in Nesher’s quarry. The quarry’s Arab workers were pushed out completely in
1938 by David Hacohen of Solel Boneh, the Histadrut’s contracting firm, who two years
prior had replaced Musbah Shaqifi – the contractor who operated the quarry since its
establishment.109 If British enthusiasm toward Nesher’s product was, initially at least, due
in part to its employment of both Jews and Arabs, the revolt and the eruption of World
War II changed British calculations dramatically. As safe shipping routes became fewer
and other regions in the empire consumed their local cement production entirely, the
British became dependent on Nesher.
During World War II, Palestine was transformed into Britain’s second-largest
military base in the Middle East, generating unprecedented demand for materials,
produce and goods.110 Palestine’s manufacturing industry grew rapidly, mainly to satisfy
British military demands, and unemployment was considerably reduced.111 At the same
time, severe inflation dramatically curtailed the purchasing power of Palestine’s
inhabitants. To combat this and to assure sufficient supplies for the military stationed in
Palestine and beyond, authorities installed an austerity regime, with price control and
rationing measures on manufactured goods and produce. This regime failed to prevent
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scarcity, however – in goods from foodstuffs to building materials, and cement in
particular.112
The war also spurred immense government construction, and Nesher became the
exclusive source of cement for British military needs in Palestine. Between 1942 and
1943, it sold 80 percent of its cement to British forces, and throughout the war the
government was required to approve all civilian purchases.113 Dependency spawned
intense government cooperation and coordination with Nesher. This included instituting
monthly coordination visits at the factory, setting production quotas, intervening on
Nesher’s behalf with suppliers of oil and coal in order to meet quotas, and having
Nesher’s representatives advise the general headquarters in Egypt.114 The war proved
immensely profitable for Nesher, even though cement was throughout a controlled
material, its price fixed and its civilian use prohibited, generating a severe housing
shortage.115
Many Palestinians felt that Nesher, like other large Jewish-owned firms, was
profiteering, granting preference to Jewish needs, and neglecting and exploiting
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Palestine’s Arab population.116 Furthermore, the war had cut off Palestinians from
neighboring countries, circumscribing the regional visions that animated earlier calls to
turn to Syrian cement instead.117 Limited by British wartime control policies, the Arab
Chambers of Commerce requested that the government either allocate some of Nesher’s
product for civilian needs, drastically reduce the tariff, or allow import from neighboring
countries once again.
As the war in Europe ended, Nesher’s workers embarked on a lengthy strike,
protesting the prices they paid while the company profited. In November 1945, after
several months of negotiations and deliberations, Pollak sold the company to the shared
ownership of Solel Boneh, and a coalition of industrialists and contractors organized as
the Central Palestine Company for Trade and Investment.118 The 50–50 split between the
trade union’s contracting firm and private capitalists was framed as an ideological
decision.119 For Palestinians, it meant that what little claim Nesher ever had to having
been a disinterested party was now completely gone. Under the joint ownership of Zionist
workers and contractors, the newspaper al-Sha‘b stated, the company had become
entirely subservient to the conquest of labor and colonization.120
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The war’s end brought little economic respite. The housing shortage, which
resulted in immense crowding and even plague, continued.121 The cement shortage itself,
according to British sources, lasted until December 1947, when Nesher’s production
finally began catching up with post-war reconstruction.122 Throughout, and despite
countless appeals, the government maintained the 850 mills tariff on imports.123 The
urgent need for construction, Nesher’s inability to produce sufficient cement to satisfy
demand, and the continued sense that the company and its agents were actively granting
preference to Jewish needs, led to what became known in the Arabic press as the “cement
crisis” (azmat al-asmant).124

“It Is Impossible for a Company to Possess Race”
Out of this crisis emerged the Arab Cement Works (ACW). According to a memorandum
by the Jerusalem Chamber of Commerce, the cement works grew out of two competing
initiatives. The first was centered in Nablus and led by ‘Abd al-Rahim al-Tamimi, who
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had also been involved in the 1937 initiative. The other was headed by ‘Abd al-Hamid
Shoman (1888-1974) of the Arab Bank. Realizing that “the Nablus scheme” was
progressing rapidly, Shoman threw his support (but not his finances, the memorandum
states) behind Tamimi’s initiative, and the ACW was incorporated in Palestine on June
22, 1945.125 Even before official incorporation, Filastin had written of “peak enthusiasm”
(ḥamasa yablugh al-dhurwa) among investors for the initiative, which received the
support of both of Palestine’s Arab banks, and al-Difa‘ had reported that the project was
garnering interest in Transjordan as well.126

Fig 1.1 Arab Cement Works certificate of shares, ‘Innaba, 1946, Birzeit University Research Center.
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During the first year of its operation, the company appointed a board and auditors,
reached an agreement with a machinery manufacturer to supply all necessary equipment,
and selected land for purchase. In purchasing machinery, the ACW initially pursued a
strategy not dissimilar to Michael Pollak’s in Nesher’s early days. It began negotiations
with the British-Danish FL Smidth company, due to ACW’s “initial desire to give
priority to British Manufacturers.” Smidth’s supply schedule proved slow, however,
prohibiting even partial fulfilment in the 26-month period ACW had set for beginning
production. In a letter to the Controller of Heavy Industries (CHI), the company
explained that despite their preference for British machinery, they were forced to sign an
agreement with the U.S. Kennedy company. Given Palestine’s urgent need for cement,
the speedy launch of operations was a priority. At this stage, all that stood in the ACW’s
way appeared to be an import license for the machinery and the release of U.S. currency
to fund the purchase. The company applied to the CHI for both on October 31, 1946 and
began searching for a director and an office near al-Ramla.127 By late spring 1947, those
who followed the ACW’s progress in the press had reason to be optimistic. On May 28,
Filastin reported that “after mighty efforts” the company had secured an import license
for the machinery and the U.S. currency to pay for it. With this news, the value of the
company’s shares rose.128 Sixteen years since a Palestinian national cement factory was
first suggested, and after a series of unrealized initiatives over the previous decade, this
“great national economic project” seemed to finally be getting off the ground.

127
128

“The Palestine Arab Cement Scheme,” December 4, 1946.
Filastin, May 28, 1947.

64
Behind the scenes, however, it was the ground that was the problem. In December
1946, the Jerusalem Chamber of Commerce reported that the ACW had purchased plots
of land between ‘Innaba and Jimzu in al-Ramla district, after “experts from the Hilwan
Cement Works of Egypt” examined the soil and recommended its suitability.129 A
January 1947 letter from ‘Abd al-Rahim al-Tamimi to the High Commissioner reveals
that the purchase of the lands was done “in trust” by “some members of the Board of
Directors as a temporary measure.” Tamimi explained that the administrator general had
responded positively to the ACW’s request to purchase the lands in its name according to
the Companies Ordinances of 1929/39.
Difficulties arose when the ACW applied to register them with the Registrar of
Lands.130 Ya‘qub ‘Atalla of the Registrar of Lands had confirmed that the company was
eligible to purchase the lands in accordance with the Companies Ordinances. Under the
Land Transfer Regulations of 1940, however, “the transfer of any land from a Palestinian
Arab to a non-Palestinian person in Area A is forbidden.” Since race was one of the
“assumed qualifications” (al-quyud al-mafruḍa) of the regulations, it was these, not the
Companies Ordinances, that prohibited the ACW from registering the lands. Regardless
of the owners of the company, ‘Atalla explained, “It is impossible for a company to
possess race” (la yumkin li-sharika an taktasib al-jinsiyya).131 It is important to note that
the translation of jinsiyya as “race” is not an obvious one. The term was most frequently
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used to refer to nationality, but could interchangeably describe race, ethnicity, sexuality,
and even tribal affiliation in certain contexts. However, as will become evident below, in
the case of the AWC, the potential ambiguity of the Arabic term is amply clarified by
how other British officials discussed the regulations.132
The registrar’s reasoning, upheld by the high commissioner on two separate
occasions, raises multiple issues. First, it seems to run counter to the purpose of the 1940
Land Transfer Regulations. The British had presented these regulations, put into place
following the publication of the 1939 White Paper in the context of the 1936–39 revolt,
as a measure to protect the Palestinian population from the increasing threat of
landlessness. That is, restrictions on the transfer of lands from Palestinian Arabs to
“anyone other than a Palestinian Arab” – understood to mean Zionist settlers, first and
foremost – was intended to ensure that “‘the rights and position’ of the Arab population
be duly preserved.” In certain areas (referred to as “Zone A” in the regulations, and
including the area between ‘Inabba and Jimzu where the ACW had conducted surveys
and where its board members had purchased lands in trust), Palestinians’ rights were
accounted the strictest protections and the transfer of land therein would be prohibited
“save in exceptional cases.”133
The registrar had correctly anticipated that the ACW would claim that the fact
that it was “100% per cent Arab in Capital and in Membership,” should suffice to exclude
the company from being considered “non-Arab.” When the ACW appealed, the office of
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the acting secretary general suggested that the company apply for consideration again
through the district commissioner.134 Although the company’s second application is
missing from the file found at the Israel State Archives, the July 1947 response from the
office of the general secretary states once again that a company is “not a ‘Palestinian
Arab’” within the definitions of the Land Transfer Regulations. The High Commissioner,
it adds, rejected the application since he “has no power to grant permission for the
transfer.”135
The Mandate administration’s reasoning – that “it is impossible for a company to
possess race” – further raises questions about the scope of corporate personhood and the
applicability of race as a category in the Palestinian context. If the legal notion that
corporations are persons, widely accepted in British law by the second decade of the
twentieth century and enshrined in the 1922 Palestine Order in Council, still makes us
somewhat uneasy, then the very question of whether a corporation can possess “race” can
seem altogether dumbfounding.136 In the United States, race has been intricately linked to
the legal history of corporate personhood. These links began with Dred Scott v. Sandford
(1857) and extend through the long history of corporations basing claims to legal rights
on the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution – introduced during
Reconstruction, partially as a corrective to the Dred Scott decision, to ensure the
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citizenship rights of freed black American slaves.137 In the British Empire, however, such
links appear to have been less pivotal, or at the very least have been less well documented
and researched.138
In Palestine, links between race and corporate personhood seem to have first
arisen directly in relation to the Land Transfer Regulations. The regulations mention
companies only in their capacity as potential mortgage holders. However, Amendment
16D to the Palestine Order in Council, put forward on May 25, 1939 to facilitate the Land
Transfer Regulations, introduced the category of “bodies of persons corporate or
unincorporated” as separate from the categories of Arab and Jew.139 This in itself hardly
suffices to interpret race as the operative category here. Shira Robinson has rightfully
noted the “slippery boundaries” that existed between race, culture, nation, and people in
international law, within the Mandate system, and in British Mandate Palestine
specifically.140
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Yet the Land Transfer Regulations appear to have inspired British officials to
employ systematic racial thinking. In May 1940, roughly three months after the
publication of the Regulations, the British chief secretary issued directions for the
submission of land transfer applications, noting that for each “transferee and transferor
[in each application] should be included race, nationality and where habitually
residing.”141 The inclusion of race as a category quickly spurred questions and doubts as
to how British officials should classify different Palestinians racially in this context.
Within months, the director of land registration for Jerusalem and the district
commissioners of Jerusalem and Haifa raised questions of whether Palestinian Druze and
Palestinian Armenians should be considered Palestinian Arabs under the regulations. The
chief secretary opined that “Druzes are Arabs who profess the Durzi creed. [Therefore] I
think that a Palestinian Durzi is a Palestinian Arab in the sense of the . . . Land Transfer
Regulations.” Regarding a potential Armenian transferee, the chief secretary decidedly
stated that, “[h]e may be regarded as ordinarily resident in Palestine; but he is not an
Arab. Ethnologically he belongs to the Aryan race.” The regulations seemed to have
awoken the inner race-scientist in some.142

141

Chief Secretary to Assistant District Commissioners, May 30, 1940, ISA-MandatoryOrganizationsSecretaryLand-000mppd.
142
ISA-MandatoryOrganizations-SecretaryLand-000mppd: Jerusalem District Director of Land
Registration to Chief Secretary, August 24, 1940; Haifa District Commissioner to Chief Secretary,
September 14, 1940; Jerusalem District Commissioner to Chief Secretary, October 5, 1940; C.S.O. Minute
Paper, September 27, 1940, and October 15, 1940. A later case saw the Director of Land Registration issue
a detailed explanation of the racial and social standing of Circassian Palestinians. Responding to an inquiry
from the chief secretary regarding a potential Circassian transferee, the director stated that Circassians
“may be said to form part of the Arab community.” However, in terms of race he found that he was “able to
discover very little regarding the origin of the Circassians . . . One theory connects them with the Goths.”
He then concluded that “the Circassian communities are undoubtedly an established and accepted part of
the population, but on the other hand they are racially entirely foreign to the Arabs.” Director of Land
Transfer to Chief Secretary, “Land Transfer Regulations 1940. Circassians,” February 18, 1948, ISAMandatoryOrganizations-SecretaryLand-000mtyn.

69
By the time the problem of determining the race of corporations arose several
years later, the idea that the terms Arab and Jew in the regulations were first and foremost
racial categories was firmly ingrained. In a March 1945 letter seeking legal advice
regarding the regulations’ application to companies, the director of land registration
expressed his understanding that “the fundamental principles of the Regulations are based
on race and residence and whilst a company may enjoy the latter, the former does not
reside in it.” Several months later, the acting chief secretary affirmed the legal opinion of
the attorney general, without mentioning race specifically. Rather, he returned to the
distinctions made in Amendment 16D to the Palestine Order in Council between Arabs,
Jews, and “bodies of people corporate or unincorporate [sic].” The attorney general
explained that
having regard to the express reference in Article 16D to bodies corporate, it
seems to me that the words “Arab” and “Jew” therein, do not include
corporations. “Person” is nowhere mentioned in the article (except as “bodies of
persons”) and accordingly one cannot introduce the definition of the word person,
in conjunction with the word “Arab.”143

This legal opinion shaped the application of the regulations for the remainder of the
Mandate.
British approaches to the Land Transfer Regulations’ application to companies
were not limited to legalistic argumentation regarding corporate personhood or ideas
about race. There were those among the British authorities who argued that companies be
excluded from the regulations to better fulfill the “spirit of the White Paper” – that is, to
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safeguard the Palestinian peasants (fallaḥin) in danger of becoming landless against
potential Zionist attempts to subvert the regulations. In November 1945, the Land
Transfer Inquiry Committee, appointed earlier that year to investigate alleged
contraventions of the regulations and make recommendations regarding their
implementation, issued its final report. Among other issues, the report addressed
proposals to exclude Arab companies from the ruling that no company is a Palestinian
Arab. The committee argued against such an exclusion, “since a nominal Arab company
might in reality be controlled, either in the present or in the future, by Jews.”144 In the
same breath it recognized that, “under the present ruling the development of legitimate
Arab companies is frustrated by inability to acquire necessary land.” Accordingly, they
recommended the exclusion be temporary, to be removed following “the provision of
adequate safeguards.” The fate of the Arab Cement Works demonstrates that no such
safeguards were ever put in place.
An article which appeared in Filastin on 28 March 1948, when war was already
raging in the land, described the ACW’s annual company meeting held in Nablus the
morning before. The company, at least as a business entity, seemed to have survived the
registrar’s decision. However, the article made no mention of machinery en route from
America, nor of the progress of the company’s plant construction. The registrar’s
decision was likely a death blow, the last in a series of events which over fifteen years
stymied any Palestinian attempts to challenge Nesher’s monopoly. Whether the logic
behind the registrar’s decision was that of limiting corporate personhood, as Ya‘qub
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‘Atalla’s original letter implied, or of upholding the spirit of the White Paper, against the
specter of “nominally Arab companies” potentially “controlled by Jews,” the results were
the same. The very measures designed to protect Palestinian land rights were turned
against a venture that, for nearly two decades, many Palestinians saw as crucial to their
ability to build their futures.145

A Mournful Commodity
In late February 1941, Palestinian capitalist Emile Boutagy wrote heartfelt letters to five
of the most powerful British officials in Palestine. All five letters dealt with the abrupt
cancellation of an import license for one thousand tons of cement from Syria, obtained by
two businessmen, Malas and Budayr. More striking than the details of the transaction’s
cancellation, whose reversal Boutagy sought, it is the language Boutagy used to write
about cement. The letters offer variations on the same theme: because Nesher’s produce
was entirely consumed by the war effort and importing cement from overseas was
impossible, cement had become in Boutagy’s words, “a matter of life and death,” which
“would be a God send for those hungering for [it].” It was, after all, a material which “no
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country in the world can exist without.”146 Boutagy’s writing was often flowery and
dramatic, even when arguing for the necessity of gramophone records to lift up British
troops’ morale during the war, or of original Kiwi shoe polish as opposed to “monstrous
imitations.”147 None of Boutagy’s writing elsewhere, however, matches the existential
tone of his writing about the cement shortage. In a more informal letter to George As‘ad
Khader, secretary of the Arab Chamber of Commerce in Jerusalem (figure 1.2), Boutagy
wrote of the British decision to cancel the import license: “These people are really
committing suicide.”

Fig. 2.2. Letter of Emile Boutagy to George As‘ad Khader, February 28, 1942, Israel State Archives.
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Boutagy was not alone in equating the ability to build – and specifically to build
in cement – and the preservation of life itself. The discourse of the “cement crisis” after
World War II also was rife with portrayals of cement as a provider of jobs and shelter, as
a commodity linked to “the welfare of the country,” the supply of which was part of
“safeguarding the rights of the public.”148 An “incessant flow of appeals and grievances”
led the Haifa Chamber of Commerce, for example, to write to the British chief secretary
of the crisis having “detrimental bearing on the vital nourishment of building projects.”
Cement, more than any other material, became synonymous with the capacity and
necessity to build in order to survive.
Although the press and the chambers of commerce may be seen as stirring up
emotions for the benefit of commercial interests, there is some evidence that the link
between building materials and the capacity to build held similar emotional significance
for others as well. In 1942, for example, Sitt Amina al-Khalidi, left an endowment (waqf)
for the establishment of a new hospital in Jerusalem’s Shaykh Jarrah neighborhood. That
summer, the executors of Khalidi’s will appealed to the British to approve the hospital’s
location and release the necessary building materials for its construction. Progress on the
location seemed to be made quickly, but Khalidi’s trustees apparently sensed that the
issue of building materials might require additional pressure.149 Thus, in mid-November,
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a coordinated series of petitions with over three hundred signatories were sent from
multiple locations in Palestine to the high commissioner, to pressure the government to
release the materials necessary for construction. While some of the petitions requested
the British to facilitate the construction of the hospital more broadly, others explicitly
referred to the release of building materials. Many of the telegrams used distinctly
emotional, even heartrending appeals. They described the facilitation of the hospital’s
construction – that is, the release of building materials – “as a measure of reducing the
tortures of which humanity is suffering,” “a contribution toward the alleviation of the
sufferings of the poor,” and “a measure of service to humanity.”150 The capacity to
construct, reduced to access to building materials, meant the world.
The multiple facets of cement’s history endowed the seemingly drab material with
emotional resonance.151 Within the discourse of Hebrew building expertise in cement and
concrete, Palestinian structures made of these materials were always ready to collapse,
their disintegration inevitable and imminent. The ideal materials for building the Jewish
homeland anew were imagined as somehow beyond the grasp of Palestinians. Of course,
from the point of view of skill, of capacity, of initiative, they never were. Yet, the Yishuv
garnered advantages elsewhere. The political and economic order that developed during
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the Mandate, solidifying Nesher as a monopoly, seemed to withstand any challenge
thrown its way. Time and again, British interests appeared to coalesce with those of the
company. What Palestinians lacked during the Mandate then was neither expertise nor
skill; rather, empire and its racialized legal structures, not labor, ended up structuring the
political economy of cement.
At the same time, these very materials became intertwined not only with visions
of the national future cultivated by economic and cultural elites, but more importantly,
with tangible, concrete needs. The prolonged “cement crisis” transformed cement’s
absence into something that was felt by countless Palestinians daily. As the notion of
crisis circulated, cement, more than any other building material, became an object of
desire and longing – the key to the capacity to build and to live. It was, as Ivan LloydPhillips from the Gaza district commissioner’s office put it, “a mournful commodity.”152
These configurations did not suddenly cease to exist with the catastrophe of 1948.
Dreams and nightmares of cement and concrete continued to haunt Palestinians well
beyond the Nakba, taking different yet eerily familiar forms.153 Seemingly defying their
own physical properties, cement and concrete traveled alongside those who were forced
to leave and sat heavy on those who remained, somehow always maintaining a fleeting
sense of promise, echoed in 2014, with a bitter smile, by Gazan artist Islam Ayoub: “Oh,
cement, oh, beloved/you are always on my mind.”154
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CHAPTER 2: WHERE I END AND YOU BEGIN: ARABS,
JEWS, AND MACHINES IN MANDATE
PALESTINE'S STONE QUARRIES

For a brief period in the summer of 1931, the city of Haifa was abuzz with conversation
of a mysterious photograph, the provenance and nature of which were unclear. The first
to report on the photograph was the leading Palestinian Arabic daily, Filastin. On Friday,
August 21st, 1931, the newspaper’s “Haifa Dispatch” included a story titled “Machine
Gun or Rock-Breaking Machine” (Arshash am Makinat Taksir Hijara), which reported
that the people of Haifa were exchanging rumors (yatadawal al-nas fi Haifa ḥadith) of a
photograph of ten Jewish men training to use a machine gun.155
Following some investigation, the article states, Filastin’s reporter was able to
trace the photograph back to Rashid al-Hajj Ibrahim (1889-1953), a leading Haifa
businessman. Ibrahim, a member of Palestine’s class of “men of capital,” told the reporter
that he had indeed received the photograph, but that it had been seized by the police.156
The reporter, following what he “saw as [his] journalistic duty” (min wajibi al-ṣuḥufi),
then went to inquire with Haifa’s Deputy Chief of Police on the matter. The Deputy
reassured the reporter that he himself had looked into the photo, and that it in fact
depicted not Jewish men training to fire a machine gun, but working at the Athlit quarry –
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a government quarry just south of Haifa, which supplied stone for the ongoing
construction of the Haifa deep-water harbor. What people were saying was a machine
gun, the Deputy noted, was in fact a machine for breaking rocks. Nonetheless, the Deputy
Chief promised Filastin’s reporter that he would go to the quarry the following day and
photograph the people and the machine from the original. He would then provide the
newspaper with both the original and the new photograph for comparison.157
The rumors surrounding this mysterious photograph – the focus of this chapter’s
first section – accompanied a broader controversy regarding firearms which the British
authorities provided to Jewish settlements in the wake of the bloody events of summer
1929.158 It was therefore reasonable to conclude as the British did, that the matter could
be laid to rest simply by convincing the public that what the photographs depicted was a
drilling machine, not a machine gun. That is, to assume that for the Palestinian public, the
fear of armed Jewish settlers was all that was at stake. However, in this chapter, I argue
that the controversy and confusion as to the nature of the objects portrayed in these
photographs can be explained not merely by a similarity in physical form - the fact that
certain machine guns of the period and certain drilling apparatuses could appear similar
to the lay public. By placing the two instruments alongside one another, this controversy
calls attention to how such drilling apparatuses, while by no means commensurate with
machine guns, did become tools in the gradual, long-term processes of Palestinian
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replacement and displacement from labor and land. That is, quarry drills, jackhammers,
compressors, and other such instruments, allowed Zionist settlers and institutions to enact
the sort of “unspectacular” processes, which Rob Nixon has called, “slow violence.” At
the same time, it is important to note that the “weaponization” of the quarry extended to
more directly observable and immediate forms of violence as well, adding yet another
layer to the “confusion” between which the machine gun or rock-breaking machine
controversy. As early as the first decade of British rule, more militant Zionists quickly
found that quarries – by virtue of the labor processes and materials they involved – were
ideal settings for weapons training and explosive manufacture. There, loud explosions
were par for the course, providing an aural cover for weapons training, while the
explosives themselves could be repurposed for military uses.159
In Palestine’s quarries, British racial ideologies intersected with differences in skill
and productivity, the economic logic of “Hebrew labor” and the racialized concept of a
differential “standard of living” for Arabs and (European) Jews. As a result, machinery and
mechanization processes became a necessary ally in the Zionist “conquest of stone” (kibush
ha-even). Jackhammers, drills, excavators, and other machines became the means with
which Jewish workers could “infiltrate” the stone industry. They allowed Jewish workers
to displace Palestinian ones by overcoming what was, at times begrudgingly, conceived of
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as the formers’ physical deficiency in comparison to the latter, as well as “pure” economic
considerations such as productivity and profitability.
The chapter’s first section follows Filastin’s investigations into the mysterious
photograph, the British reactions to the affair, and the regional, and even global,
circulation of multiple images claiming to truthfully represent what the original
photograph had captured. It places the photographic affair in the context of the “armory
scare” of the summer of 1931, regional interest in the intensifying frictions between Jews
and Arabs in Palestine, and the emergence of Palestinian mass party-politics. The
chapter’s second section uses the construction of the Haifa deep-water harbor and its
Athlit Quarry as entry-points to examine the racializing and anti-racist discourses about
bodily, intellectual, and cultural capacities and needs of workers which emerged under
the British Mandate. It demonstrates that historical actors articulated both the
justifications for a racialized division of labor and opposition to it in terms drawn from
global and imperial discourses about race, whiteness, and racial subjugation.
The two sections which follow examine how individuals who took part in the
Zionist conquest of stone discussed quarrying work and the quarrying industry, both in
contemporary debates as well as in their memoirs. I ask how the Zionist project of
national regeneration of land and self, founded in part upon the idea of recovering the
relationship between Jewish bodies and the Jewish homeland, took shape in an industry
which proved particularly difficult to “conquer.” In Palestine’s stone quarries, I argue, the
processes of refashioning the land and the self – which Zionist thinkers frequently
envisioned as driven by unmediated desire and connection between the two – in fact
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rested upon material and cultural mediators: the Palestinian quarrier, and quarrying
machinery.
During the mandate, the stone industry had no Jewish success stories like that of
the Nesher Cement Factory. Beginning in the early 1920s, Zionist attempts at the
conquest of stone frequently took the form of apprenticeship under Palestinian, and at
times, Mizrahi masters. The chapter’s third section studies Jewish quarriers’ dependence
on Palestinian expertise. It demonstrates that Zionist imitation of indigenous Palestinian
practices extended beyond self-Orientalizing aesthetic practices, with which it is most
associated. In the stone quarry, among other places, both the creation of the “new Jew”
and the regeneration of the Jewish homeland depended on the appropriation of
Palestinian skills, knowledge, sensibilities, and bodies.
The fourth section shows how machinery emerged as a primary weapon in what
was, at its core, a struggle to replace and displace Palestinian quarry labor. The adoption
of mechanization as part of an economic discourse of efficiency and productivity aligned
Zionist institutions’ strategies with racial and colonial divisions of labor which the
ideology of labor Zionism ostensibly rejected. Finally, this section juxtaposes this
embrace of mechanization with an article on the very same question published in 1935 in
the Palestinian economic journal, al-’Iqtisadiyyat al-Arabiyya. The article’s author,
Edward F. Nickoley, discusses the relationship between labor power and mechanization
throughout “the Near East.” However, read in the Palestinian context and on the
backdrop of Zionism’s increasing embrace of mechanization as a means of “slow
violence,” Nickoley’s article reveals an alternative approach to the relationship between

81
machinery and labor: one which regards displacement and replacement as threat rather
than promise.

Machine Gun or Rock-Breaking Machine?
The headline, “Machine Gun or Rock-Breaking Machine” made its second appearance in
the pages of Filastin on Tuesday, August 25th, four days after the first story. The
newspaper’s Haifa correspondent notified readers that in the interim, he had visited the
Deputy Chief of Police again as agreed. During the visit, the Deputy presented the
reporter with the original photograph which had inspired the rumors, alongside a second
one which he had taken during his visit to the quarry, allowing the reporter to examine
both photos side by side. Unfortunately, the reporter’s conclusions from the comparison
were somewhat equivocal. The machine in the second photograph appeared to him larger
than that appearing in the first. The photograph portrayed only five men, and not ten. He
did, however, identify the five as being among those who appeared in the original.160
Despite his prior agreement with the Deputy Chief, the reporter’s attempts to
receive copies of both photographs so that they could be published in Filastin presumably to allow readers to judge for themselves - came to naught. Still not altogether
convinced, the reporter admitted to his readers that he knew little about either machine
guns or quarrying drills. Therefore, he writes, he arranged for an acquaintance, ‘Izzat Bey
al-Qassem, a former officer in the Ottoman army, to visit the Deputy Chief the following
day and examine the photographs for himself. Upon examination, the readers of Filastin
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are told, ‘Izzat Bey was more decisive in his conclusion: he declared the two photos to be
of the same machine, and that the machine itself was undoubtedly intended for rockbreaking.161
‘Izzat Bey’s conclusions seem to have convinced Filastin’s reporter, as the
newspaper ceased to question the British claims about the photograph in its reporting.
Convincing the wider public, however, proved more difficult. The British authorities,
likely eager to quell such rumors at a time when Palestinian Arab fears of the arming of
Palestine’s Jewish settlements were rampant, decided to address it publicly. On August
26th, a day after Filastin apparently put its inquiries to rest, an official government
communique addressing the matter appeared in multiple Arabic, Hebrew, and Englishlanguage newspapers:
In the course of an article which appeared recently in an Arabic newspaper the
Government was asked if it would publish the results of its enquiries on the
subject of a photograph which was found in Haifa on or about August 10, and
which was supposed to represent a cannon or machine-gun surrounded by a group
of Jewish men.
A copy of the photograph has been procured and it has been ascertained that the
photograph was taken at the Athlit Quarries, that the young men are members of a
party of quarry workers, and that the implement which has been mistaken for a
gun is a machine for drilling holes in the rock for quarrying purposes.162
Yet, despite the broadly circulated communique, “the machine gun myth,” as the
British eventually referred to it, quickly circulated beyond Palestine’s boundaries,
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subsequently also resurfacing within them. Within days of Filastin’s articles and the
British rebuttal, three regional newspapers, the Egyptian al-Ahram and al-Lata’if alMusawwara and the Lebanese al-Ahrar, reported of the affair. Their coverage, in turn,
featured a third iteration of photographic evidence, depicting not ten or five men as in the
previous photographs, but a single individual sitting in front of a machine the newspapers
thought similarly enigmatic.
Multiple Palestinian publications reported that the Mandate authorities attempted
to seize all copies of the newspapers featuring the new photograph.163 In a conversation
with Filastin, Major Partridge, the same Deputy Commander of the Haifa District Police,
explained the seizure, claiming that “the photograph published by al-Ahram and al-Ahrar
and the text written beneath it were written in an incendiary and misleading manner.”164
Filastin, for its part, unequivocally dismissed the new photograph as fraudulent. Its Haifa
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correspondent, who had led the initial reportage and investigation, stated that since in the
original photograph there were “ten young Jewish men around the instrument and not one
[as in the new photograph],” the image which the Egyptian and Lebanese newspapers
featured was “not the same photograph… and demands correction.”165
Upon examination, the captions accompanying the photograph (figs. 2.1 & 2.2),
which the Deputy Chief of Police had described as “incendiary and misleading,” seem to
have leaned more towards the latter, perhaps not even intentionally so. Rather, they
reflected and addressed the confusion and uncertainty which continued to surround the
whole affair. The longer caption, appearing alongside the copy sent to the PEC offices in
London and New York, describes the individual in the photograph as “said to be a Jew
sitting behind a machine-gun;” states that the original photograph had been given to the
Haifa Police by “those protesting against the arming of the Jews;” and narrates the British
denial and explanation in full. Moreover, the editors clarify that they “do not know if this
is the same photograph,” and accordingly present it “without commentary, leaving the
judgment of whether what it represents is a machine gun or a device (masura, lit. ‘pipe’)
for rock excavation, to the experts and specialists among the men of war and of
quarries.”166
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Fig. 2.1. Copy of photograph published in unspecified Arabic language newspaper. Box 24, Folder 2,
Palestine Economic Corporation Collection, Manuscripts and Archives Division, New York Public Library.

photographs, it is impossible to tell how similar or dissimilar this instrument was to the ones the British had
previously claimed to be a quarrying device. I thank Ciruce Movahedi-Lankarani for calling my attention to
the similarity between the instrument portrayed in Figure 3, and the Vickers machine gun. See: John Ellis,
The Social History of the Machine Gun (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986 [1975]), Ch. 5.
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Fig. 2.2. Frontpage of the Egyptian al-Ahram, August 27, 1931. The photograph appears at the top of the
page, under the headline Midfa‘ Mitraliyoz am Masura Naqr al-Ahjar [Mitrailleuse Gun or Stone Carving
Device (lit. “pipe”)]. The caption beneath dryly describes the Palestinian Arab and British claims regarding
what the photograph depicts.
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In the immediate background to the alarm the photographs raised were broader
Palestinian concerns about the threat of Mandate authorities arming Zionist settlers. Such
concerns, although not entirely new, had recently been sparked again in June of 1931. AlJami‘a al-‘Arabiyya, a Jerusalem-based newspaper identified with the political line of the
Mufti Hajj Amin al-Husayni and his supporters, reported that the British police were
training Jewish settlers in the Tulkarm area, northwest of Nablus, to fire machine guns.
Authorities’ attempts to appease the Palestinian public and media by explaining that the
arms provided were to be kept in sealed armories and for defense purposes only, as part
of the changes made to the Palestine police force in the aftermath of the violent clashes of
1929, were largely unsuccessful.167
Weldon C. Matthews shows that the revelation of the sealed armories became an
important rallying cry for Palestinian nationalists, particularly among those who later in
1932 founded the Istiqlal (Independence) Party, Palestine’s first mass-politics based
party. Activists, many of whom were from Nablus, organized two congresses there on
July 16 and 31 to discuss the armories, as well as subsequent protest strikes in Nablus and
other cities on August 15.168 Thus, when the pamphlet featuring the ten men and the
mysterious machine first appeared in Haifa on or around August 10, it fed into a fear
already shared by many. Rashid al-Hajj Ibrahim, who played a pivotal role in the
quarrying machine/machine gun controversy, was among the Istiqlal Party’s founders,
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and was closely tied to the campaign against the Jewish armories. The photograph and
the armory “scare,” it appears, were deeply intertwined.169

A Colonial Division of Labor: Race at the Haifa Harbor Works
As chapter one has shown, by the late 1920s Zionist popular and British official
discourses shared certain racialized conceptions of skill in working with specific
materials – namely, cement and concrete, as opposed to local stone. The Zionist discourse
of Jewish expertise in cement and concrete was embedded in the conquest of labor and in
attempts to restructure the building trades in Palestine. British officials, meanwhile,
turned to ideas about the innate physical and intellectual differences between Jews and
Arabs as offering possible solutions to growing conflicts over labor between Palestinian
Arabs and Jewish settlers, especially in government works where the British were forced
to intervene.
The need for the British to find such solutions became more pressing as
construction of the new deep-water harbor in the port city of Haifa was set to begin in
late 1928. The largest government-led construction project since the beginning of British
rule, and one of imperial importance, the harbor works promised to be a major employer
both during construction and when the harbor began operations.170 This combination of
high profile and promise, made the harbor works a site of particularly potent contestation
over employment. Beginning in the fall of 1928, the Histadrut pressured the mandate
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authorities to grant fifty percent of positions at the harbor works to Jewish workers. The
same Histadrut officials also insisted that Jewish immigrants’ supposedly higher standard
of living be met by paying them higher wages than their Palestinian peers.171
For British officials seeking a salve for the intensifying competition over
employment in government works, of which the Haifa harbor was merely the most
prominent example, racial thought offered a possible remedy. Wary of introducing
differential wages between Jews and Arabs fulfilling similar duties alongside one another
in such a sensitive endeavor as the harbor, some officials, including then High
Commissioner, John Chancellor (1870-1952), suggested that the “natural tendencies” of
each “race” serve as the basis for the division of labor between Jews and Arabs.172 What
these “tendencies” amounted to, according to Chancellor and others, was Jews’ “greater
intelligence,” and therefore gravitation towards “skilled and semi-skilled labor,” as
opposed to Arabs, “superior physique,” and better fit for “heavy unskilled labor.”173
Discussions and correspondences between British officials charged with
overseeing the harbor’s construction are replete with iterations of this distinction. Jews
are consistently referred to as physically incapable of certain kinds of “unskilled work,”
at the same time as they are depicted as possessing “greater intelligence” than their
Palestinian peers.174 The latter, meanwhile, are discussed as “very raw material,” suited
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for “the commonest kind of labor.”175 Palestinian’s longer working hours (nine to ten
hours a day, as opposed to the eight hours of Jewish workers) explained by “the ‘natural
bent’ of the Arab… to work from sunrise to sunset.”176 The British thus envisioned a
division of labor at Haifa which would play to each “race’s” supposed strengths:
Palestinians would work in the Athlit Quarry, work which the British regarded as
unskilled and reliant primarily on physical strength and tolerance. Jews, meanwhile,
would occupy more technical tasks including the operation of heavy machinery and work
in modern construction technologies including reinforced concrete and concrete
blocks.177
However, when the British first proposed to divide labor in the Haifa harbor
works along racial lines in this manner, Zionist organizations mounted what appeared to
be a coordinated effort to oppose it. In mid-February 1929 the Zionist Executive and the
Histadrut’s Executive Committee sent memoranda to the Mandate’s Chief Secretary and
High Commissioner, respectively, criticizing the proposed arrangement as impractical,
unjust, and fundamentally undermining the establishment of a Jewish National Home in
Palestine.178 It was impractical, they argued, because unskilled, semi-skilled, and skilled
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labor were often difficult to neatly separate and define, and because many forms of
skilled labor depended on the products of unskilled laborers. It was unjust to both Jews
and Arabs to limit their employment to specific occupations, and particularly unjust
towards Jewish workers given the growing preponderance of unskilled and semi-skilled
labor in government work. Most importantly, the arrangement fundamentally undermined
the establishment of the Jewish National Home – an objective enshrined in the mandate
Britain received from the League of Nations in 1923.179 Such a national home, the
Histadrut’s memorandum argued, was dependent on Jewish workers “[undertaking] any
kind of work, be it the roughest.” Jews did not
… come to Palestine as to a colony to benefit here by the labour of others. We
have no intention of forming a skilled labour aristocracy, by the side of a mass of
native labourers to be looked upon as the “hewers of wood and drawers of
water.”180

The threat of becoming a colonial labor aristocracy loomed large over Zionist
settlers, particularly over those who viewed themselves as part of a proletarian labor
Zionism. Early twentieth-century labor Zionists merged Eastern European socialist and
nationalist thought with an expressed disdain towards what they viewed as the
exploitative colonial social structure which earlier Zionist settlement and its planter class
had engendered.181 The threat was not merely moral or economic. It also had an
embodied dimension. If even the “new” Jewish body, forged through labor in Palestine,
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was considered unsuitable, even deficient, for certain forms of physical work, what
would this mean for the “new Jew” and the project of national regeneration?
And yet, the rejection of a colonial division of labor was belied by how Zionist
penetration into construction and quarrying throughout the Mandate period were
frequently discussed and conducted. As noted above, the discourse of Jewish expertise in
cement and concrete dovetailed with British racialized attitudes towards labor. Moreover,
segregated labor arrangements at Jewish-owned companies such as the Nesher Cement
Company – where Jews were employed directly by the company in the factory, and
Palestinian Arabs employed by a contractor in the quarry – as well as in projects of the
Zionist Palestine Electric Company, were hailed by the British as successful models for
precisely such skill-stratification along racial lines.182
Indeed, even before the British proposed a racial division of labor at the Haifa
harbor, the Palestinian Arab newspaper Filastin – whose reporting on the “machine gun
or rock breaking machine” controversy was discussed above – criticized the Histadrut’s
demands regarding the harbor’s construction as effectively calling for racial
discrimination. On October 9, 1928, Filastin published an editorial on its first page which
bore a remarkable title – “Arab Workers and Jewish Workers: Back to the “White Man’s”
Tune – Where Are You, Oh Arab Leaders?” (‘Umal al-‘Arab wa-‘Umal al-Yahud: ‘Aud
‘ila Naghmat “al-Rajul al-Abyad” – Ayna Antum ya Zu‘ama’ al-‘Arab?).183 The editorial
responded to the aforementioned publication of proceedings from the mid-September
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meeting between Mandate officials and Histadrut representatives regarding the harbor
works. In the meeting, the Histadrut presented three conditions regarding the construction
of the Haifa harbor – 1) a prohibition on employing foreign labor (a category from which
Jewish immigrants were excluded); 2) the enforcement of a fair wages clause, taking into
consideration the supposedly higher Jewish standard of living; and 3) the employment of
a definite percentage of Jewish workers reflecting the relative Jewish contribution to
Palestine’s economy, rather than their significantly smaller share in the population.184
Filastin’s editorial took no issue with the first condition. This would be to the
benefit of both Arabs and Jews. However, its author used the second and third conditions
to launch a critique of the concept of a differential “standard of living,” a concept which
had become fundamental to the Zionist principle of Hebrew labor and the conquest of
labor. Filastin argued that behind the argument for higher wages based on the idea of a
higher Jewish standard of living, was a thinly veiled request that the government
discriminate (tumayyizu) between Jewish and Arab workers: the Histadrut was, in fact,
appealing to a sense of whiteness and “cultural refinement,” which European Jews
supposedly shared with the British.185
Through a series of rhetorical questions under the subheading “Why this
discrimination (limadha hadha al-tamyiz)?” the editorial asked whether Jewish laborers
showed evidence of being stronger or more perseverant in the face of hardships than Arab
laborers, or whether the cultural needs of the Jewish worker justified such a gap in wages
since he needed to take “his sweetheart” to “theaters and places of entertainment every
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night?” What the Histadrut was demanding, Filastin argued, was a “return to the ‘white
man’s’ tune.” That is, “raising [the ‘white man’] over the ‘black man’ in all matters.” In
other words, it was a demand that wages be proportional not to workers’ productivity but
“to [their] refinement, whiteness of faces, and redness of lips.”186 If the Histadrut’s tactics
were intended to gain benefit from a world ordered according to the “white man’s tune,”
Palestinians, the editorial was effectively claiming, were among that unjust world’s black
people.
Filastin’s appeal to global discourses of whiteness and blackness in this article
reflected a longstanding engagement of the Arabic press and Middle Eastern intellectual
circles with questions of race. This engagement was multi-faceted. It included critiques of
race-relations in the United States and of colonialism by some, alongside the adoption
and adaptation of bio-racism by others. Such modes of thought were not simply
wholesale “importations” of Western racial thought but had cultural and social histories
of their own in the Middle East and Africa, often intertwined with enslavement and
conquest.187
In this context, Maha Nassar has demonstrated how, beginning in the 1930s,
Palestinian Arabic newspapers sympathetically covered the oppression and struggles of
Black Americans and the movement of Black solidarity with Ethiopia in the face of the
1935 Italian invasion.188 It is important to note, however, that at least prior to the 1930s,
like other groups able to stake a claim for whiteness at a time when it emerged as what
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W.E.B. Du Bois described as a “new religion,” many Palestinians, particularly Christians,
were attempting to gain recognition of their own whiteness. This was true in Palestine, in
the diaspora, and in Palestinians’ roles as colonial officials.189 At the same time, many
Jews attempted to establish their own pathways to whiteness in the US and Europe,
through their own involvement in colonial enterprises, and in Palestine itself.190
In a period when the “global color line” became an important factor in
international politics, the casting of Palestinians as the black victims of British-Jewish
white supremacy, as Filastin’s 1928 article suggested, was perhaps radical, but not
unthinkable.191 The newspaper’s critique of the concept of the standard of living as a
device for racial discrimination, presages the insights of historians of the US and Europe
who, since the 1990s, have shown that this concept was frequently deployed to allow for
racial, class, and gender exclusion from the workforce, or to create and maintain
hierarchies within it.192 That Filastin’s casting of Zionist Jews as attempting to benefit
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from the “wages of whiteness”193 took place only several years before Nazism would
begin its all-out assault on Jews as Europe’s ultimate racial others; that historians of the
standard of living have noted how Jews in particular were often considered a threat to or
as lying outside the “national standard”;194 and that within the same article Filastin itself
resorted to European antisemitic tropes, shows just how volatile and contextually
dependent such “obtained” whiteness could be.195

Learning to Love the Stone
The British suggestion of a racial division of labor in the Haifa harbor works provoked
not only Labor Zionism’s broad colonial anxieties, the historical basis of which Filastin’s
editorial had laid bare. By designating that quarry work specifically be carried out by
Palestinian Arabs, it also hit a raw nerve: Zionism’s continuous failure to gain a foothold
in Palestine’s stone industry. Throughout the period of British rule, the Zionist “conquest
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of stone” remained constant, but also consistently elusive. Stone, unlike cement and
concrete, where Zionist expertise could be manufactured as if of whole cloth, appeared
somehow unruly.
The double meaning of the title of the Even va-Sid (literally “Stone and Lime,”
although the company’s English name was Lime and Stone Industries) Company’s
company history published in 1984, Adam Mul Selʻa – “Man Facing Rock” –
encapsulates much of the mythical dimensions of the Zionist conquest of stone.196 The
relationship between Zionism’s new Hebrew man (and to a lesser extent, also its new
Hebrew woman) and the stones and rocks of Palestine/Israel is portrayed as at the same
time antagonistic and intimate.197 In this sense, the portrayal echoes the erotic desire for
the land which historian Boaz Neumann has described as characteristic of the “pioneers”
(ḥalutzim) of the second and third waves of Zionist European immigration (in Hebrew

David Faians, Adam Mul Selʻa : Avnei Derekh le-Orekh Shishim Shenot Yetsirah be-Kibush ha-Even veha-Sid [Man Facing Rock: Stepping Stones along Sixty Years of Creation in the Conquest of Stone and
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‘aliya, ascendance. Pl. ‘aliyot) to Palestine. This desire gendered the land feminine and
often virginal and cast the young Zionists as set to “conquer” and give life to her/it and
themselves, through manual labor.198
A history of the Zionist conquest of stone in Israel/Palestine as a process shaped
both by physical labor and political economy, however, reveals multiple other parties
instrumental to the enactment of desire Neumann described, unsettling its supposed
intimacy. First among these were the Palestinian Arabs, and somewhat less frequently
Palestinian and other Middle Eastern Jews, from whom many European Jewish
immigrants learned the work in the first place. The history of Zionist apprenticeship to
Arab masters in quarrying and stonework reintroduces learning from and imitating
Palestinian Arab labor as a pivotal piece in the broader Zionist conquest of land and
labor. It also draws together the material and the cultural in these practices of imitation
and sheds new light on the phenomena of Jewish and Zionist Orientalism.199
Scholars have examined Zionist practices of imitating Palestinian Arabs’ dress,
language and customs in para-military organizations like Hashomer (“The Watchman”)
and the Hagana (“The Defense”), in the aesthetic practices of photographers and artists,
and in the literary and poetic depictions of the pre-state era. However, their emphasis has
often been on the role of the Palestinian Arab as a model and vehicle for the negotiation
and articulation of Zionist self-perception. These scholars regard the Palestinian Arab,
particularly the Bedouin and the fallaḥ, and at times also the Palestinian or Middle
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Eastern Jew, primarily as having served a mediatory role in the Zionist cultural
imagination, linking the returning European Jews to their Middle Eastern origins, often
through the “hybrid” Sephardi Jews.200 A focus on labor processes however demonstrates
that this aesthetic and symbolic role was in some cases inseparable from practical
considerations. When it came to working on the land, Jewish self-fashioning in light of an
Arab model extended beyond the adoption of an aesthetic or habitus, into the realm of
fashioning an economically productive body.201
Zionist attempts to gain a foothold in Palestine’s stone quarries dated back to the
final decades of the Ottoman Empire. However, as in cement production, the most
significant efforts to introduce “Hebrew stone” began with the advent of British rule over
Palestine.202 The sources of capital invested in setting up Zionist-owned quarries, the
structures of the various quarrying firms, and the ways in which labor was organized in
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them varied: from decidedly capitalist ventures, through the first incarnation of the
Histadrut’s Solel Boneh contracting company with its allegiance to mainstream labor
Zionism, and the collectivist Gdud Ha-Avoda (“Labor Brigade”), and finally to the jointly
Palestinian-Zionist owned, Even va-Sid, by far the period’s most successful effort.
Throughout, the need to learn how to manage, organize and operate a quarry, and how to
work in one, was a constant. Few European Jewish settlers had arrived in Palestine with
experience in stone quarrying and cutting, or in overseeing a quarry’s operations.
Whether “Hebrew stone” was to be achieved by targeted capital investment and
the establishment of “Hebrew” quarries and quarrying firms, or by introducing Hebrew
labor into existing quarries, the vanguard of stone’s Jewish conquerors would first have
to learn what the work entailed and how to do it. To this end, management and capital
consulted frequently with foreign experts.203 Workers themselves, meanwhile, found the
expertise they required was overwhelmingly local. Archival sources are relatively silent
about the need to learn from and emulate Palestinian expertise in the stone industry.
However, the memoirs of Jewish quarry workers who learned the craft and others who
were involved in the industry during the 1920s are not.
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In some instances, authors gloss over the actual processes of learning the trade or
the identities of those it was learned from entirely.204 Other accounts acknowledge the
apprenticeship process but leave the masters unmentioned. Zvika Dror’s biography of
Yitzhak Sadeh (Landsberg) (1890-1952) – later a key figure in the militarization of labor
Zionism, but in the early 1920s still a leader of the Labor Brigade and an aspiring
quarrier – praises Sadeh’s “[understanding] that [quarrying] was a trade that required
knowledge and skills.” Thus, Dror writes, when the Labor Brigade first engaged in
quarrying in the Majdal (Migdal) area north of Tiberias in 1921, Sadeh sent Abrasha
Hassin (1900-1976), a key figure in the conquest of stone, and others to “train in a quarry
near Haifa.”205 While Dror leaves the episode at that, such training most likely meant
working in an apprenticeship capacity for Palestinian Arab quarriers. As will be shown
below, Jewish settlers who undertook such apprenticeships adopted Palestinian quarriers’
repertoire of skills and sensibilities, as well as the Arabic professional lexicon through
which they ordered and understood Palestine’s quarries and stones.
In his memoirs, Hillel Dan (1900-1969), a long-time head of Solel Boneh, offers
one such narrative of apprenticeship. Recalling his first year in Palestine, Dan writes of
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the first government contract received by the Ahdut Ha-Avoda (a left-wing Labor Zionist
party) Works Office in late 1920. The contract was for paving a road between the city of
Tiberias and Samakh (Tzemakh), along the Sea of Galilee.206 Since the British authorities
did not recognize political parties like Ahdut Ha-Avoda as contracting bodies, when the
Works Office received the tender, the government required that an individual signatory
bear responsibility for it. At the time, Dan writes, not one among the Works Office’s
personnel knew even the names of the materials used in road-paving. The party
leadership thus selected one individual, a “’sacrificial victim’” (“korban”) [quotation
marks in the original], to be the signatory and notified the authorities. However, when the
day of signing arrived, the man was nowhere to be found. After several days, concerns as
to his fate began mounting. Then,
Just as he had vanished, he suddenly appeared, all glowing and rolling with
laughter at the sight of his friends’ worried faces. Instead of answering their
inquisitive looks, he uttered a long stream of strange words, in a throaty
guttural pronunciation.
“Ḥami,” he uttered between his teeth. “Ṭobjeh, Maṭbaḥ.” We looked at him
astonished. “Stick a Lamina in my hand,” he roared and waved his arm.207
Only when he saw that we were beginning to question his clarity of mind, he
acquiesced to telling his story.
When the role [of signatory] was forced upon him, he went to an Arab
contractor in Haifa and asked him to hire him as a quarrier. Only after much
206
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pleading did he [the contractor] agree to employ him. Within a few days, the
man learned the terms [of the trade] and even etched into his memory workmethods, blasting processes, etc. His daily wages, those of a novice Arab
laborer, were not enough even [to pay] for breakfast…
The man’s ingenuity worked in our favor. He signed the contract with the
British and surprised them with [his] “expertise” [quotation marks in the
original].208

Members of the Labor Brigade also recorded narratives of learning the stone trade
in the Jerusalem area. In several of these, the apprenticeship narrative is more explicit
still, pointing to a specific individual rather than to an unnamed Arab “guide.” Dror’s
biography of Sadeh, and the memoirs of two other members of the brigade, ‘Imanu’el
Bar-Haim (1902-1974) and Mordechai Ish Shalom (1902-1991), all mention a guide they
refer to as Abu Ibrahim. In these sources, Abu Ibrahim is said to have been from one of
the Palestinian villages on the western outskirts of Jerusalem: Dror identifies him as

208

Dan, be-Derekh lo Selula, 24-25. Dan structures the episode in a manner that seems to follow a pattern
of biblical prophetic revelation stories, in accordance with what Robert Alter has called a “type-scene”,
after Walter Arend’s formulation from his 1933 study of Homer. The protagonist, Natan Haruvi, separates
from the collective at a moment of distress. He then sets alone on a journey from which he returns with
newfound knowledge which remedies the collective’s plight. The encounter here, of course, is not with the
divine, as in biblical narratives of revelation, but with the nameless Arab contractor, and while in the typescene it is usually the protagonist who shows reluctance to accepting the divine revelation and mission,
here it is the Arab contractor who is reluctant to accept Haruvi as an apprentice. The structure of the
narrative nonetheless resembles that of theophany type-scenes, as studied by George Savran. Other
components of the story also echo biblical narratives of revelation: Haruvi’s journey took him to Haifa,
most likely to a quarry on Mount Carmel, which is a location with a rich prophetic history. When Haruvi
returns, Dan describes his face as “glowing,” a motif which could have been lifted directly from Moses’
glowing face as he descended Mount Sinai. Haruvi’s appearance to his peers as potentially having lost his
clarity of mind and uttering unrecognizable words, the pronunciation of which seems physically out of
place (“guttural” and “throaty”), could indicate that Dan was also incorporating other, non-biblical
prophecy narratives which include the phenomenon of “speaking in tongues.” See: Walter Arend, Die
typischen Szenen bei Homer (Berlin: Weidmann, 1933); Robert Alter, The Art of Biblical Narrative, second
edition (New York: Basic Books, 2011 [1981]), chapter 3; George Savran, “Theophany as Type Scene,”
Prooftexts 23, no. 2 (2003): 119–49. I thank Steven Weitzman for calling my attention to the concept of the
type-scene and Alter and Savran’s work

104
being from Lifta, while Ish-Shalom writes that he was from al-Shaykh Badr, a few
kilometers to the southeast.209
According to Dror and Ish Shalom, Sadeh was responsible for recruiting AbuIbrahim as a guide for the quarry work at Giv‘at Shaul, just south of Lifta.210 Ish Shalom
describes Abu Ibrahim as “an excellent quarrier,” and a “craftsman.”211 For Bar-Haim,
who was anxious to become a quarrier but only granted the chance to do so when
previous groups of the Brigade left the quarry to pursue better earnings, “[it was] very
likely, that without the personality and guidance of Abu Ibrahim, I would not have stuck
with this toilsome work [i.e., quarrying] for long.” Work alongside Abu Ibrahim was “a
source of pleasure. I learned the trade from him, I learned to know and love the stone and
the process of production.”212
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These narratives also dismantle the racialized British idea of quarry work being
“simple, brute labor” fit for “unskilled” workers and the “physically superior” Arab
rather than for the “greater intelligence” of the Jew. In them, quarrying appears as a craft
that required finesse and the development of particular sensibilities, rather than brute
force. Both Ish Shalom and Bar-Haim describe Abu Ibrahim’s “hazings” of Jewish
quarriers who sought to approach the splitting of stone at the quarry with force alone.
Abu Ibrahim would let the novice quarriers exert themselves by swinging the large 13kilogram hammer again and again, “for a quarter of an hour and more,” and then would
approach the stone, take the hammer and with “two-three strikes” would expertly split the
slab.213
Part of what Abu Ibrahim imparted on the Jewish quarriers, it seems, was a sense
of intimate knowing. Ish Shalom’s descriptions of this process of learning to know the
stone is particularly rich in its sensory and emotional content. “It took time before we too
learned to listen to the sounds emerging from the stone. To feel where the crack is
revealed in it, and to hit it in the right place,” Ish Shalom writes. Like Bar-Haim, he too
describes “growing attached to the stone and the rock. [Learning] to love them and the
work with them.” More than half a century later – at a time when, Ish Shalom writes,
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“there is no [no longer any] Jewish quarrier nor Jewish stonemason” – he portrays his
relationship with the quarry’s stones as more than merely an interaction with inanimate
objects,
When you work in the quarry, you learn that the stone has sounds and colors, and
the rock has tendons and arteries. You face a rock, but in truth it is as if it were
alive before you. You remove its outer shell with the shakuf [a Hebrew
mispronunciation of the Arabic shakush], and you notice [the stone’s] geological
composition. When you are familiar with the division of a slab, it is easier to split.
When you hit a stone according to the tendons and arteries, it responds to you and
splits with great ease.
…There is light gray stone, and dark gray. There is reddish stone, and yellowish
stone, and there are stones in which there is a combination of colors. Each kind of
stone has its own sound. When you strike a mizi yahudi stone you hear a distinct
sound, while the voice of the soft stone is dull and thin.214

And yet, the voices of the stone were not the only ones Ish Shalom heard in the
quarry which had left a lasting impression on him. In the introduction to his memoirs,
which he titles “Opening in Two Voices,” as though it were a musical piece, he casts the
voices of Abu Ibrahim and his wife Fatima, in the titular role. Ish Shalom mentions that
Abu Ibrahim guided the Brigade’s quarrying group, however the focus of the introduction
is not on the craftsman’s professional skills, of which the reader learns later in the
memoirs. Rather it is on how Abu Ibrahim and Fatima’s interactions shaped Ish Shalom’s
perception of himself within Palestine’s landscape.
As Abu Ibrahim and Fatima engaged in a call-and-response conversation between
Giv‘at Shaul and al-Shaykh Badr (which Ish Shalom explains he could not understand,

Ish Shalom, be-Sod Hotsvim u-Vonim 105. Jeffrey Jerome Cohen’s study-come-meditation on stone in
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University Of Minnesota Press, 2015).
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since he did not speak Arabic) covering the aerial distance with their voices, Ish Shalom
“confronted in a very tangible manner, what awaited us here, in Eretz Yisrael, in
Jerusalem.” He recalls first fully perceiving the “wilderness” (ha-shmama) of the land
and the need to “quarry stones from the mountains of Jerusalem and to build the city with
them,” through the “cry of the wilderness (ze‘akat ha-shmama) that came to [his] ears in
Abu Ibrahim’s and Fatima’s voices.”215 Ish Shalom repeatedly emphasizes how unlikely
it was that this mundane vocal exchange had such a momentous impact on him. The story
he weaves around the exchange neatly encompasses foundational Zionist tropes of
“making the wilderness bloom”, “redeeming the land” and building it. However, a single
sentence, one which appears somewhat out of place in this overarching narrative, might
perhaps offer a better indication of why the exchange was so formative. The vocal
exchange between the village and the quarry, between husband and wife, demonstrates
Ish Shalom’s realization that the life-long “quest” his memoir narrates entailed dislodging
more than stones from the land around him, but also people: “The two [Fatima and Abu
Ibrahim] shouted to each other in high voices, because they are the masters of [this] space
and [this] wilderness, and they are their proprietors.”216

The idea of Palestine as a wilderness or wasteland – shmama – has, of course had an important role in
justifying the Zionist project of “building the land,” mentioned above. See: Alan George, “Making the
Desert Bloom: A Myth Examined,” Journal of Palestine Studies 8, no. 2 (1979): 88–100; Haim Gerber,
“Zionism, Orientalism, and the Palestinians,” Journal of Palestine Studies 33, no. 1 (October 1, 2003): 23–
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1920-1947 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008). For an examination of how the image of
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Bodies and Machines
If the Zionist conquest of stone was intended to obtain a significant hold over Palestine’s
quarries and stone resources, the approach adopted by the Labor Brigade – training under
local masters and adapting local methods – very quickly proved to be insufficient.
Beginning in the early 1920s, a succession of local committees and foreign experts
proposed a broad range of alternative strategies.217 Eventually, one idea took hold –
viable “Hebrew stone” would necessitate the widescale mechanization of quarry work.
At the heart of this idea - promoted most decisively by Director of the Commerce
and Industry Department of the Zionist Executive, Nahum Thischby (1885-1952) – was
an economic calculus. Not only was the cost of Jewish labor considerably higher than
Palestinian Arab labor, the productivity of Jewish workers was frequently lower. While
members of the Labor Brigade initially opposed “revolutionizing” quarries through
mechanization, by 1927 Thischby could somewhat triumphantly offer a retrospective
evaluation, stating that
As competition with the Arabs by working by hand is out of the question,
modern machinery ought to have been introduced, and should continue to be
introduced in the future.218
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The increased productivity of quarries that utilized “labor-saving machinery”
including excavators, drills, and jackhammers, it was thought, would ameliorate the
deficiencies of the Jewish body and the higher cost of Jewish labor. This would allow for
the development of a strong Hebrew stone industry, permitting private and public firms to
open new quarries. At the same time, mechanization of existing quarries would permit
the displacement of Palestinian workers and expertise there.219
Discussed at the industry-wide level, the economic language of “competition,”
“cost,” and “productivity” could make quarry mechanization appear like a somewhat
abstract proposition. However, when these discussions focused on the workings of
specific quarries, the fundamental idea – that mechanization would allow the
displacement of Palestinian workers and expertise – became more evident. For example,
a laudatory article published in the September 1925 issue of the Kibbutz ‘Ein Harod’s
journal Mi-Befnim (“From Inside”), narrated the difficult beginnings of Jewish labor in
the local quarry several years prior, its development, and its future. The article accorded a
prominent obstructive role to “the Arab expert” (ha-mumḥe ha-‘aravi) employed in the
quarry, whose high salary, according to the article, had proved burdensome. The expected
arrival of a compressor-powered drill, however, it was hoped, would both increase
productivity and reduce costs, since “it will [then] be possible to let the Arab expert
go.”220
The quarry at the Nesher factory is another case in point. As mentioned in
Chapter One, Nesher was a “mixed” workplace, with Jewish employees working in the
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factory and Palestinian Arabs in the company quarry. It was also the site of some of the
Mandate periods most substantial cross-communal labor organization efforts.221
However, many among the factory’s Jewish workers and the Histadrut leadership,
maintained throughout that labor in the quarry should be “Hebrew” as well. For over a
decade since the factory began operations and until 1936, when the Solel Boneh
contracting company’s leadership was able to force his hand to “integrate” the quarries,
Nesher’s founder, Michael Pollak, withstood Histadrut and workers’ pressures by
repeatedly promising that Nesher would transition to “full Hebrew labour” as soon as the
quarry was mechanized to allow it.222 “When [the machines] arrive,” became a repeatedly
deferred moment of promise. Pollak and other members of Nesher’s management
announced time and time again that such an “arrival” was imminent, only to have it
dissipate shortly thereafter.223
Over time, Jewish workers at Nesher and Histadrut officials seemed to internalize
this conditional relationship. In September 1933, rumors began spreading among the
factory’s workers that as part of a factory expansion, management would finally
mechanize work in the quarry. In a September 29 letter to the Histadrut’s Executive
Committee, the Secretary of Nesher’s Workers Council described “a stir” (tesisa) among
the Jewish workers. The workers, he reported, were urging the Council demand that
management introduce Jews into quarry work following mechanization. A note scribbled
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on the letter, likely by a member of the Executive Committee, suggested that if there was
any chance of success, it would be worthwhile to do so.224
The letter also revealed an accompanying assumption. Mechanization and
“rationalization” of the quarry – the two terms were often bundled together in discussions
of the conquest of stone – were antithetical to the continued employment of Palestinians
there. Prior to August 1933, the letter noted, when partnership between Jewish and
Palestinian organized labor at Nesher finally dissolved, Nesher’s Jewish workers could
not support quarry mechanization and rationalization wholeheartedly since “[these]
would have considerably pushed the hands of the Arab workers away from the quarry.”225
Palestinian workers, it was assumed, had little place in a “modern” industrial workplace.
Here too, a racialized hierarchy of skill emerged.
Once deemed plausible, such hierarchies were to be protected. When in December
1933 reports described additional steps towards the mechanization of Nesher’s quarry,
including the training of Palestinian workers on the new machinery, the local Jewish
Workers’ Council reacted furiously. In a December 5, 1933 letter to the Histadrut’s
Executive Committee, the Council reported that workers demanded that factory
management halt the introduction of new machinery until Michael Pollak returned from a
trip abroad. When he did, the workers intended to press him on his promise that
mechanized quarrying would be carried out only by Jewish workers. The Histadrut’s
Executive Committee responded within a week. They supported the workers’ demands,
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specifically calling on them to resist attempts to force Jewish employees to train
Palestinian workers on the machinery.226
Unsurprisingly, the voices of the Palestinian workers that quarry mechanization
was intended to displace, or any other Palestinian voices for that matter, are absent from
these intra-Zionist discussions. This does not mean, however, that similar questions of the
costs and benefits of mechanization – extending well beyond the specific instance of
quarry work – did not figure in Palestinian thinking about the nexus of political economy,
labor, and development. The leading article in the November 15, 1935 issue of al’Iqtisadiyyat al-‘Arabiyya (translated by its editors as The Arabic Economic Journal, or
sometimes, The Arab Economic Journal) – a journal Sherene Seikaly has identified as the
primary organ of Palestine’s “men of capital” – provides a glimpse of a different
approach to the relationship between mechanization, labor, and “progress.”227
The article, titled “Labor Versus Machinery in the Near East,” warns against the
adoption of the “common fallacy” of exaggerating the dependence of production
efficiency on mechanization and the “corollary” argument that “economic progress is
impossible without mechanization.” Pointing to the problem of “technological
unemployment” elsewhere, the article’s author, Edward F. Nickoley (1873-1937), an
American Professor of Economics and the longtime Dean of the Faculty of Arts and
Sciences at the American University of Beirut, suggests that the emergence of this
problem has allowed a “more balanced… attitude” to supplant the “traditional faith in the
machine as the saviour of the race.” One important outgrowth of this “more balanced
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attitude,” Nickoley suggests, is a growing recognition of the need to make a clearer
distinction between machinery that “cooperates with labor,” and between machinery
which competes with labor. This distinction, according to Nickoley, reveals that the
benefits of mechanization are not absolute, and that the specific form mechanization
should take is always context dependent.228
In the case of the Near East, an “indiscriminate demand” to introduce machinery
as a condition for progress, Nickoley argues, fails to consider local conditions. Although
the Near East’s countries may not possess abundant natural resources, and suffer from
“unduly timid” capital, they enjoy “an excessive supply not only of unskilled labor but of
labor with high potentialities of technical efficiency.” Introducing labor-saving or
substituting machinery would only “accentuate a condition which is already critical…
inadequate opportunity for the labor which exists.” “Progress” in the Near East, Nickoley
claims, could only be brought forth by providing “effective training and intelligent
direction of the quantitative and qualitative potentialities” of its inhabitants.229
Al-Iqtisadiyyat first included Nickoley’s article in a special English and French
language issue of the journal. Two months later, in the journals’ January 25, 1936 issue,
the editors included the article again, this time translated into Arabic.230 In keeping with
the editorial line of the journal which “conceptualiz[ed] economy… as discrete from the
political,”231 Nickoley does not mention colonialism, Jewish settlement in Palestine, or
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Zionism in his article. In accordance with al-’Iqtisadiyyat’s editorial line, he writes of the
matter at hand from an approach that seems to aspire toward separating the economic
from the political. Nonetheless, it is instructive to read his suggestions, which, given the
venue, had likely struck a chord with at least some of Palestine’s capitalist class, against
the backdrop of the Zionist embrace of quarry mechanization. Equally as rooted in the
economic language of “efficiency,” “costs,” and “productivity” as his Zionist
counterparts, Nickoley prescribes a different vision. He saw imminent danger in
indiscriminate mechanization’s capacity to replace, deskill, and eventually displace
indigenous populations in the Middle East, precisely the qualities which made machinery
so appealing to its promoters in the Zionist conquest of stone.232

Conclusion: “Soon They Will Be Firing the Arab”
When finally, Jewish workers were introduced into Nesher’s quarry in 1936, it was due
not to mechanization but to the 1936-1939 Palestinian Great Revolt, and the incessant
pressures of the Histadrut and its contracting company Solel Boneh on Pollak. At first the
quarry became a “mixed” workplace, with Jews and Arabs working alongside one
another. Solel Boneh’s David Hacohen (1898-1984), who had previously established a
partnership with Tahir Qaraman at Even va-Sid, and the Palestine Arab Workers
Society’s Sami Taha, were the architects of this first stage of the quarry’s transformation.
Then, by the late 1938, the quarry transitioned to exclusively Jewish labor.233
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With the transition to exclusively Jewish labor, mechanization was in fact soon to
follow. However, it soon proved to be a fickle ally of labor. By 1942, Nesher’s now
wholly Jewish quarrying workforce found themselves and the company’s management on
the opposite sides of the quarry mechanization debate. Fearful of losing their jobs, the
Nesher Workers’ Council fought against management’s plans to introduce a new
excavator to a recently opened quarry face. This time, however, they did not receive the
Histadrut’s backing. Rather, the Histadrut’s Executive Committee issued a letter to the
Workers’ Council stating that
Theoretical assumptions and experience – both prove that there is no basis for the
workers to resist the expansion of machinery use [in the quarry]. The machine has
been and still is one of the central means for the Jewish worker to expand and
solidify his standing, to improve his working conditions, and to increase the work
itself.234

And what of the question with which this chapter began? The question which for
a short while in 1931 vexed people not just in Haifa and Mandate Palestine, but also in
Beirut, Cairo, London, and New York: machine gun or rock breaking machine? The
histories of the construction of the Haifa Harbor and its Athlit quarry and of the Zionist
“conquest of stone” more broadly, demonstrate that the line separating these two
machines could be finer than we might otherwise assume. The “weaponization” of the
quarry drill – making it into a device for Palestinian displacement – was tied to racial
hierarchies of different bodies, their laboring capacities and needs, and their relationships
to their environment, technology, and modernity writ large. These racialized

Histadrut Executive Committee to Solel Boneh Directorate, Haifa and the Nesher Workers’ Council,
June 18, 1942, LMA, IV-208-1-2363C.
234

116
understandings also placed mandate Palestine along the emergent global color line of the
1920s and 30s, connecting local struggles to transnational and imperial frameworks. At
the same time, Mandate Palestine’s construction sites and quarries were locations where
other seemingly obvious separations could be challenged as well. There Eastern
European Jewish settlers learned they would need to adopt Palestinian sensibilities,
knowledge, and bodily comportment, and that the displacement of Palestinian expertise,
and Palestinians, remained difficult because of the Zionist project’s dependence on them.
That did not mean however, that other strategies of displacement could not be
explored. One such strategy, already explored as early as the 1911 Yavnieli Mission, was
to look for more suitable Jewish bodies to serve as replacements.235 In a 1945 report on
the economic feasibility of employing Jewish labor in “primitive lime kilns” as part of the
production process, Dr. Ludwig Grünbaum, uses the Even va-Sid lime kiln at Shfeya as a
case in point.236 There, utilizing Yemeni Jewish workers, the prospect of “full Hebrew
labor” seemed closer than ever. The clause in Grünbaum’s report titled “Arab Labor in
Shfeya”, reads as follows:
“I went over the list of workers, I visited Shfeya, and I talked with some workers.
From the evidence, I learned that there is only one Arab in the factory, who is
teaching the craft to the Jewish workers. Soon they will be firing the Arab.”237
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CHAPTER 3: “IF WE ARE A FORCE”: CONSIDERING
COERCION AND APPEARANCES IN THE DIVISION OF
LABOR

Of all the years and events which have cast their long shadows on the modern history of
Palestine/Israel – 1917 and the Balfour declaration, the violence of summer 1929, 19361939’s Great Revolt, and 1967’s Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip –
none has loomed larger than 1948. In many ways a shorthand for a sequence of events
which spanned the years 1947-1949, 1948 is etched in Palestinian history and memory as
the year of the Palestinian catastrophe, the Nakba. In Zionist history and memory, it
marks the year of Israeli independence. The year has also come to define one of the
primary and longest lasting divisions among Palestinians: that between the roughly
750,000 Palestinians forced to leave their homes in what became Israel and who became
refugees, and the roughly 150,000 Palestinians who were able to remain in the boundaries
of the new state, or returned in the years immediately following. To the latter, it gave an
enduring name: “’48 Arabs” (‘arab tamaniyah wa-’arba‘in).238
The events of 1948 are rightly recognized as a watershed. This recognition of
their transformative nature has, however, led to substantive continuities between what
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Citizens of Israel (University of California Press, 2005), 59.
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preceded these events and what followed frequently being overlooked in the scholarship.
Such oversights have been perhaps most pronounced when it comes to examining how
colonial structures, which were in place under the British Mandate, evolved in post-1948
Israel. Several important works have examined the role of these colonial legacies.
Scholarship by Shira Robinson, Yael Berda, and Leena Dallasheh, among others, has
demonstrated how colonial practices and logic shaped the relationship between the
nascent Israeli state and Palestinian citizens in it, particularly in relation to the legal,
political, and social dimensions of citizenship and rights.239 Cultural studies of Mizrahi
Jews, or more specifically, Arab Jews – a nomenclature some of the field’s leading
scholars argue for on historical, cultural, and political grounds – pioneered by Ella Shohat
and taken up by scholars like Aziza Khazzoom and Yehouda Shenhav, have emphasized
how colonial and orientalist cultural hierarchies impacted Mizrahim’s “absorption” in
Israeli society.240 This chapter extends the pathways paved by these inquiries to examine
how ideas and policy suggestions the Zionist leadership considered before and during
1948’s upheavals, laid the groundwork for the Israeli state’s division of labor. I show that
as the Yishuv moved towards what its leaders would no doubt consider “post-colonial”
statehood, even if only in temporal terms, these ideas and policy suggestions remained
firmly rooted in the racialized divisions of colonialism and empire.
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The chapter relies on minutes of Histadrut Executive Committee Meetings, social
scientific studies produced during the 1940s, and the records of the Yishuv Emergency
Committee (Va‘adat ha-Matzav, lit. “the situation committee”), established following the
UNSCOP partition proposal in late 1947, to plan the administration of the future Jewish
state. In this respect, the chapter is unique among this dissertation’s chapters. Because it
focuses on Zionist perceptions and ideas about divisions of labor, race, economy, and the
labor market, it relies almost entirely on Zionist or Hebrew sources.
This focus on Zionist discourses allows the chapter to also address a conceptual
matter, providing a second related axis along which I trace continuities between
Mandatory Palestine and the history of post-1948 Palestine/Israel: the question of
Zionism’s dependence on coercive power. In his critique of Gershon Shafir’s classic
study, Land, Labor, and the Origins of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, 1882-1914,
Zachary Lockman calls attention to the overlooked role coercion played in “reali[zing]
Zionism’s goals,” even prior to 1948. This elision occurs in part, because until 1948 the
levers of coercive state power were unavailable to the Zionist leadership directly. As
Lockman points out, while some coercive tools were available to the labor Zionist
movement in its struggle for Hebrew labor during this period, until at least the mid-1940s
the movement relied primarily on the coercive state action of the British to advance its
objectives in Palestine.241
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Since the British did relatively little to interfere in Palestine’s labor market, the
struggle for Hebrew labor could be won in earnest only after the foundation of Israel,
when the state apparatus was firmly in the hands of the labor Zionist leadership (and, as
Lockman notes, also as a result of the Nakba and the “radical transformation” of the
land’s demography).242 This did not mean, however, that when conceiving of the labor
market, the labor Zionist leadership and its institutions did not give such coercive power
consideration. As Lockman shows in his analysis of a 1927 text by labor Zionist leader,
Hayyim Arlosoroff (1899-1933), regardless of whether someone like Arlosoroff
approved of such coercive measures, he saw the necessary power to enact them as
decisively out of reach. The minutes of the Histadrut Executive Committee meeting I
examine in the chapter’s first section, suggest that by 1942 some in the labor Zionist
leadership had begun to reconsider this assessment. The sources used in the second and
third sections of the chapter then provide an opportunity to examine how Zionist leaders
(including those beyond the labor Zionist milieu) and experts viewed the use of coercion

efforts in a “country with low a wage level,” by a people “with a European standard of needs,” were
pursued “without using coercive means,” he came up short. The only truly comparable example Arlosoroff
could find was, in fact, the South African one, where state coercion through legislation was the primary
means for sustaining white workers’ “European” standards. Without addressing the morality of the steps
taken by the South African state to protect white workers, Arlosoroff conceded that the toolset of state
coercion South Africa employed was entirely out of labor Zionist’s reach in Palestine. However, since
starting conditions in South Africa were similar, labor Zionism had no choice but to pursue a policy akin to
that which eventually became euphemistically called “separate development.” As this chapter
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in organizing the labor market when explicitly tasked with “seeing like a state,” following
UNSCOP’s partition recommendation in late 1947.243
The chapter’s first two sections demonstrate that by the early 1940s, as some in
the Labor Zionist leadership warned of the demise of the Hebrew construction worker,
discussions of the dangers of a colonial division of labor, first explored in the previous
chapter, shifted in tone. Using the minutes of a 1942 meeting of the Histadrut’s Executive
Committee and Solel Boneh’s leadership regarding construction work undertaken for the
British (and American) war efforts, I show that although some Labor Zionist leaders held
onto the question of whether such a division was morally justifiable, different questions
altogether animated much of the discussion. Rather than framing the question as
primarily one of morality and self-perception, they asked whether it was politically
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possible for the Labor Zionist movement to adopt such a division of labor and what
would the ramifications of instituting such a colonial division of labor in Histadrut-led
works be? Underlying these questions were concerns about the unfolding catastrophe of
the Holocaust – the dimensions of which were not yet widely known – but also about the
Zionist enterprise’s coercive power and international standing, and the visibility of
racialized colonial divisions of labor.
The third and fourth sections then fast-forward to September 1947, when,
following the publication of UNSCOP’s recommendation for partitioning Palestine into
Jewish and Arab states, the Zionist leadership established an Emergency Committee
tasked with planning the administration of the future Jewish state. Following similar
themes as the first two sections, these sections focus on how the future state’s “Arab
labor question” was discussed in meetings and plans which experts proposed to the
subcommittee charged with devising the future state’s Ministry of Labor.

“The Lowest Rung”
As noted in Chapter 1, during World War II Palestine became Britain’s second-largest
military base in the Middle East, industrializing rapidly to meet British military needs.
The central role of Palestinian construction workers in wartime construction projects,
including those of the Histadrut’s own contracting and construction companies, raised
concerns among Histadrut officials that Palestinians were gaining access to skills and
expertise intended to set Jewish workers above and apart from them. Maintaining
exclusive claims to modern technical expertise and knowhow, was, as the previous
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chapters have shown, one tool through which labor Zionist institutions and workers
pursued the conquest of labor in the construction industry. In a Histadrut Executive
Committee meeting on 15 April 1942, these developments led Berl Repetur (1902-1989)
of the Work Center (Merkaz ha-‘Avoda), and its longtime representative in Solel Boneh’s
management, to ask whether, “it was already possible to carry out large works without
the skilled Jewish worker?”244 Noting the dwindling and aging of the population of
Jewish construction workers, Repetur decried the dangers that would face the “last
remains” of Jewish construction workers when the war ended. David Remez (18861951), the Histadrut’s Secretary General, explained that Jewish construction workers had
in practice been on the lowest rung of the project of “building the land” for some time.
With no security, and “after… years of trouble, of unemployment and of illness,” they
would do anything to escape construction work.245
Repetur and Remez’s assessments of the state of Hebrew labor in the construction
industry in the early 1940s appear to have been accurate. The industry’s heavy reliance
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on “unskilled” temporary labor had, by the late 1930s, transformed it into an immigrant
absorbing industry in which many Jewish immigrants found their first jobs in Palestine.
More established settlers, especially the small but growing group of second-generation
Zionist settlers, meanwhile, tended to gravitate towards industries such as metalwork,
printing, as well as white-collar jobs.246 Following 1935’s construction “boom,” when
roughly 16,500 Jewish workers were employed in the industry, the number of Jewish
construction workers plummeted, to a low of roughly 5,000 in 1938, and then between
7,000-9,000 in the early years of World War II.247
The industry was also becoming increasingly Mizrahi. Among the shrinking
numbers of Jewish construction workers, the share of Mizrahi Jews grew. By 1939,
roughly twenty percent of Mizrahim worked in construction, compared to roughly
fourteen percent of Ashkenazi Jews.248 By World War II’s final years, the Sephardic
Jewish newspaper Hed ha-Mizrah reported, certain trades in Jerusalem’s construction
industry, such as tile-laying, quarrying, stone cutting, and construction materials
production (as well as occupations like municipal sanitation workers, caretakers and
guards), were overwhelmingly populated by Mizrahim. The article’s author, S. Malakhi,
claimed that the fact that so many Mizrahim remained in these trades, for which there
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was very little demand throughout the war’s construction standstill, had effectively
transformed them into unskilled laborers, with no, or very low, permanent income.
“Something like a sect [kat, although perhaps the term “caste,” is a more appropriate
translation] limited to certain professions was created,” Malakhi wrote, stating he was
unable to determine whether someone intended this to happen. The process did explain,
however, the worsening state of Jerusalem’s Mizrahi population in his view.249

Coolies East of Tel Aviv
The question of the future of the Hebrew construction worker which arose during the
April 15 meeting, overlay a cleavage between the members of the Executive Committee.
Those members who expressed concern regarding the future of Hebrew labor in the
construction industry, also expressed alarm at the exploitative conditions of Palestinian
workers employed by Histadrut-owned firms. The representatives of the Histadrut’s Solel
Boneh contracting company, meanwhile, were on the defensive, claiming they felt as if
they were seated “on the accused bench” (‘al safsal ha-ne’eshamim) for exploiting
Palestinians and forsaking the Hebrew worker. In their defense, they first denied they
were hurting the “Arab worker” at all: If anything, Palestinians working for Solel Boneh
were profiting. Secondly, the most important thing at stake, they argued, was not the
future of Hebrew labor in a specific industry, but the existence of Solel Boneh as a tool of
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economic power. Hiring more Jewish labor would mean losing government tenders or
operating at a loss. Either could bring Solel Boneh’s downfall.250
Several of the Histadrut Secretariat members rejected the company’s claims. In
their view, the wage gap between Jewish and Palestinian workers was egregious. Ziama
Aharonovich (1899-1970) (who would later change his name to Zalman Aran and
become a long serving Israeli Minister of Education and one of the architects of the
state’s education system in its first two decades), stated that regarding Solel Boneh’s
existence as the foremost objective at present and condoning the employment of cheap
Palestinian labor to preserve it, threatened the Histadrut with “a moral and political
failure.” The reliance on underpaid Palestinian labor, he suggested, would place Jewish
workers in Palestine in a colonial relationship with Palestinian Arabs: While “[f]or
generations, the English worker has gained what he has based on exploiting the
colonies,” Jews in Palestine, “with our small shoulders [here, Aharonovich turned to
Yiddish: ‘mit undzere shmole pleytses’],” were in an entirely different position. The
exploitation of Palestinian workers by Histadrut owned companies would expose
Zionism, already “surrounded by enemies,” to a “most grave courthouse” after World
War II ended.251
Aharonovich’s invocation of the English worker’s relationship to Britain’s
colonies recalled the Executive Committee’s 1929 memorandum to the High

250

Protocol of Meeting of the Histadrut Executive Committee Secretariat with the Work Center and the
Contracting Institutions, April 15, 1942, LMA, IV-208-2363C.
251
Protocol of Meeting of the Histadrut Executive Committee Secretariat with the Work Center and the
Contracting Institutions, April 15, 1942, LMA, IV-208-2363C. I thank Ayelet Brinn and Sam Shuman for
their assistance with the translation from Yiddish.

127
Commissioner, discussed in chapter two, which similarly regarded a colonial division of
labor in Palestine as a moral failure.252 But, unlike the authors of the 1929 Memorandum,
Aharonovich now also called attention to the coercive power which instituting and
maintaining such a division of labor required and which he thought the Zionist enterprise
still lacked. Aharonovich thus indicated the oft-overlooked role of such power in labor
Zionist politics, which Zachary Lockman has called attention to.253 The Histadrut,
Aharonovich implied, was no British Empire. If it adopted such exploitative practices
now, retribution would surely come later.254
For Hillel Dan of Solel Boneh, these arguments were irrelevant. The goal of his
work, he stated, was to increase the Jewish population in Palestine. For this, a strong
Solel Boneh was crucial. “Should that matter be endangered,” Dan clarified, he would
grant it precedence over any moral question:
if I have no other way [to guarantee a Jew’s right to exist in Palestine or
elsewhere] – I am willing to exploit an Arab as well. This is not a question of us
exploiting a colony to send someone money. We need to force our way in this
land to sustain ourselves [emphasis in the original], to live.255
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Dan’s argument was simple, its existential tenor likely forged in light of events in
Europe, even if the reality of Nazi death camps had not yet come into full view: If an
exploitative division of labor was necessary to assure Jewish life in Palestine, Dan
argued, so be it. This, to him, was altogether different from the question of the English
working class’s gains from British colonialism. Whether others would agree was another
matter. Dan did not fear anyone holding the Histadrut accountable, as Aharonovich did. If
Solel Boneh’s approach was successful, he argued, that is, “if we are a force (be-mida
she-niheye koakh)…, we will have what to respond to such accounting.” The sort of
coercive power Aharonovich thought Zionists in Palestine lacked, Dan indicated, was
close at hand.
Golda Meyerson (later, Meir) (1898-1978), also of the Histadrut’s Secretariat,
positioned herself as a mediator between the sides. She considered the question of
Hebrew labor in construction crucial. On the other hand, she, like Hillel Dan, “was never
concerned,” from a moral standpoint, that the Histadrut was “causing injustice to the
Arabs,” even if this was hard to explain to socialists elsewhere. Yet, when Meyerson
expressed what did concern her, she also shed light on what might have prevented such
broader understanding – the institution of a racialized division of labor.256
Undertaking a government tender with Palestinian workers as Solel Boneh’s
leadership desired to do, Meyerson argued, was only justifiable if it ensured that future
works would employ Hebrew labor. Moreover, there were particular projects which
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Meyerson thought it was important to carry out solely with Hebrew labor. This was the
case when tenders brought the Histadrut into contact with the relatively small US
Military presence in Palestine, as in the building of the Tel Litvinsky base east of Tel
Aviv. Works like Tel Litvinsky had “a large political role”, in Meyerson’s view. They
should be accepted and performed with Hebrew labor out of “long term political
calculations,” similar to those which motivated the “sending of Hebrew workers to
Iran.”257
In the Tel Litvisnky case, these “political calculations,” had a specifically
American twist. They should “prove [to the Americans] that the Hebrew worker can carry
out such work[s], not just the Hebrew contractor” [emphasis in the original, NBZ]. The
Tel Litvinsky works provided an opportunity to impress upon US forces – and,
presumably, political actors – the vitality of Zionism’s undertaking. Meyerson’s concerns
about US perceptions were rooted in her assumptions about how US officials thought of
Jews. “Immense buildings have been built by Jewish contractors in New York, but a
Jewish worker has not been seen there,” Meyerson noted. It was crucial therefore to
“prove to the Americans… that the Hebrew worker there is doing the whole job, from
start to finish, [and] not ‘coolies’.”258
Meyerson’s insistence on guaranteeing that American forces witness Jewish
workers and not just Jewish capital in action, was rooted in labor Zionism’s commitment
to refashioning not only the Jewish body but to performing that refashioning on the
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international stage. Her use of the term “coolie” in reference to how American onlookers
might perceive Palestinian Arab workers, however, is, at first blush, striking. As Madhavi
Kale, Moon-Ho Jung, Lisa Lowe and others have shown, the meaning of the term
“coolie” varied widely between and within the British Imperial and American contexts,
shifting between “free” and “unfree” labor, from the nineteenth century onwards.259
When the Milwaukee-raised Meyerson’s used the term to refer to Palestinian workers
building a US military hospital in British-ruled Palestine, she could equally have been
thinking of the British or American contexts for “coolie labor.” What did remain
consistent about coolie, despite its “plasticity,” was its application to distinctly racialized
and exploited laborers, and its association with the excesses of colonialism.260 This was
no less true in Palestine: when politicians or authors in the contemporary Hebrew press in
Palestine used the term “coolie,” they typically did so either to invoke its exploitative
valances, its racial ones, or both. The implication of Meyerson’s use of the term then, was
that to outside onlookers versed in the global color line, Palestinian workers working
under Jewish managers could appear to be precisely such coolie labor.261
Meyerson’s invocation of the workers sent to Iran, situates the discussions of the
April 15, 1942 Executive Committee meeting in direct relation to the Solel Boneh works
in Abadan, where Yehouda Shenhav locates the zero point of the encounter between
Zionism and the Arab Jews.262 While the works at Abadan would not begin until later that
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year, by April the contracting company had already set up an office in Baghdad.263 The
encounter of the Zionist emissaries to Abadan with a system of coolie labor and its
disparities, which positioned them “as white Europeans,” constituted a key component of
what Shenhav describes as the “phenomenology of colonialism,” defining their attitude
towards Mizrahi Jews.264
If the colonial context of Abadan was culturally formative of the encounter
between Zionism and Arab Jews, then the near-simultaneity, even precedence, of
discussions about colonial divisions of labor and “coolies” in Palestine itself, coupled
with the increase of Mizrahi Jews’ and Palestinians’ share in menial labor executed by
the Histadrut and its organs, lent these hierarchies both a cultural basis and a structural
foundation in the labor market. Taking the link which Meyerson draws between Abadan
and Tel Litvinsky seriously, albeit for connections which Meyerson herself would have
likely refused, takes us a step further towards understanding the colonial foundations of
social hierarchies in 1950s and 1960s Israel. By drawing Shenhav’s study of the
encounter at Abadan more closely into Palestine’s sphere, it allows us to do so through
the sort of “integrated approach” to Mizrahi and Palestinian Arab history which Shenhav,
building on Shohat and Shafir, espouses.
Following Meyerson’s comments, to which their appeared to be little objection,
the remainder of the Executive Committee’s meeting for the most part eschewed the
explicitly colonial framework for discussing Solel Boneh’s use of Palestinian Arab labor.
Instead, it turned to the by then familiar question of squaring the use of Hebrew labor
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with the supposedly “iron laws of economics.” That is, to the matter of employing Jewish
workers at the expense of profitability. Berl Repetur and David Remez dominated the
discussion, warning repeatedly of the dwindling ranks of Jewish construction workers,
partially a result of the negligence of their affairs by the Histadrut in recent years.
While the April 15, 1942 meeting concluded on a relatively positive note, the
crisis in the construction industry it sought to address subsided only partially in the
subsequent years of the War and after. The concerns Repetur, Remez, and others
expressed during the April 1942 meeting, about the potential disappearance of the Jewish
construction worker, extending beyond the conditions of the wartime economy, proved
prescient. Between 1945-1948, the shortage in construction workers in Palestine was a
major concern, prompting the establishment of training programs by the Histadrut and
reaching even the British parliament.265 Compounded by a shortage in building materials
and years of stagnant civilian construction, Palestine underwent a cross-sector housing
crisis.266 The shortage, in both housing and workers, particularly skilled ones, continued
beyond the 1948 war and the Nakba. As the following chapters show, the massive
construction projects required by the Israeli state in its initial years were carried out to a
significant extent by an underpaid, undervalued and largely “unskilled” construction
workforce. These “lower” echelons of the construction workforce would quickly become
the domain of Mizrahi Jews, Palestinian citizens, and after 1967, Palestinian non-citizen
subjects from the Occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip.
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Peppered throughout the Executive Committee’s 1942 discussion about the
construction industry and the future of the Hebrew construction worker are references to
how the direction which the industry and the worker take would impact a future Jewish
state. But these references are for the most part oblique. Talk of a state in 1942, in the
throes of a global war, was necessarily abstract. The following sections examine how a
different group of individuals, Zionist politicians and experts on economics and labor
envisioned the future Jewish state’s labor market, immediately following UNSCOP’s
recommendations for Palestine’s partition in September 1947. By then, the contours of
the state, its boundaries, and its demography, appeared to be much more concrete. The
experts were tasked specifically with proposing plans for how the new state should
address its “Arab labor question.” This, in the committee’s view, was to be a pressing
problem in a state whose population, according to the UNSCOP plan, would be roughly
forty-five percent Arab, and whose boundaries would be open to the residents of the
neighboring Palestinian Arab state and to the Middle East as a whole.

Equivocating Equality
In May 1947, three months after Britain announced its plans to withdraw from Palestine
and transfer responsibility for the land’s future to the United Nations, the UN formed the
United Nations Special Commission on Palestine (UNSCOP) to address this
responsibility. The Committee, composed of representatives of eleven member states –
Australia, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, India, Iran, the Netherlands, Peru,
Sweden, Uruguay, and Yugoslavia - was to serve in an investigative and
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recommendation-making role. Committee members conducted a several weeks’ long visit
to Palestine, toured Jewish refugee camps in Europe, met with representatives of the
Yishuv’s various political strands in Palestine and with representatives of several Arab
nations in Beirut. They did not, however, meet with Palestinian representatives. The Arab
Higher Committee boycotted UNSCOP on the grounds that Britain’s transfer of authority
to the UN was illegal. UNSCOP issued its recommendations for partitioning Palestine
into Arab and Jewish states with a separation zone under international administration
running from Jerusalem to Jaffa, on September 3, 1947 (Fig. 3.1).267
Even prior to UNSCOP’s establishment, the Yishuv leadership began preparations
for an eventual transition of power from the British to a sovereign Jewish state. Then, in
October 1947, the Yishuv institutions launched the Emergency Committee, to begin
planning the structures of the future state’s government, and the divisions of
responsibility and authority within it.268 The Committee’s head was David Ben Gurion,
and it included eight subcommittees, each responsible for a number of related topics,
according to members’ expertise.
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Subcommittee C, headed by Yitzhak Gruenbaum (1879-1970), a former head of the
Jewish Agency’s Departments of Immigration and Labor, who had been a member of
Polish parliament before immigrating to Palestine in 1933, was responsible, among other
matters, for planning the state’s Labor Ministry. Jonathan Fine rightly points out that of
all the administrative issues the Yishuv would have to tackle as it transitioned into a state
government, labor was one in which the Zionist institutions had robust structures and
experience to build on. While these pre-existing institutions, primarily the Jewish
Agency’s Department of Labor, would likely serve as a basis for the new ministry, they
would also have to undergo significant changes in scope, responsibilities, and
structure.269
Alongside questions of staffing, physical structures to occupy the future
ministry’s offices, and other matters which all subcommittees were required to address,
Subcommittee C’s planning for the Labor Ministry also included several unique
challenges. These were rooted in part in the need to incorporate duties previously handled
by the Mandate Government’s Department of Labor (established in 1942), such as
workplace safety regulation and inspection alongside the responsibilities and functions of
the Jewish Agency’s Department of Labor.270 However, in the eyes of some
subcommittee members and the experts enlisted to assist them, the “central question”
which the move from the Jewish Agency’s Department of Labor to planning a
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government labor ministry presented the subcommittee with, and one which Fine does
not address, was “the Arab labor question.”271
As mentioned above, according to the UNSCOP’s recommended partition plan,
which at the time of the Emergency Committee’s establishment was still the primary
blueprint for the future states, this population would be comprised of roughly fifty-five
percent Jews and forty-five percent Palestinian Arabs. According to this plan, the socalled “Arab labor problem” a major external threat from the perspective of Zionist
colonization and settlement since the late-Ottoman period, would to a significant degree,
become an internal question for the new state to tackle.272
As much of the critical literature on the conquest of labor has shown, some of the
strategies adopted or considered by the Yishuv until 1947 to address this “problem” – the
racially differentiated wages and concepts of each group’s standards of living, often
summarized by Zionist spectators as the problem of “cheap Arab labor” – paid lip-service
to, or even genuinely sought to address the profound inequalities between Jewish and
Arab workers. However, such egalitarian considerations were time and again forsaken or
deferred in favor of the immediate interests of Jewish workers and the “Hebrew
economy.” Indeed, Mandate Palestine’s “dual economy” – even if it was largely an
abstraction which the land’s actual economic conditions, interactions and transactions
repeatedly refuted – nonetheless provided the Yishuv with a license to not only disregard,
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but constantly position its “own” economy against an Arab one. In the new state,
however, such a separation would present a wholly different challenge.
Subcommittee C’s planning efforts were thus faced with a set of foundational
questions regarding the racially divided labor market: Could the new state preserve the
Yishuv’s Mandate-era approach built on economic segregation, unequal wages and
rights, precedence for Hebrew labor, and preference for Jewish economic interests? What
would such a preservation entail? If continued segregation was not a viable option, what
were the alternatives? What kind of economic responsibilities would the new state have
towards its nearly 500,000 projected Palestinian citizens?
Before examining the work of Subcommittee C, a discussion of the Yishuv’s
plans for managing a population of nearly 500,000 Palestinian citizens on the eve and
during the initial stages of the 1948 War, begs addressing one of the oldest and thorniest
historiographical debates regarding the events of the war: to what extent did the Yishuv’s
leadership plan the mass expulsion of Palestinians during the 1948 War? It may be
tempting to read the evidence presented, in this section and the following one, of plans
proposed within the Yishuv leadership for a future which did not envision a Palestinian
Nakba, as indicative of the unplanned nature of Palestinian expulsion. I do not think
however that such a reading would be supported by the evidence itself. There is little
reason to assume that if there had been plans for expulsion, the members of
Subcommittee C and the experts they enlisted would have been privy to them.
The subcommittee’s early 1948 discussions reveal the extent to which its
members viewed the inequality of the Mandate period’s labor market as deeply ingrained
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in a set of economic, cultural, and social differences between Palestine’s native Arab
population and the Jewish settler population. In a January 11, 1948 summary document,
the subcommittee’s head, Yitzhak Gruenbaum, flagged the institution of a minimum
wage as one step which would need to be taken immediately once the state begins
governing. A minimum wage, Gruenbaum argued, was necessary to “establish equality in
the labor market and terminate the competition of cheap labor.”273 During Subcommittee
C’s meeting two weeks later, however members of the subcommittee expressed
reservations as to the advisability of Gruenbaum’s statement regarding “establishing
equality,” in light of the existing wage gaps between Palestinian Arab and Jewish
labor.274
Moshe Shapira (1902-1970) of the religious Zionist Ha-Po‘el ha-Mizrahi party,
suggested that given the deep “difference” between the “level” of Jews and Arabs,
Gruenbaum remove the references to “equality,” and leave only the language about
“instituting a minimum wage.” Shapira resorted to a qualifying discourse by now familiar
in Zionist circles, stating that, “with all our desire to bring forth equality, there is no
doubt that some time will pass before this will be fulfilled…. At present, we should not
commit to achieving equality, something the state will not be able to do.”275 Avraham
Katznelson of MAPAI expressed a similar sentiment, even as he stated that he understood
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that establishing a minimum wage seeks to replace the principle of Hebrew labor, a
principle “which has no place in the state.” In that case, he argued, he agrees that the
summary “should not particularly emphasize the matter” (ein lehavlit et ha-davar bemeyuḥad), presumably referring to the concerns voiced by Shapira.276
Gruenbaum’s response to the two appears, at first, to be unequivocal: “It is
obvious that in the [Jewish] State,” he replied, “neither the conquest of labor nor the
principle of Hebrew labor will be discussed.” He was quick to qualify this statement,
however, by noting that there will be two problems, that of cheap labor, and the need to
guarantee that all unskilled work does not pass into Arab hands. The only distinctions the
state would be able to make regarding the right to certain jobs, Gruenbaum states, would
be between citizens and between foreign nationals who enter the country illegally. The
minimum wage, accordingly, will be the only device at the state’s disposal to address the
problem of cheap labor.277 And yet, shortly after Gruenbaum made such assured
statements about the necessity to forsake the principle of Hebrew labor and its conquest,
and the impossibility of a policy discriminating between citizens within the future state,
three expert memoranda submitted to the committee suggested various ways to sustain
the first two and institute the latter.
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Planning a Division of Labor
The authors of the three memoranda found in Subcommittee C’s archival records, were
Alfred Bonne (1899-1960), A.L. Grünbaum (Ga‘aton) (1898-1984), both leading
economists, and Lavi-Yitzhak Schneider (Shani-Or) (b. 1871), a high-ranking
administrator in the Mandate government’s Department of Labor.278 Despite writing the
memoranda at different moments – one before the civil war stage of the 1947-1949 war
and the Nakba began, and the other two in the shadow of the fighting – all three authors’
plans were rooted in the demographic estimates of the UNSCOP plan. That is, they were
plans for a Jewish state in which nearly half the population would be Palestinian Arabs.
When Alfred Bonne authored his 4-page memorandum, “The Problem of Arab
Labour within the New Jewish State,” on September 30, 1947 – less than a month after
UNSCOP published its partition proposal – the Yishuv had yet to establish its Emergency
Committee.279 The document opens with Bonne’s calculations, based on UNSCOP’s
Report, of the size of the future state’s Arab population. He estimates a total non-Jewish
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population, “the bulk of which are Arabs,” of between 470,000-480,000.280 Among the
“grave [political and economic] problems,” which such a large Arab “minority” in the
new Jewish state would create, Bonne regards that of labor as the foremost economic
difficulty. How, he asks, would “such an enormous number of Arab… workers and
producers,” impact the “Jewish economy”?281
This problem, Bonne explains, was not entirely new. In fact, it was similar to that
which the large Palestinian Arab population in areas of Jewish settlement constituted for
the Jewish economy up until that point. In the past, Bonne continues, the Yishuv
attempted to handle this problem by establishing “a dual economy,” intended to protect
the “high economic and social level” of the Jewish sector against cheaper Arab labor and
commodities. Ideally, partition would have enabled the continuation of such economic
segregation. However, UNSCOP’s plan, “burden[ed]” the Jewish state with a significant
Palestinian Arab population, risking “extremely oppressing effects on the Jewish capacity
of competition.”282 Therefore, Bonne’s memorandum proposes three possible approaches
to “tackle” the problem:
(a) The Arab worker within the Jewish State has free access to the Jewish labour
market, enjoying the same rights as his Jewish colleagues;
(b) The admittance of Arab workers to the Jewish labour market is governed by a
quota, which may be revised from time to time, its size to be determined by the
needs and interests of the Jewish economy;
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(c) The system of “dual” economy will be continued within the new Jewish State.
In this event, the [a]uthorities of the Jewish State will carry on the policy,
pursued by the Mandatory, of ignoring the discrimination practiced against the
Arab worker within large sections of the Jewish economy.283
In Bonne’s view, the first approach – free (and equal) access to the labor market,
for all citizens of the new state – seriously threatened the “remarkable achievements” of
the Jewish economy thus far. Simply abolishing the “policy of exclusive Jewish work”
which enabled this achievement, would result in an “immediate… flooding of the Jewish
labour market with cheap Arab workers.”284 Employers could not be expected to prefer
more expensive Jewish workers. Jewish workers, including new immigrants, would face
reduced job opportunities, wages would drop, and the new state would draw significant
Arab labor migration from neighboring countries. Bonne’s conclusions in this respect are
unequivocal: even if a policy that restricts Palestinian citizens’ access to the labor market
causes “grave apprehensions,” granting them free and equal access, “appears impossible."
An approach to organizing the labor market which Bonne himself might refer to as a
“progressive” one, as will be seen below, appears to him out of the question. The
question, then, becomes what restrictions should be implemented and how.285
The second approach Bonne evaluates involves setting an adjustable quota for
admitting Palestinian citizens as employees into the Jewish sector. This quota would be
periodically evaluated and altered in accordance with the sector’s needs. “Central control
offices” would issue labor cards for Arab workers eligible for employment, as well as
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administer their use. Only workers who had such labor cards would be eligible for
employment. Bonne’s description of this option is the driest and most technical of all
three. This is likely indicative of his preference for it, although he does not state so
explicitly. He describes the quota system’s main drawback as the “not inconsiderable”
administrative effort it would require. And even so, he remarks, there is sufficient
experience in instituting such systems elsewhere to allow for their adoption and
adaptation.
Finally, Bonne turns to describing the third option: continuing the present system
of a “dual economy.” That is, “a voluntary separation of the Jewish and Arab economic
sector, and the maintenance of bars to ‘foreign’ labour.” Bonne raises two “grave
objections” to this option. The first is a moral argument, of sorts. Bonne assumes that that
the state which will exhibit a “strong progressive trend,” is unlikely, to adopt such a
policy. The most difficult aspect for such a state, he believes, would be to “maintain an
attitude of indifference in… clashes [over] working places,” as the British did.286 The
second argument against this option is considerably more involved and seems to be the
real source of Bonne’s concern: the potentially “grave repercussions” on the international
stage if labor organizations in the new state refuse to admit Palestinians into their
ranks.287
A “policy of discrimination” of this sort, Bonne writes, is not without precedent.
The example he cites, that of South Africa, effectively extended Hayyim Arlosoroff’s
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comparison from two decades prior.288 Bonne claims that under the conditions faced by
the new Jewish state, such a policy would be harder to pursue, if only for pragmatic
reasons. In the South African case, Bonne states, “there are nearly no countries with a
negro government that could retaliate [against the policy of racial discrimination of black
South Africans].”289 The new Jewish state, however, would face a radically different
situation. In particular, “the economic fate of numerous Jewish communities whose
economic security is not infrequently menaced even now, will be at stake.” Although he
does not state so explicitly, it is clear from this juxtaposition that what he has in mind is a
sort of racial axis of fidelity and retaliation. The parallel to the relative absence of
countries with “negro government[s],” being in this instance the abundance of countries
with “Arab governments” in the proposed Jewish state’s immediate surroundings.290
In contrast to Bonne’s more focused memorandum, Aryeh Ludwig Grünbaum’s
plan, submitted to Subcommittee C on January 19, 1948 was intended to provide a
blueprint for the entire labor market, specifically during what Grünbaum refers to as the
state’s “development period”. Nonetheless, the “Arab labor question” is a primary focus
of Grünbaum’s as well. His analysis of this question, meanwhile, appears at first to place
him directly at odds with Bonne.291
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Grünbaum argues that the state’s initial development period, which he estimates
will last between 10-15 years, will generate a considerable number of new jobs, primarily
in construction, public works, and government administration. Since existing production
needs will persist, the new jobs generated by the development economy, will mean that
this period will be characterized not by unemployment but “by [a need] to find working
hands to undertake all the necessary jobs.”292 As a result, there will likely be very little
competition over jobs between Jews and Arabs. The main concern regarding wages will
not be their reduction due to “social swamping” by the cheap labor of the state’s Arab
citizens, but exaggerated wages for all.293 Moreover, unless the “development period”
will be substantially extended, the state would likely need to rely also on migrant labor
and imports. The primary challenge of administering the labor market would thus be the
prevention of irregular entry of “Arabs… from neighboring countries,” primarily the
neighboring Palestinian state, and of general “chaos” in the labor market due to extensive
Jewish immigration.294
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Although Grünbaum’s analysis of the challenges is at odds with Bonne’s, his
proposed solutions echo the administrative and bureaucratic approach of Bonne’s
preferred suggestion. The key difference between Bonne’s proposal and Grünbaum’s, is
that the latter insists that state involvement in the labor market should be, at least on the
face of things, universally applied to all citizens. Grünbaum suggests creating a
“rationalized” labor market, in which all individuals seeking employment will be
assigned to specific trades by governmental employment bureaus. The bureaus would
classify all workers according to their capabilities and direct them to employment
according to the economy’s needs. Each worker will receive a labor card, detailing skills,
level, and designated employment. Employers, meanwhile, would be prohibited from
hiring individuals without an employment card.295 Such a system, Grünbaum argues,
would ensure efficient use of the labor force during the crucial stages of the development
period. It would also curtail the threat of the entry of “unwanted foreign Arabs” into the
labor market, without breaching the UN partition decision’s guarantee of free travel
between the new Arab and Jewish states.296
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Grünbaum explicitly rejects instituting separate employment bureaus for Arab
citizens of the state, a practice which he argues “gives the impression of their
discrimination” (me‘oreret et ha-roshem shel haflayatam le-ra‘a), and manifests a
“politics” he describes as “unwanted and even impossible, for a number of political and
moral reasons.”297 What potential competition there still might be between the new
state’s Arab and Jewish population, despite the abundance of employment offered during
the development period, will in Grünbaum’s view be mitigated further by two factors: 1)
the inability of the state’s Arab citizens to engage in all but unskilled labor during this
initial period; and 2) the continued material support of non-governmental Zionist
institutions for Jews in “conquest labor (‘avoda kibushit) in the village, quarries, ports,
etc.”298 Thus, Grünbaum adopts the notion of Palestinian “backwardness,” and suitability
primarily to unskilled labor which characterized and justified the racial division of labor
during the Mandate period.299 He also endorses, like Bonne, the continuation of the
conquest of labor, through the subsidization of Jewish workers – increasing their real
income using non-governmental funds while nominally maintaining equal pay for equal
work. It appears clear that Grünbaum’s main concern was not discrimination per se, but
rather its “impression.”
Although he states in the memorandum’s summary that, “on principle, it is
prohibited to discriminate against the Arab citizens of the Jewish state,” Grünbaum’s plan
is rife with discriminatory practices. These are couched in terms of cultural differences
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and differential needs. In this respect, his plan proposes no more than a slightly
“softened” version of the racial division of labor that evolved during the Mandate period.
It institutes a preference for an effectively segregated employment market, in which the
employment bureaus will be instructed to “usually direct Arab workers to Arab
workplaces and Jewish workers to Jewish workplaces.”300 And it endorses a continued
racial wage gap, using non-governmental subsidies for Jewish workers, even in
government funded public and development works.301
The final proposals regarding the organization of the labor market to be discussed
here, are those submitted to Subcommittee C by Lavi Schneider (Shani-Or). A generation
the senior of the two economists, Bonne and Grünbaum, Schneider was an administrator
in the Mandate government’s Department of Labor. Unlike Bonne and Grünbaum,
Schneider was a permanent expert member of the subcommittee. He provided detailed
proposals for the structure of the future state’s Labor Ministry, a lengthy plan for the
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organization and administration of labor in the state, and a short memorandum dedicated
specifically to the “Administration of the Arab Labor Market.”302
In both the lengthier plan and the short memorandum, Schneider divides the
“Arab labor question” into three issues, which recall those discussed by Bonne and
Grünbaum: 1) the level of wages; 2) regulating employment; and, 3) preventing entry of
foreign workers from neighboring countries. Regulating the “Arab Labor problem”,
Schneider writes, will require “a range of legal, economic and administrative measures.”
Such measures should “protect the national [i.e., Jewish] character of the economy, while
maintaining the rights of the Arab citizens and proper relations with the Arab
population.”303
Like Bonne and Grünbaum, Schneider bases much of his analysis and
recommendations on assumptions about the Palestinian citizens’ lower standard of living
and the adjustment period which raising it to a “Jewish level” would require. To do so,
Schneider turns to a theory of wages and consumption which had appeared occasionally
in earlier discussions of the “cheap labor problem”: the idea that raising Arab wages and
standards of living to those of Palestine’s Jewish population, could only be done
gradually and over an extended period of time.304
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According to this theory, a swift equalization of wages would be economically
disastrous. as populations with lower standards of living were not properly versed in
consumption to ensure the continued circulation of capital within the economy. Rather,
they would passively squander capital. In the context of Mandatory Palestine and in
Schneider’s plan for the future Jewish State, this theory of consumption essentially
granted license to a continuation of the wage gap between Palestinian Arabs and Jews.
That is, until the consumption habits and needs of the lower-income Palestinian
population would expand appropriately. In the meantime, Palestinian workers would “of
course,” be paid a “fair wage, according to [their] needs.”305
The solutions Schneider proposed to tackle the wage gap were similar to those of
his peers. To ensure that new Jewish immigrants, especially, find their place in the labor
market, a continued, if modified, “conquest” approach to labor should be considered.
Employers would pay equal wages to all according to the “Arab standard,” and nongovernmental Zionist institutions would supplement the wages of Jewish workers so that
they reach a more “appropriate” level.306
Schneider also proposed a segregationist approach to conducting public works in
particular, echoing some of the same concerns British officials expressed during the
construction of the Haifa harbor.307 As wage discrimination between Arab and Jewish
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workers at the same workplace is “unwanted,” work in “public works, railway[s]… and
port[s]” should be allotted to exclusively Jewish or Arab work groups, with the exception
of tasks that require special expertise.308
As for preventing the entry of “foreign workers”, Schneider suggested “avoid[ing]
policing methods as much as possible, from which arises a smell of racial discrimination
and xenophobia and [which] are not likely to improve the relationships between the
groups.”309 Instead, he proposed instituting employment bureaus which would assign
workers to all public works, most government and municipal jobs, and specific economic
branches. The bureaus would exercise control and surveillance primarily through
statistical methods, rather than through policing, comparing the numbers of assigned
workers in each bureau to the numbers of employees in each workplace, while keeping
in-person inspections to a minimum.310
All three memoranda show that when faced with the potential of incorporating
nearly 500,000 Palestinian Arab citizens into the proposed Jewish state, their authors
embraced liberal, progressive rhetoric while remaining bound by, if not committed to,
colonial and racial divisions of labor and hierarchies of skill. The three essentially
proposed a continuation of policies tied to the principles of Hebrew labor and the
conquest of labor – even as those were supposedly disavowed by the politicians who
composed Subcommittee C – and endorsed various degrees of segregation in the poststatehood labor market. In keeping with their self-perceptions as part of a progressive
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political project, Bonne, Grünbaum, and Schneider portrayed these aspects of their
proposals as necessary evils, expressing their discomfort with them. They were also
careful to designate what strategies in their view lay beyond the pale. As in the
discussions of the Histadrut Executive Committee in 1942, these boundaries were set not
only by what was deemed acceptable, but also, and perhaps even primarily, by what was
considered possible. The events of 1948 dramatically altered the conditions the
memoranda set out to address. Even so, the value of analyzing them goes beyond merely
capturing a moment in the development of Zionist thinking about labor, race, political
economy, and international politics. These seemingly soon to become irrelevant plans,
provide an apt backdrop for the approach the Israeli state eventually adopted towards
administering and organizing the radically different demographics, geography, and
political economy the Nakba engendered.

Grave Apprehensions
The events of 1947-1949 – the civil war, the regional war, and most crucially the
Palestinian Nakba – altered Palestine beyond recognition. Very little of what the
UNSCOP plan and the November 29, 1947 United Nations vote on partition had
suggested for the land’s future remained. There was no Palestinian Arab state. The
Jewish state, the State of Israel, the founding of which its first Prime Minister David Ben
Gurion, declared on May 14, 1948, was considerably larger than the one proposed by
UNSCOP, swallowing through military force and armistice agreements roughly half of
the Arab state’s promised territory. The legal movement across the new state’s borders
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with its neighbors was heavily restricted and limited. Over 750,000 Palestinians were
driven from their homes, leaving only a small minority of about 150,000 who were able
to remain in the new state’s boundaries or to return to their homes within them in the
years following 1948.311 The refugees included most of the Palestinian urban elites and
political leadership. “What remained of the Palestinian people inside the nascent state,”
Shira Robinson has noted, “was a poorer, more rural, less educated, and largely leaderless
shadow of its former self.”312
Of course, the “Arab labor problem” which Subcommittee C of the Yishuv’s
Emergency Committee dealt with, had been radically altered as well. The tragedy of the
Nakba had “lifted” the “burden,” which the economist Alfred Bonne saw in the inclusion
of nearly half a million Palestinian Arabs in the proposed Jewish state, almost entirely.313
So much so, that in the hundreds of pages of archival records documenting responses and
discussions of A.L. Grünbaum’s “Four Year Development Plan,” from 1950, the
Palestinian citizens in Israel – the same “Arabs” who had occupied a primary place in his
memorandum to the Emergency Committee less than three years prior – are barely
mentioned.314
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Even so, the approach the Israeli state adopted to organizing this much diminished
“Arab labor market,” resembled, if anything, the harshest of the policies presented in
1947-1948 to Subcommittee C. The state’s policies seemed to bring together the gamut of
policies which Bonne, Grünbaum, and Schneider rejected as too extreme, too blatantly
discriminatory. Those policies from which, in Schneider’s words, “[arose] a smell of
racial discrimination and xenophobia.”315
Shortly after its independence, the nascent state imposed a military administration
upon the Palestinian citizens within it. The military administration, which remained in
place until 1966, introduced effective military rule over all Palestinian-majority areas. It
included not only a work permit regime and but also imposed severe restrictions on
Palestinian citizens’ freedom of movement. As in South Africa, Bonne’s baneful
example, the Histadrut, which only grew in power after 1948, did not accept Palestinian
citizens as equal members until 1959, and even then allocated their affairs to a separate
Arab department.316
Since the Histadrut’s labor exchanges were not nationalized and there were no
Palestinian Histadrut members until 1959, during the 1950s the Ministry of Labor
reluctantly opened a small number of dedicated labor exchanges for Palestinians. In
addition to their small number and limited geographical spread, the exchanges were
essentially limited to allocating relief work. The military administration thus cooperated
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with the Histadrut and with the Ministry of Labor in limiting Palestinian citizens’ access
to employment. It was precisely this coalescence of draconian policing, segregation, and
exclusion which, as mentioned above, allowed the labor Zionist leadership, now helming
the state, to finally pursue a policy of Hebrew labor successfully.317
Palestinians in Israel thus found themselves cut off from potential markets for
their agricultural produce and their labor, and in dire need of new means for economic
survival. By the mid-1950s, work in agriculture and then construction work, primarily in
Jewish locales, were by far the most widespread forms of wage-labor among Palestinian
citizens, employing mainly men. In both, they found themselves competing for low
wages primarily with Mizrahi Jewish immigrants, discriminated against, housed in transit
camps or settled in remote areas, and “channeled into unskilled manual labor,” but
nonetheless given distinct precedence by authorities over Palestinian citizens.318
The state’s first decade also brought forth the near disappearance of the “Hebrew
construction worker,” which members of the Histadrut Executive Committee’s
Secretariat so feared in 1942 – at least as they likely imagined such a worker. As
mentioned in the introduction to this dissertation, the forced migration of most
Palestinians during the 1947-1949 war and the influx of European and Mizrahi Jews in
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the 1950s into the new Israeli state, rendered large-scale construction projects an urgent
priority across Israel/Palestine. The Israeli government initiated the construction of
“development towns” (‘ayarot pituaḥ), new neighborhoods, agricultural settlements, and
supposedly-temporary “transit camps” (ma‘abarot) within its new boundaries in the
1950s and 1960s, to house immigration waves that tripled the countries Jewish
population.319
During the same period, the archetypal European Jewish Zionist “pioneers,” the
ideal subjects of the then hegemonic labor Zionist movement, continued their withdrawal
from physical labor in construction. The pre-state era ideals of Hebrew labor and building
the land,” which had made construction a contested and ideologically celebrated line of
work, remained in place. However, in line with the new state’s developing division of
labor, the task of carrying out these ideals was rapidly racialized, falling to the state’s
most marginalized populations.
First, construction drew in Mizrahi Jews, who by 1957 made up roughly 40% of
the industry’s workforce. These new immigrants, which the new state’s leadership largely
perceived as “backwards” and “primitive,” were tasked with carrying the mantle of
“Hebrew labor,” partially in the name of their own “development” and “physical
regeneration.”320 Then, when the Jewish sector reached full employment in the late
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1950s, the construction industry increasingly came to depend also on Palestinian citizens.
By 1962 Palestinian citizens were roughly twice as likely as Jewish citizens to be
employed in construction. By 1971, they were roughly three times as likely.321 Israel’s
division of labor after 1948 thus appeared more and more like the colonial ones which
labor Zionists had for so long outwardly disavowed. This disavowal had been throughout
the Mandate almost always conditional, its pursual deferred. “Now,” was almost never
the right time to decline the benefits afforded by virtue of proximity to whiteness in a
racially ordered world, or to refuse exclusionary and exploitative policies, even if they
raised “grave apprehensions.”
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CHAPTER 4: “WILL YOUR GOVERNMENT BE TAKING
THEM TOO?” POLITICAL ECOLOGIES AND
ECONOMIES OF STONE, 1948-1964
In the years immediately following 1948, the stone quarries to the south of the Palestinian
villages of Bi‘na, Deir al-Assad, Majd al-Krum, and Nahf (henceforth the Shaghur Valley
quarries, although they are often referred to separately in various sources), became a
point of contention and contestation between locals, the nascent Israeli state, competing
labor unions, and several commercial operations. The quarries were located primarily in
an area which local landowners had previously leased to the Mandate government during
the final years of British rule, for the purpose of military training, but which under the
new Israeli state became the target of competing ownership claims.322 Evidence as to
whether all or some of the quarries were active prior to the lease to the Mandate
government is vague. However, as early as 1949, locals who had previously relied
primarily on agricultural production or on wage-labor in Palestine’s urban centers, began
independently operating or working as wage-laborers in several of the quarries. The
quarries then became their primary source of livelihood.323
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In their search for new sources of income in the aftermath of 1948, the residents
of the Shaghur valley villages were not unlike many of their Palestinian peers elsewhere.
The Palestinian Nakba brought with it the forced migration of roughly 750,000
Palestinians and the near complete destruction of Palestinian urban life. In its wake, the
nascent Israeli state imposed a military administration upon the roughly 150,000
Palestinian citizens who were able to remain within or return to the newly established
state in the years following 1948 and who, for the most part, eventually became Israeli
citizens. The military administration introduced severe restrictions on Palestinian
citizens’ movement and employment. Palestinians in Israel thus found themselves cut off
from potential markets for their agricultural produce and their labor, and in dire need of
new means of economic subsistence.
Examining the history of the Shaghur quarries after 1948, alongside several other
quarries in the newly formed Israeli state, this chapter returns once again to the material
and site which stood at the center of Chapter 2: stone and the quarry. This chapter
examines how a confluence of factors spanning ecology, economy, politics, and race,
made quarries into flashpoints between the state, business interests and the country’s
most marginalized populations. Quarries emerged as such flashpoints as a result of
Israel/Palestine’s geography and geology, the historical patterns of Zionist colonization,
the ability of some Palestinians to remain within the new Israeli state despite the Nakba
and the geographical location of those that remained, the attempts of the Israeli state to
continue Zionism’s conquest of stone with the tools and power now available to it, and
ongoing processes of racialization of physical labor.
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Like other forms of physical labor, quarry work, which as Chapter 2 has shown
was already racialized under British rule, became during the 1950s and 1960s further
identified with Palestinian citizens and Mizrahi Jews. As this chapter will demonstrate,
the realities of work and life in and around the quarry, were often brutal – marked by
exploitation and precarity. At the same time, the quarry and the relationships forged with
and within it, allowed these marginalized communities to rearticulate their selfperceptions and shore up their material circumstances in the wake of traumatic
dislocation. The chapter concludes by investigating how quarries as Palestinian and
Mizrahi spaces left an indelible, if underrecognized, mark on Palestinian culture and
played a pivotal role in early representations of Mizrahi Jews.

Stubborn Formations
Throughout the 1950s and early 1960s, the Israeli state carried out massive construction
of housing and infrastructure. These building enterprises, carried out by public and
private contractors, were intended to “absorb” incoming immigrants, and strengthen the
state’s hold over its territory. This was particularly true in territories which UNSCOP’s
partition plan had originally designated as part of the future Arab state, where even in the
aftermath of the Nakba, Palestinians often still constituted a majority. The state’s
construction frenzy proved a catalyst for the introduction of skilled Palestinian
construction workers into the “Jewish” labor market as early as 1949. It also created a
growing need for construction materials such as cement, stone, and quicklime.324
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To obtain the latter two materials in particular, the Israeli state found itself
uncomfortably entangled with, if not dependent upon, the Palestinians who remained
with its boundaries and were now its citizens. This dependency was equally rooted in
how Mandate Palestine’s stone industry took shape, and in the events and aftermath of
1948 and the Nakba. While Zionist attempts to monopolize other crucial production
sectors during the mandate were often successful, effectively laying the infrastructural
and economic foundations for the Israeli state, the “conquest of stone” (kibush ha-even)
still remained from a Zionist standpoint, perilously incomplete.325
As I have argued in the second chapter, the reasons for this failure were varied.
Unlike cement production or electrification, Zionist efforts to enter quarrying and stone
production during the Mandate, encountered an already established Palestinian quarrying
industry which was not only relatively technically advanced, but also owned much of the
stone-rich land where quarries could be opened. Thus, even the largest Zionist stone
enterprise at the time, the Even va-Sid company, began as a partnership with Palestinian
capitalists. In addition, Palestinian quarry and stone workers had better knowledge, skills,
and expertise than their Jewish counterparts. In the initial years of “the conquest of
stone,” Jewish quarry workers had, for the most part, learned the trade by apprenticing
under Palestinian masters. British racial thinking about the “inherent” laboring capacities
of Arabs and Jews, which associated the former with the hard, physical labor required in
quarrying and the latter with more “technical” work, limited Jewish work on government-
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operated quarries. Finally, the Zionist turn to quarry mechanization only produced limited
success.
The territorial patterns of Zionist colonization also structured the post-1948 stone
quarrying industry. The pattern of Zionist land purchase during the years prior to the
establishment of the state, generated a by now widely recognized overlap of high-quality
agricultural soil and the Zionist so-called “’N’ of settlement” (figs. 4.1 and 4.2). At the
same time, it also generated a significant mismatch: the areas of Mandate Palestine where
the Zionist Yishuv owned land privately and collectively on the eve of 1948 – at the
height of their pre-state expansion – were almost entirely misaligned with the land’s
limestone deposits (fig 4.3).
As part of the Nakba, Zionist forces drove out the Palestinian residents of some
limestone rich areas which Israel was then able to include within its boundaries,
particularly in the so-called “Jerusalem corridor.” This made it considerably easier for
state authorities to facilitate the exploitation of deposits there.326 However, the two areas
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Fig. 4.1 Classification of soil map. Sami Hadawi “MAP H: Palestine:
Classification of Soil,” Palestinian Rights and Losses in 1948: A
Comprehensive Study (London: Saqi Books, 1988), p. 200. Copied from
Aida Asim Essaid, Zionism and Land Tenure in Mandate Palestine
(London: Routledge, 2014), p. 7.
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Fig. 4.2. Map of Jewish-owned land in Palestine c. 1947. From Aida Asim Essaid,
Zionism and Land Tenure in Mandate Palestine (London: Routledge, 2014), 7.
Based on “Jewish Owned Land in Palestine as of 1947,” palestineremembered.com
https://www.palestineremembered.com/Acre/Maps/Story571.html.
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Fig. 4.3. Lithologic map of Israel and Environs with Legend. Copied from A. Sneh, M.
Rosensaft, 2014, “Major Exposed Lithologic Units of Israel and Environs (1:500,000),”
Geological Survey of Israel http://gsi.gov.il/?CategoryID=698&ArticleID=1768.
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of the state in which there remained a Palestinian majority, the Galilee and the so-called
Triangle area (Arabic: al-Muthalath, Hebrew: ha-Meshulash), an area spanning from
Kafr Qassem in the south to Wadi ‘Arra in the north, were also home to the majority of
limestone deposits within its boundaries.
In the years immediately following 1948, this underlying geology was crucial not
only because the Israeli state had to contend with the absorption of unprecedented waves
of Jewish immigration, as mentioned above, but also with a cyclical and acute shortage of
cement, which lasted at least until mid-1951. It soon became apparent that both the
production of the local Nesher Cement Company, still a monopoly at the time, and
cement imports in a time of global shortage, would not be able to satiate the construction
boom’s needs. The emergent practice of settling Jewish immigrants in so-called
“abandoned” Palestinian villages and neighborhoods, could only partially meet the state’s
settlement needs and plans. Planning officials suggested three solutions, to be pursued in
parallel: the first, was to hasten the long-delayed establishment of a second cement
factory. The second solution was to adopt and develop new building techniques. The
third solution was to adapt local Palestinian construction techniques. Both the new
techniques and the adapted local ones, the committee members suggested, would shift
construction’s dependency from cement, back to stone. Accordingly, they would also
necessitate increased quarry production.327
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Conditions of Exploitation
This coalescence of material shortages and geological conditions had considerable effects
on the lives of the Palestinians in the Galilee and the Triangle, on Mizrahi Jewish
immigrants, and on the state’s extractive policies. The drastic curtailment of the
economic horizons of Israel’s largely agricultural Palestinian citizenry, the imposition of
a military administration, and the attendant restrictions on their movement and
employment, had radically changed many Palestinians’ relationship to their environment.
Where in many places agricultural lands were seized and agricultural trade became
unviable, quarries offered a local source of livelihood, whether as independent, and
frequently unlicensed, quarry operators, or as wage-laborers. The state, in turn, tried to
gain dominance over stone production by turning to land expropriation, discriminatory
license-granting for quarry operation, and a continued emphasis on pre-state policies of
Hebrew labor – effectively granting preference to the livelihood of Jewish citizens over
that of Palestinian ones.328 The government Custodian of Absentee Property, an office
ostensibly set up to handle the properties of Palestinians considered legally “absent,”
played a significant role in the state’s attempts to gain control and administer Palestinian
owned quarries.329 Alongside the State Assets’ Department of the Treasury Ministry and
the Jewish National Fund (JNF), the Custodian was charged with devising the conditions
of quarry operation leases.330 The Custodian’s role was not limited to expropriating
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Palestinian lands. It also provided enterprising Jewish quarriers with the “abandoned”
machinery of Palestinian quarries.331
As far as the labor itself was concerned, the racial division of labor in the
quarries, which British racial thinking undergirded during the Mandate period, by and
large continued. Jewish employers in the new state often showed a distinct preference for
Palestinian workers. This was not solely because of their greater experience and skill, but
also because as mostly “unorganized” laborers, excluded from the Histadrut until 1959,
Palestinians were made extremely vulnerable to exploitation. Contemporary reports about
quarry operators’ employment practices detail a wide range of abuses: from low pay and
the continued holding back of wages, to what some contemporary reports described as
“disgraceful conditions of exploitation” (tna’ei nitzul maḥpirim) of Palestinian workers,
including women and children, and employers’ “reign of terror” (mishṭar shel ṭeror) over
employees who threatened to expose such practices.332
Ministry of Labor officials occasionally attempted to bridge the need to protect
the rights of Palestinian workers on the one hand, and the policy of increasing Jewish
employment, on the other, but often granted precedence to the production imperatives of
quarry operators. Some operators even successfully argued for the continued employment
of low-paid “Arab labor” as a temporary measure intended to establish their enterprises’
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profitability. After profitability was assured, they promised, they would be able to meet
the mandated quota of 50% “Hebrew labor.”333 Discriminatory arrangements supported
by economic calculations were not only the province of small employers. At least until
late 1954, Even va-Sid – by far the largest quarrying operation at the time – refused to
provide Palestinian workers with employment conditions and wages equal to their Jewish
peers. The company argued that since no other quarry operators had done so, they could
not afford to “bear the costs” of pioneering such equality.334
Even when Jewish workers were introduced to the quarries, quarry labor often
remained racialized, albeit differently so. Throughout the 1950s and early 1960s the
Jewish workforce in the quarries – and in physical labor in the construction industry in
general – became increasingly Mizrahi. Quarry operators were encouraged specifically to
employ recently arrived Mizrahi Jewish immigrants settled in transit camps (ma‘abarot),
in “abandoned” Palestinian villages, and in other forms of settlements located near their
quarries.335 In part, this too was a matter of geography and geology, seemingly detached
from the labor itself: the story of state-directed Mizrahi settlement in these decades was
intimately linked with the policy of “Judaizing” areas of the state which, prior to 1948,
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had been and often still were, largely Palestinian.336 And it was these areas, as we have
seen, which were richest in building stone deposits.
However, in areas of the Palestinian-dominated Triangle and Galilee as well as in
the corridor along the Jaffa-Jerusalem road, the Jewish agency also established
designated “quarriers’ villages” (kfarei ḥotzvim) in particularly stone-rich areas.337 These
quarriers’ villages were most frequently populated primarily by Mizrahi Jews. This
decision was justified through racializing – and often self-contradictory – discourse,
much of which can be traced back to the Mandate period and, in the case of Yemeni
Jews, as far back as the turn of the century Yavnieli mission.338
Thus, for example, when discussing work in the quarries, writers in the Hebrew
press often depicted Kurdish Jews, such as those settled in Ma‘oz Tzion, a settlement
established in 1951 on the ruins of the Palestinian village of al-Qastel en route to
Jerusalem, who dominated the quarries of the Qastel, as the ideal hard-laborers: culturally
primitive but strong-headed and able-bodied.339 Others, meanwhile, depicted Yemeni
Jews almost as Kurdish Jews’ diametric opposite – as if “all spirit, and no body. Like
fireflies,” one contemporary journalist opined, while another described an innate Yemeni
fear of “mountains and their shadows.”340 Others still, however, depicted Yemeni Jews as
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extremely hard-working, with little to no material needs, and so inherently acquiescent
they were unlikely to express any material demands. As such, Yemeni Jews were in fact
excellent candidates to be settled in the often isolated quarriers’ villages, such as
‘Atzmon in the north, Tirat Yehuda and Hadid along the Jaffa-Jerusalem road, and others.
There they could carry out work which would improve their physical state, and which
few others wanted to do.341

The Right to the Quarry
In this context, the history of the Shaghur valley quarries in the Western Galilee stand out
for multiple reasons. First, the struggle over them was prolonged and the Palestinian
laborers, quarry owners, and activists who challenged the state over their right to the
quarry were relatively well organized. The struggle was also widely publicized,
reverberating, as we shall see, even internationally. Second, the struggle over the Shaghur
valley quarries fueled some of the most incisive contemporary Palestinian critiques of
Israeli state policy beyond those articulated by relatively well-known figures, such as
communist Members of Knesset Tawfiq Tubi and Imil Habibi (sometimes rendered as
Emile Habiby), or the lawyers and activists Hanna Naqara and Elias Kusa. Third, the
Shaghur quarries quickly became well-known for the exquisite quality of their limestone
deposits. Initially considered by Israeli authorities as an excellent and abundant source
for much-needed gravel, by 1956 the quarries were being hailed in the Hebrew press as a
treasure trove of marble of unrivaled quality. This meant that large contractors such as
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the Histadrut’s Solel Boneh company, the privately-owned Company for the
Development of Quarries in Israel (ha-Hevra le-Pituah Mahtzavot be-Yisrael), and smalltime entrepreneurs alike, all vied for a share in their exploitation.342 Finally, the struggle
over the Shaghur quarries left an indelible, if underrecognized, mark on Palestinian
culture and conceptions of what it means to be proudly, defiantly, and politically
Palestinian, and of a specifically Palestinian connection to the materiality of the land of
Palestine/Israel.
As noted above, the Palestinians of the Shaghur valley began working the
regional quarries as early as 1949, primarily through local initiative, but also as hired
labor.343 Archival evidence suggests that the earliest attempt to organize among local
workers took place in early 1951, when workers founded a cooperative quarry workers’
association in Bi‘na, backed by the local branch of the communist-affiliated labor union,
the Arab Workers Congress (AWC) (Arabic: Mu’atamar al-‘Umal al-‘Arab, Hebrew:
Congress ha-Po‘alim ha-‘Arvim). However, organization efforts among the workers
seem to have begun in earnest even earlier, as a response to the establishment of a quarry
by the Israeli government’s Public Works Department (PWD).
While he provides no specific date for the events, the poet and novelist Hanna
Ibrahim (b. 1927) recalls in his memoirs that when the PWD began operating the quarry,
it employed “70 Jewish workers from Acre, but not a single individual from Bi‘na, aside
from the night guard, who was coincidentally the son of the owner of the land, and whose
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employment was one of the conditions of the lease [to the PWD].” In response to the
exclusion of Palestinians from the quarry’s workforce, the local branch of the AWC
decided to organize “a different kind of demonstration (muẓahara min nau‘ akhir).”
Instead of an ordinary demonstration to demand work, they would go to “conquer the
labor (li-iḥtilal al-‘amal)” in the quarry. Ibrahim recalls that as soon as the AWC issued
its decision to attempt such a conquest of labor, “more than fifty workers, some of whom
were carrying what work tools they had,” went to the PWD quarry and “simply” asked
for work, “just like that” (hakadha bi-basaṭa). While the director of works in the quarry
could not offer work to all the individuals who arrived that day, an arrangement was
reached whereby twelve of those who were in greatest need began working in the quarry.
This “partial victory,” as Ibrahim describes it, further cemented the AWC’s already
growing role in the village.344
In early 1951, several Bi‘na residents who had been employed in a quarry
operated by a Jewish resident of Haifa since 1949, established the Bi‘na Cooperative
Association for Quarry Workers. The Haifa resident operated a quarry on land in the
Shaghur valley which he was leasing from its Palestinian owners. The organizers of the
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Cooperative Association hoped that operating their own quarry as a cooperative would
provide an alternative to the poor pay and harsh conditions work as hired labor in the
Haifa resident’s operation offered.
The Cooperative’s organizers first applied to register their association in late
January 1951. In his recommendation to the Registrar of Cooperative Associations in the
Ministry of Labor to approve the Cooperative’s registration, Y. Shim‘oni of the Ministry
of Labor described the low rates which the quarry operator paid the locals for their labor.
These rates, Shim‘oni reported, were paid on a piecework basis, and effectively
guaranteed the quarry operator a “one-hundred percent profit.” At the same time, the
piecework method itself, “[exploited] every movement of the laborer and [strained] him
to produce maximal output and to use what [remained] of his strength over unlimited
work hours.” No longer willing to accept such treatment, Shim‘oni writes, the workers
broke away from their employer and started operating a quarry independently on land
owned by another Bi‘na resident. Now, inspired by the AWC branch in the village, they
wished to register as a cooperative association so as to continue the operation of their
quarry.345
Following Shim‘oni’s recommendation, the process of registering their
association seemed to go relatively smoothly. By mid-March 1951 the Cooperative was
successfully registered. Obtaining a license to operate the quarry, however, proved
considerably more difficult. When the workers had first applied for a license in late
January 1951, the Nahariya district governor demanded they first register as a
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cooperative association and provide him with a list of all association members and their
roles, which the organizers promptly did. However, as a May 1951 letter from Yussef
‘Abdu, Secretary of the Union of Cooperative Associations of Arabs in Israel, another
AWC-affiliated operation, reveals, neither meeting these conditions, nor meeting any
further stipulations presented by the governor seemed to have had much effect.
According to ‘Abdu, in late April that year, the governor flatly refused to grant the Bi‘na
Cooperative Association for Quarry Workers a license to operate, without further
explanation. By 1954, the Association seems to have completely ceased operation, at
least in any official capacity.346
Other quarries in the Shaghur region saw different kinds of struggles during the
early 1950s. At the Solel Boneh quarry, for example, the company’s quarry manager
conditioned workers’ employment on their leaving the AWC and joining the competing
labor union, the Palestine Labor League (PLL), a Histadrut-affiliated union intended to
organize Palestinian workers.347 By early 1954, it became clear that taken together, these
struggles constituted something broader than each single manifestation indicated. It had
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become a struggle for the ownership of the quarries and the agricultural lands
surrounding them.

“A Chain of Racial Persecution”
In February 1954, Shoukry al-Khazen, the headmaster of the prestigious Orthodox
School in Haifa and a political activist, and Boulous Hanna Boulous, one of the larger
landowners in the Shaghur region, authored a six-page English-language memorandum,
addressed to then Israeli President, Yitzhak Ben Tzvi.348 Signed by over one-hundred and
fifty of the landowners of Bi‘na and Deir al-Assad, the memorandum, copies of which
Khazen and Boulous sent also to the American and British consulates, meticulously
surveyed the historical background for local claims to ownership of the quarries. It
described in detail what its authors described as the “four links” of the “chain of racial
persecution” the state had unleashed upon the locals.
Citing the 1945 Villages’ Statistical Report issued by the Mandate government,
Khazen and Boulous argued that prior to 1948, neither the British nor the Ottoman
government laid claim to the lands of either village, as they both recognized the villagers
as their sole owners. Land surveys the Mandate authorities conducted in 1931-2 and as
recently as 1946, recognized these village-owned lands and categorized them according
to their agricultural usage. The memorandum does point out though that unlike its early
1930s precursor, the 1946 survey did not account for land which residents were at the
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time leasing to the British Army as a training ground. This land, as it happened, was also
where the villages’ quarries were located.
The British Army, the memorandum states, honored their lease and continued
paying their dues to the land’s owners until all payments were completed on May 15,
1952, exactly four years after the Mandate was dissolved. The relationship of the villages
with the authorities, however, changed radically with the establishment of the State of
Israel.
[G]overnment officers began to exercise diverse devices of oppression and
persecution against the owners [of the land] to prevent them from working the
quarries preparatory to confiscating them.349
It was then that the four “links” of the “chain of racial persecution,” began to unfold. If
the purpose of this chain was the land’s eventual confiscation, what pulled it along from
link to link was the dependency of the people of Bi‘na and Deir al-Assad on the quarries
for their very survival.
First, the government “adamantly and arbitrarily” refused to grant licenses to
Palestinian operated quarries (as we have seen above in the instance of the Bi‘na
Cooperative Association). As a result, the landowners chose to operate according to what
the memorandum describes as the “commonplace knowledge that the… competent
authorities under the military rule envisaged that no license should be granted to an Arab
unless he takes a Jewish partner.”350 To get around this unwritten rule, some quarry
owners leased their land to Jewish contractors, so that the latter could then apply for the
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necessary licenses. This, the landowners thought, would enable both them and the
laborers from the area to once again earn a living from the quarries, even if it meant
sharing some of the profits with the lessees. However, the “second link” of the chain –
which at this point the landowners began seeing for what it was – soon appeared.
When, following their agreement with the quarries’ Palestinian landowners, the
Jewish lessees first applied to the government for quarrying licenses, government
officials instructed them instead to obtain altogether new, separate leases for the same
lands. This time, the officials told the lessees, they should obtain leases for these lands
not from the local landowners of the Shaghur valley, but from the state, and specifically
from what the memorandum refers to as the “Director of the State Domain.” The land,
the government officials stated, did not belong to the Palestinians who had leased it to the
Jewish operators in the first place – it was state-owned land. Here, for the first time, the
government introduced the claim that the state, and not the people of Bi‘na and Deir alAssad, was the quarries’ rightful owner.351
The Jewish contractor-lessees, likely eager to begin working the quarries,
complied. They sought separate leases from the state for the lands which they had
originally leased from the Palestinian landowners. Sure enough, they soon received the
leases, and alongside them the coveted quarrying licenses. Having done so, the
contractor-lessees then refused to pay the previously agreed upon rent to the Palestinian
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landowners, let alone share the profits of the quarries’ operation. The lessees argued that
the new leases signed vis-à-vis the state rendered the previous ones null and void and
refused all claims by the landowners otherwise.352
Following this stage, which Khazen and Boulous define as the “third link” in the
“abominable policy of racial oppression,” the local landowners decided to turn to the
supreme court in order to challenge the state’s claims of ownership.353 The supreme court
ruled in favor of the Palestinian landowners, denying the state’s claim to the land.
However, this did not dissuade the state from further pursuing its claims. Rather, it
unleashed the chain’s “fourth link,” as the state turned to a different legal avenue to
obtain control of the quarries.354
Seeing that the court would not uphold its claims, the Israeli state filed for a land
dispute with its own land dispute arbitration authority, the Land Settlement Department.
The Land Settlement Department’s handling of the matter, the memorandum alleges, was
in direct contradiction to its intended role as an impartial arbitrator. Its representatives in
both villages, made presenting any challenges to the state’s claims extremely difficult for
the landowners. The representatives never posted a detailed plan of the lands claimed by
the state as required by law. The Department also closed all its local offices throughout
the period allotted for filing challenges. Since the residents of the Shaghur valley were all
living under the movement restrictions of the military administration, this made filing
such challenges considerably more difficult. Finally, when the Land Settlement
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Department appointed a land surveyor to examine the competing claims, it appointed
none other than the surveyor of the Custodian of Absentee Property. Unsurprisingly, the
appointed surveyor’s findings aligned entirely with the state’s claims, ignoring those of
Palestinian landowners. The “financially able” among the latter, the memorandum states,
were forced to go to great expense and hire another surveyor independently to try and
challenge the decision.355
Although their understanding of the government’s actions as pre-meditated from
the get-go may have lent too much credit to the foresight and planning of state authorities
and agents, the efficacy of what the memorandum’s authors called the racial chain of
oppression was undeniable. By the time of the writing of the memorandum, local
landowners and laborers alike had suffered considerable economic damage, both by
virtue of being unable to work the quarries regularly, and of the expenses which the legal
proceedings caused them to incur. While the matter of ownership was still disputed at the
time of the memorandum’s submission, an assessment of the events which led up to that
point provided its authors and over one-hundred and fifty local signatories, with the
grounds to present a damning critique of the Israeli state.
This critique was not reliant solely on a systematic presentation of events, but also
on carefully selected rhetoric. The rhetorical inventiveness of the authors began with the
pointed imagery of the “chain of racial oppression,” given body and weight by the
description of its different links. Each mention of the chain and its links was underlined

355

TNA, FO 371/111060, “Memorandum.”

182
in the original text. It then culminated with the analysis the memorandum provided of the
underlying objectives of the state, which is worth citing in full:
We cannot but conclude from the aforementioned measures that the Government
has formulated a policy contemplating our impoverishment by stripping us of our
landed properties and by causing us to incur excessive expenses in litigations
against individual trespassers and against Government departments endeavouring
to take our lands. The picture is becoming gradually clear. It depicts a malicious
intention to render us landless, unable to live decently, and to make us wood
choppers and water carriers for the children of Israel. We would ultimately
become dispersed and destitute and be forced to leave the country to join the army
of refugees.356
Khazen and Boulous had already laid out the claim that the state was following a
racial policy of oppression throughout. Now, they compounded that accusation by
portraying the state’s intentions as being to render the Palestinian minority a landless
class of “wood choppers and water carriers,” and eventually to make them into refugees.
This, of course, stood in stark contrast not only to Israel’s declared policy towards
Palestinian citizens. It also undermined labor Zionism’s continued disavowal of what its
proponents portrayed as a colonial division of labor, often employing the very same
biblical reference as Khazen and Boulous did.357 Lest invocation of such a social order
was not pointed enough, the memorandum then moved to directly invoke what Shira
Robinson has characterized as the “colonial specter” which haunted the Israeli state in its
initial years.358 Here too, they underlined the words to which they wanted to call their
readers’ attention:
We wish in particular to invite Your Excellency’s attention to the great difference
between the spirit of justice that characterized the conduct of the settlement
TNA, FO 371/111060, “Memorandum.”
See Chapter 2 and 3 above. For another example, see also: TNA: CO 733/189/3, Letter from Dov Hos to
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officers of the Colonial Mandatory Administration and the oppressive attitude of
the settlement officers of the democratic State of Israel.359
Fully leaning into the contradictory resonances of the terms “colonial” and
“democratic” in the post-World War II era, the memorandum presented its addressee, the
Israeli president, as well as the various foreign missions who received copies of the
memorandum, with a “clear picture” indeed. Despite its claims to being a democracy, its
“alleged desire to live with the Arabs in peace and friendliness,” and “the many sweet
promises… for the betterment of the lot of the Arabs of Israel,” Palestinians were finding
themselves worse off under the democratic Israel than under its colonial predecessor.

Stone Imprints
In 1964, the fight for the Shaghur valley quarries and agricultural lands was finally lost
and the city of Karmiel established in their place. In the ten years which had passed since
the landowners of Bi‘na and Deir al-Assad submitted their memorandum to the President,
contestation over the quarries took on different forms. Having found that laying legal
claims to the lands was not sufficient to prevent the Palestinian landowners and laborers
from working the quarries there, however haphazardly, in 1956 the state embraced a
different approach. In January of that year, the Israeli Defense Forces’ Chief of Staff
declared roughly 100 thousand dunums in the Galilee and additional areas, including
most of the Shaghur quarries, a “closed military zone.” Several Jewish operated quarries,
such as those of Solel Boneh, were not included within the closed zone and continued to
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operate unabated. However, Palestinian Shaghur residents who sought to operate their
own quarries, or seek work with other Palestinian quarry operators, were forced to face
the fact that accessing the lands they still legally owned was now considered a criminal
offense. In the eight years prior to Karmiel’s eventual establishment, the Shaghur
residents went on strike, protested, appealed repeatedly to the Israeli courts, and, when
possible, continued to work in the quarries despite the restrictions, risking arrest.360
In 1961, the state officially expropriated over five thousand dunums belonging to
the four Shaghur valley villages, previously included in the “closed military zone” and
encompassing the quarries. Again, the resistance of the local population was furious and
unrelenting, reaching the Israeli Knesset and Supreme Court. Sabri Jiryis described this
latter part of the Shaghur struggle as, “quite effective in the long run, since after
[K]armiel there were no more expropriations on such a scale.”361 Yet, the struggle could
not save the Shaghur quarries, which in 1964 Karmiel swallowed whole.
My attempts to trace a historical narrative of the Shaghur valley quarries led me
on a circuitous path, one which captures the ongoing movement between the material and
the metaphorical of Israel/Palestine’s stone. In April 2018, I attended a daylong
conference on the Palestinian Nakba at George Washington University. I had been
conducting research at the United States National Archives in College Park and spending
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considerable time thinking of how to incorporate the history of stonework specifically
into my project. Perhaps it was this mindset, the fact that I had seldom heard or read the
poem in English before, or both, but when during one of the conferences’ panels, the
Hebrew literary scholar Hanan Hever recited an English translation of Mahmoud
Darwish’s “Identity Card” (see Appendix I), the words “quarry” and “rock” in the poem
struck me like subsequent thunderbolts.362 There was my “in” into the world of stone, at
the heart of one of the most famous Palestinian poems of the twentieth century. The
weight of Darwish’s quintessential early expression of defiant and political Palestinianness, specifically Palestinian masculinity, was carried on the shoulders of a quarry worker
and his relationship to the quarry’s stones. “Identity Card” was so iconic, so oft cited and
discussed, it had never occurred to me to even look.
As I began learning more about the history of quarries in the archives, I adopted
“Identity Card,” alongside Ehud Ben ‘Ezer’s 1963 novel, The Quarry (ha-Mahtzeva), as
the cultural artefacts I most frequently cited in conversation, to demonstrate how quarries
shaped the experiences of the nascent Israeli state’s most marginalized populations –
Palestinians and Mizrahi Jews.363 Ben ‘Ezer’s The Quarry is hardly of the caliber of
“Identity Card.” Whereas Darwish’s poem has grown in stature over time, re-inscribed,
repeatedly, as a quintessential expression of defiant and political Palestinian-ness, Ben
‘Ezer’s novel has been, to some extent, forgotten. Nonetheless, it was a pioneering
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attempt in twentieth-century Hebrew literature to depict the lives and struggles of Mizrahi
Jews in the nascent state from their point of view. As the Mizrahi author, critic, and
political activist Sami Michael stated in a 2002 retrospective review of the novel, Ben
‘Ezer was unique among his generation of authors in his approach to writing about
Mizrahi subjects. He wrote of Mizrahi Jews not as an outside onlooker, regarding their
life as whole, rather than incomplete or lacking.364
The novel, which was also adapted into a play in 1964 and later a film in 1990,
tells the story of power struggles and romantic entanglements in an unnamed quarry and
its adjacent “quarrier’s village.” Although his characters’ relationship to the quarry in the
novel – for which Ben ‘Ezer drew inspiration from his time as a teacher in Ma‘oz Tzion,
near the Qastel Quarry on the route to Jerusalem365 – is not as intimate as that of “Identity
Card’s” speaker, work there nonetheless shapes the bodies and lives of the novel’s
protagonists. In keeping with the processes of quarry labor’s racialization described
above, Ben ‘Ezer portrays spaces which, as the novel progresses, become almost entirely
Mizrahi. At the beginning of the novel, Rabinovich, the quarry foreman and the only
remaining Ashkenazi man working there, retires. A power struggle then ensues between
Moshe David, the protagonist, and the newly appointed foreman, Nissim Levi, whose
rivalry with Moshe David dates back to their previous lives in the unnamed Middle
Eastern country from which they emigrated. After Rabinovich’s departure, the quarry
itself, the nearby village, and even the novel’s urban scenes become effectively
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segregated from the Ashkenazi Jewish elites, which figure only periodically as an
intrusive outside force. Thus, as Sami Michael has noted, the novel’s protagonists and
antagonists are given room to compete among themselves for power and influence, and
the community as a whole, to shake off Nissim Levi’s tyrannical rule from within.366
The Quarry is not devoid of orientalist tropes, and sections of it have not aged
well. However, like “Identity Card,” it nonetheless opens the door onto the forgotten role
of quarries at the margins of the nascent Israeli state: spaces where the limits of the
state’s sovereignty were tested, and where its discriminated-against populations could
exercise degrees and forms of autonomy otherwise hard to obtain.
In October 2018, I was conducting oral history interviews in Palestine/Israel.
Most of the individuals I interviewed were former construction workers. However, I was
also able to locate several former quarry workers who were willing to be interviewed as
well. Among these, the poet and author Hanna Ibrahim, who had worked in the Shaghur
valley quarries between 1952-1964, was by far the most recognizable name.367 In our
conversation at his home in Bi‘na, Ibrahim described in detail how during that period, the
people of Bi‘na, Deir al-Assad, Majd al-Krum, and Nahf struggled against the Israeli
government and the military administration to maintain access to the quarries which were
their main source of livelihood. But, as the interview revealed, this struggle’s place in
Palestinian history likely far eclipses anything that a historical narrative about it could
possibly capture.

366
367

Michael, “ha-Proletar ha-Yahid,” Ha’aretz, May 2, 2002.
Interview with Hanna Ibrahim, Bi‘na, October 22, 2018.

188
During our conversation, I asked Ibrahim, as I did others among the former
workers I spoke with, for his thoughts about Darwish’s quarry worker in “Identity Card,”
and the quarry as a Palestinian symbol. As soon as I mentioned the poem, Ibrahim said:
“He wrote this [the poem], in my name (huwwa, hay katabha bi-ismi)… he put himself in
my place (ḥaṭṭ ḥalo maḥalli).”368 He then began reciting lines from the poem which
aligned with his biography:
“I work with my comrades of toil in a quarry… (wa-a‘amalu ma‘ rifaqi al-kadḥi
fi maḥjar)
I have eight children (wa-abna’i thamaniyatun),”369 and actually I had eight
children!370
Approaching “Identity Card” anew yet again, its affinities to the narrative of the
struggle over the quarries of Bi‘na, Deir al-Assad, Majd al-Krum, and Nahf are
remarkable. The dependence of the villages on the quarries is captured in the lines: “I
have eight children / For them I wrest the loaf of bread / The clothes and exercise books /
From the rocks.” Nicknamed “red Bi‘na” (bi‘na al-ḥamra’), for the widespread support
of its people for the communist party, Bi‘na appears as a likely candidate for the village
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which Darwish describes as “…remote, forgotten / Its streets without name / And all its
men in the quarries and fields / Love communism.”371 And although talk of the
government’s intentions to take “these rocks” which are all that “you left us and all my
descendants,” could, as we have seen above, apply to any point in time from the early
1950s onwards, it would have been particularly pressing in 1963, when Darwish’s poem
was first published.
To the question, “Will your government take them too?” the state provided its
final answer the following year. But while it was eventually able to sever the material
binds between the people of the Shaghur valley and the stones for which they struggled,
and from which they “wrested bread, clothes and exercise books” for fifteen long years,
the government could not sever the affective bond between them. Rather, through
Darwish’s poem, this bond has gained a significance spanning well beyond the Shaghur
valley, across Israel/Palestine and outwards to the Palestinian diaspora and the
international scene. Yet, at the same time, its symbolic power has arguably occluded the
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material, lived history of attachments which inspired the poem in the first place. Perhaps
re-narrating the history of twentieth-century Palestine/Israel, already overdetermined by
symbols and meanings, as one in which the semiotic and the concrete are both given due
consideration, can prevent us from losing sight of one for the other.
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CHAPTER 5: “WE BUILT THIS LAND”: PALESTINIAN
CITIZENS IN ISRAEL’S CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY,
1948–1973372
“And what if I told you that… workers slept between the thorns, in the field?
Workers would dig [a hole] like a grave and put straw inside. When it rained they
would do like this around [Ahmad mimics piling up dirt so that water cannot
enter] and put a tin above.”
Ahmad Yusuf Masarweh (b. 1939), 10 October 2018373

The physical construction of the Israeli state in its initial decades depended not only on
the dispossession of Palestinians, as in the Shaghur Valley quarries, but also on their
labor. In the decades after Israel’s establishment and the Palestinian Nakba, Palestinian
citizens in Israel - a newly constituted minority in their own homeland, reeling from
catastrophe and living its aftermath – played a crucial role in the making of the state
responsible for their ongoing dispossession. As mentioned in previous chapters, Israel’s
initial decades were marked by massive state-directed construction, intended to house
unprecedented numbers of Jewish immigrants. Many of these housing projects were built
by Palestinian hands, on Palestinian-owned land, and on the ruins of Palestinian cities,
towns, and villages.
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This chapter explores the experiences of Palestinian citizens in Israel’s
construction industry in the twenty-five years after 1948. The processes through which
they became disproportionately represented in such racialized and frequently exploitative
labor, both foreshadowed the exploitation of Palestinian subjects from the West Bank and
Gaza Strip in the Israeli economy after the 1967 war, and resembled patterns of migrant
labor exploitation in other settler-colonial contexts.374 As in those instances, these process
were part and parcel of the broader marginalization and exclusion of Palestinian with
Israeli citizenship: the imposition of a military administration between 1948-1966, which
restricted their movement and employment; massive land expropriation and unequal
resource allocation which curtailed possibilities of economic sustenance and
development; and purposeful limitations imposed by the state on the construction and
development of Palestinian localities. By offering Palestinian citizens “a path to
survival,”375 Israel’s construction industry enrolled their labor in the service of the very
structures that exploited and excluded them in the first place.
These structural elements, recalling John Chalcraft’s analysis of hegemony in
relation to subaltern groups in his exploration of the dynamics of Syrian labor migration
to Lebanon, form the backdrop of this chapter. The chapter’s foreground, however, is
dedicated primarily to exploring what Chalcraft has described as “the optimism of the
story” of hegemony’s “invisible cage”: how powerful structures, because they require
decision-making agency on the part of workers, always leave “a possibility – especially
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in the context of ceaseless structural and social change, fracture, and contradiction – that
such agency [be] put to purposes other than those that [work] to reproduce the dominant
form of power.”376 I argue that although Palestinian citizens who found work in Israel’s
construction industry often did so feeling as though they had little choice, workers and
their communities used their place in the industry to circumvent and at times even
challenge the Israeli state’s suffocating hold. Through their growing role in building the
Jewish state, Palestinian citizens gained skills and knowledge of techniques, materials,
and forms of spatial organization which they adapted and introduced into the
reconstruction of their homes and towns. These capacities, marshalled in the service of
informal arrangements and solutions, were all the more instrumental given the state’s
purposeful stifling of Palestinian localities’ development. Still others refused to accept
the racialization and dehumanization which marked them as out-of-place and
undeserving, and relegated them, at best, to society’s sidelines, hidden in plain sight.
Instead, they sought to reclaim their humanity and belonging through various means,
including bringing their oppression into the public eye.
To explore these experiences, the chapter relies on oral history interviews
conducted with nineteen Palestinian men and women who are former workers, foremen,
contractors, labor organizers, and their family members, primarily from the Triangle area
and the Galilee.377 These interviews are used alongside archival sources, newspapers, and
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film. Of the nineteen individuals interviewed, the narratives of thirteen are used here.
Following a brief exposition about the narrators and the methodology I used in the
interview and analysis process, the chapter first examines the various factors which
pushed individuals into the construction industry specifically. Then it looks at the
circumstances that surrounded work-life – commuting, dwelling, and the relationship to
family, community, and home. At the center of my analysis of narrators’ experiences I
place workers’ physical and emotional experiences of labor, and the multiplicity of
homes– in the affective, discursive, and material dimensions of the word – that they
made. These included the houses they built for others, alongside the forms of shelter and
homemaking they engaged in for themselves and their communities: from establishing
temporary dwellings in harsh-conditions and attempts to be at home wherever work took
them, to utilizing the skills, expertise, and income of their labor in the service of
remaking their own homes and those of their communities.
I view Palestinian homemaking in the nascent Israeli state as a deeply political
act, akin to what bell hooks has called “construction of [the] homeplace.” “In the face of
the brutal harsh reality of racist oppression,” such “homeplaces,” hooks argues, “however
fragile and tenuous… had a radical political dimension.” hooks urges us to reevaluate
African-American women’s fulfilment of the gendered roles “assigned by sexism” within
the home, in light of how they expanded these roles to make the home a shelter, a place
of rest, and at times the starting point for revolution. Her notion of constructing the
homeplace – focused on material, affective, and intellectual care and nurturing – defines
some of the Palestinian (and at times, Palestinian and Jewish) homemaking practices
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discussed below, particularly those practiced by women. However, my emphasis is
primarily on how physical acts of construction, of making homes in the material sense,
intertwined with the struggle of Palestinian citizens in Israel to be once again at home in
their homeland.378

Narrators and Methodology
All individuals I interviewed were involved in the Israeli construction industry between
1948-1973. They are, nonetheless, a diverse group, capturing some of the variety of
Palestinian experiences shaped by the industry at the time. With the exception of one, all
narrators resided in rural locales during the period, reflecting the overwhelmingly rural
character of the Palestinian locales that survived the Nakba.379 Some narrators had
lifelong careers in the construction industry, others only spent relatively short periods of
time in it. Some aligned themselves with the Labor Zionist ruling elite of the period,
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others were and still are ardent communists. Others still, sought to make their own
political paths or seem to have had relatively little involvement in party politics.
Narrators also differed in the access they had to education. As a rule, these
differences seem to have been primarily generational. Most narrators were only able to
complete primary education. Narrators who were able to obtain a high school education,
did so despite prohibitive costs. These costs stemmed not only from the price of high
school education itself, which did not become compulsory, nor nominally “free” in Israel
until 1978, but also from the geographical dispersion of secondary education institutions
for Palestinian citizens in Israel. As a result, obtaining a high school education did not
mean that an individual did not work as a child, or in the construction industry as a
teenager.380
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The oral histories which my conversations with narrators produced are, like other
oral histories, by definition dialogic and collaborative endeavors, shaped by a wide range
of factors: The malleability of narrators’ memories and subjectivities, their selfreflexivity, the languages in which the interviews took place, my positionality vis-à-vis
interviewees, and the settings and participants. These factors no doubt influenced not
only the content of their narratives but also the discourses and cultural contexts they drew
upon and embedded their narratives in. Narrators’ memories and the processes of
remembering which the oral history interviews requires of them, are active processes of
reconstruction. These processes are informed by communal and even national memory
and ways of remembering. They are also impacted by events which occurred long after
those being recalled and by the present in which the remembering took places.381
The semi-structured interviews that inform this chapter were conducted mostly in
Hebrew, in which all narrators are fluent, and which was the primary language in which
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most of them worked, with parts of the conversations in Arabic. However, there were
instances in which narrators were more comfortable conducting interviews entirely in
Arabic. Not coincidentally, those who were more comfortable with the latter option were
also those whose working lives were conducted primarily in Arabic as well.
At the beginning of each interview, I discussed my research agenda with the
narrators, explaining that our conversations would inform a project that examines the
history of construction work and the construction industry and their roles in shaping
social hierarchies in twentieth-century Palestine/Israel. Occasionally, this also entailed
my explaining what led me, as an Israeli Jew, to be interested in this history.
Understandably, some individuals were initially more suspicious of my intentions than
others, cautious not to sound too critical of their experiences with the state or with Jewish
employers and management. Others sought to meet what they presumed were my
expectations from them. That is, as Katherine Borland has noted, narrators “adapted their
narratives to account for what they think their audiences already know, what they might
care about, what they might be sensitive to.”382
Most interviews were conducted as one-on-one affairs, usually in a single sitting.
However, in instances in which other people were present during an interview, I have
also incorporated their narratives. I did not originally set out to recreate or simulate a
setting in which collective storytelling of life histories (what Rosemary Sayigh calls
quṣṣaṣ, stories; qiṣṣaṣ in literary Arabic) usually takes place.383 Nonetheless, the
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dynamics of these collective settings which Sayigh identifies in her work - the
interjections and questions of other participants, even their very presence – doubtlessly
impacted the narratives people shared. Such instances of “co-narrated” back-and-forth
introduced questions I would not have thought to ask and personal and familial histories
which I could not have been aware of. At the same time, these multi-participant settings
may have also caused people to refrain from speaking of certain things or to frame things
differently than they would have in the context of a one-on-one interview. They
emphasized the degree to which social contexts, settings, and interactions shape the
performance of oral narratives.384
Occasionally, collective settings noticeably encouraged participants to share
experiences they seemed otherwise hesitant to speak of and elicited the active narration
of individuals aside from the intended “interviewee.” Given that I had originally set out
to interview former workers, all of whom were men, the collective interview settings also
granted me an invaluable opportunity to hear from workers’ families, particularly their
wives. This unplanned introduction of women’s narratives, although severely limited in
number, added new dimensions to my inquiry, reshaping my perspective on how both
construction work and homemaking were gendered.

Out of Necessity
For many among the roughly 150,000 Palestinians who were able to remain within the
new Israeli state after the 1948 war and the Nakba, or to successfully return to it in the

384

Borland, “Co-Narration, Intersubjectivity, and the Listener in Family Storytelling.”

200
subsequent months and years, scarcity and want were defining features. As Adel Manna
has recently reminded us, having survived the Nakba and being able to remain more or
less “in place,” did not mean that survival was not still the primary concern of those who
remained.385 The growing body of scholarship on Palestinian citizens in Israel in the
state’s first decades - the time of the Israeli military administration between 1948-1966,
and the years immediately following - has shown that during this period, survival meant
many things: from struggles for the right to remain, through those over political and civil
rights and over resources, to those over cultural and political connections to the Arab
world.386 It has also shown, however, that survival often retained its barest meaning:
staying alive, not going hungry, keeping a roof over your family’s head. Governmental
land expropriation, discriminatory resource allocation, and restrictions on movement and
thus access to markets, meant that the agricultural economy many families and
communities relied upon was no longer able to sustain them. Employment became a
necessity, but was hard to come by locally, and in order to work elsewhere – namely, in
Jewish localities – individuals had to navigate the military administration’s work permit
regime.
In light of these difficulties, the imperative of survival drove individuals to seek
work wherever available. “Now, I, as a child, there was no high school. We finished
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primary school. There was a military administration, we can’t leave [the village], and
there was hunger… So, we went to work,“ Ahmad Masarweh, of ‘Ar‘ara in the Triangle,
recalls.387 Munir Qa‘war (b. 1940), of nearby Kafr Qar‘, the eldest of four siblings when
his father passed away in 1951, remembers that, “Israel was just established, there were
problems everywhere, and people were hungry. People don’t have [food] to eat.” Munir’s
father had saved enough money to sustain the family after his passing until Munir had
finished the 8th grade, “and after that, there is no more money. I have to go to work.”388
Among the narrators who were or came of school age after Israel’s establishment,
Munir was hardly alone in having completed only his primary schooling. As mentioned
above, the inaccessibility of a high school education, geographically as well as
financially, compounded poverty in motivating children to search for work. Of the
individuals whose narratives form the basis of this chapter, only Muhammad Abu Ahmad
(b. 1943) of Nazareth, Anis Khoury (b. 1952) of Tarshiha, and Sadeq Dallasheh (b. 1954)
of Bu‘eine, graduated high school. Both however, recall working in construction during
high school as well. Sadeq stated that he would have never been able to finance his high
school studies, for which he had to leave Bui‘ene and rent an apartment in ‘Ilabun, had he
not saved money working in construction during the summer breaks.389
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During the first two decades of Israeli statehood, work in agriculture was the most
readily available.390 Ahmad Yusuf Masarweh first found work in Zikhron Ya‘akov, a
Jewish settlement roughly twenty kilometers west of ‘Ar‘ara, at the age of thirteen. Munir
Qa’war first found work in agriculture in Giv‘at ‘Ada, several kilometers from his
hometown of Kafr Qar‘, at a similar age. This remained true for younger narrators. Sadeq
Dallasheh recalls, “the first daily wage I made in my life, I was eight or nine years old.”
When the family’s finances were particularly tight, he would work alongside his mother
in the fields below Bu‘eine.391
While not as widespread as agricultural labor, the construction industry, which
faced a shortage of skilled professionals and the housing needs of massive immigration
waves, was among the first branches to absorb Palestinian workers. As early as October
1949, a British diplomatic report noted that despite the dominant preference for Jewish
employees – that is, the continuation of the pre-state policy of Hebrew labor, now
undergirded by a state apparatus – “certain Arab elements, such as skilled carpenters and
others, whose services are necessary to the authorities, readily find employment in the
construction of the new Jewish settlements.”392
Solel Boneh, the Histadrut’s contracting arm first established in the early 1920s,
and one of the most powerful corporations in the state, was an early recruiter in the
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country’s north. Mikhail Haddad (b. 1926) of Tarshiha, who was working in construction
in Damascus when the war erupted, found work with Solel Boneh in Tarshiha itself just
after Jewish forces occupied the village in 1948. He was employed in repairing homes
whose Palestinian owners had fled or been driven out, so that they could house new
Jewish immigrants.393 Shawqi Khoury (b. 1931) of Fassuta, had no prior experience in
construction when he began working for Solel Boneh, building the new cooperative
agricultural settlement (moshav) Hosen to Tarshiha’s southeast, in 1949. He remembers
however that those with prior experience and skill were the first to be recruited. His
recollections align both with Mikhail Haddad’s narrative and the 1949 British diplomatic
reported cited above, as he notes that “in Tarshiha especially there were excellent
craftsmen…. [T]here were carpenters, ironworkers…. They would be accepted straight
away as expert craftsmen.”394
Ibrahim Shamshoum (b. 1933), of ‘Arrabe, was following in his father’s footsteps
when he first set out to Haifa in 1950 or 1951 hoping to find work in a concrete block
factory at the age of seventeen or eighteen. Ibrahim’s family had fled their hometown of
Nazareth to ‘Arrabe after the fall of Haifa in April 1948. He recalls that for roughly two
years “there was no work” in ‘Arrabe, prompting him to leave for Haifa. When I first
asked Ibrahim, later a contractor and a leading figure in the ‘Arrabe branch of the
communist party, how he had started working in construction, he replied, “my father was
Interview with Mikhail Haddad, Tarshiha, October 21,2018. Mikhail’s story, poignant as it may be, was
not unique. Palestinians elsewhere were also employed in renovating and even demolishing the homes of
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demolition and construction for Solel Boneh in his hometown of al-Birwa, only a few years after he and his
family were driven from it. Ross, Stone Men, 41-45.
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a builder” (abui kan mu‘alim ‘amar).395 Whenever he explained how he learned a certain
skill, Ibrahim always referred back to this familial heritage.396
Most narrators, however, had neither family legacies nor prior experience in
construction work. By the time they came to work in construction, they usually had
already worked in agriculture or other physical labor.397 What drew most of them to
construction work was that when there was demand for workers, wages were
considerably higher than those in any other occupations available to them. All narrators
agreed that wages in construction were higher than those offered in agriculture.398 When I
asked Ibrahim Zahalqa (b. 1944) of Kafr Qar‘, if he recalls whether many others in the
village also worked in construction when he began working in 1964, he said,
Yes. Many… There was no work, only this… Working at that time, say, in ’64 or
’65, if we had to work in agriculture it would be four [Israeli] Pounds a day…
And in construction it was double, double and then some, more than ten Pounds [a
day].399
Ibrahim’s insistence that work in the construction industry for many of his peers
was also a product of limited choices - “there was no work, only this” - was echoed by
other narrators, including those who, like Ibrahim, built entire careers in the industry.400
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Muhammad Abu Ahmad, who was the Secretary of the Construction Workers
Association in the Nazareth area from 1963-1980, linked this notion of construction as
work for those “who have no other choice,” to early safety problems in the industry and
the widespread denigration of so called “Arab labor” (‘avoda ‘aravit) in Jewish Israeli
culture,
…People simply weren’t experts. Like I said, this idea of “Arab labor” didn’t
come from nothing. A significant number of these Arab workers who came to
construction, came because they had no other choice. You work in
construction.401

This sense of having no other choice should not be confused with self-denigration
or denigration of their craft among the narrators themselves. Fissures appeared and
experiences of hurt, discrimination, and frustration surfaced even in the narratives of
individuals who at first sought to portray an idyllic picture of professional relations
between Palestinians and Jews. Yet, narrators never expressed shame in doing work “no
one else would.” On the contrary even, as Muhammad himself put it,
There’s a common saying: We the Arabs built this country. What are you [the
Jews] saying? Who built this country? Who built Haifa? The kibbutzim? The
hotels? We the Arabs built this country…. What, doesn’t the country belong to
us? Don’t we belong to the country?402
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I mentioned this formulation again later when asking Muhammad about its
relationship to the many difficulties workers experienced under the military
administration. His reply made explicit the claim’s link to Zionist discourses of
republican citizenship as a basis of rights, even as these had moved away from “building
the land” to military service: “It was prominent. We would even say it just like that,
openly. We argued, ‘What, what do you have more than me? What, you went to the
army? I built the country!’”403
Sadeq Dallasheh drew a related parallel, albeit without mentioning military
service directly. Instead, he described construction work among Palestinian citizens in
Israel as akin to the institution of “national service” (sherut leumi). “National service,” is
a state-supervised system of voluntary work in pre-approved civil society organizations.
It is offered to some citizens as an alternative to Israel’s mandatory military conscription.
Such “service” is viewed both as a means for citizens who wish to contribute to the
(national) community but cannot serve in the military to do so, and as a way for those
individuals to enjoy at least some of the rights and social and material rewards military
service grants.404 Unlike Muhammad Abu Ahmad, who sought to cast construction work
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as a form of republican participation by comparing it to military service, Sadeq’s
comparison was aimed towards both construction work’s ubiquity among Palestinian men
in Israel, and the material benefits it provides:
One thing remains [constant], it [i.e., construction] is a national service. [It is a
form of national service] for an Arab…. How do I get to this [conclusion]? It’s
[like] a national service. I want to go and study at the university? I need some
money to pay tuition. Now, where do I work? The simplest thing, whenever I
want, I can find work in construction, it’s always like that.405
Sadeq’s mention of university tuition is hardly coincidental. Higher-education
tuition support is a key material benefit given to those who serve in the military or in the
national service system. Construction, in Sadeq’s telling, is comparable to national
service for Palestinians, not because of its contribution to a nation and nationalism which
are not their own and have historically developed at their expense. Most Palestinian
political parties and civil society organizations in Israel have consistently opposed the
participation of Palestinian youth in national service programs, which they view as means
for their cooptation and the neutralization of their civil, economic, and national demands.
Rather, for Sadeq, construction for Palestinians serves a similar function as national
service does for some Jewish Israelis, in that it provides income which can be used to
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fund higher education. Greater access to higher education through tuition support has
been a central point for those advocating that Palestinians join national service programs
en masse. Construction work, Sadeq effectively argues, already functions similarly for
some.406
Sadeq himself gained most of his experience in construction between 1970-1973,
when he worked in the southern port of Eilat and in the Dead Sea to save up for
university and later during university breaks. Before this he had paid his way through
high school by working in construction during the summers. Throughout our
conversation, Sadeq repeatedly mentioned the influence his parents’ emphasis on
education had on his siblings and him. Their mother would meticulously check her
children’s homework daily, only to reveal to them later in life that she was in fact
illiterate. But the link between construction work and funding education as a device for
social mobility appears to have been broader and at least to some extent generational.407
Anis Khoury (b. 1952) of Tarshiha, a career educator and former school principal,
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worked at Solel Boneh for several years to fund his academic studies.408 And although
Munir Qa‘war himself left school for work at thirteen, he recalls that funding school and
academic studies for his youngest brother – whose birth in 1953 was part of what drove
Munir to seek a job in the first place – was an important motivation for him. Multiple
narrators mentioned the ability to fund higher education for their children as the
consideration behind their continued work in the construction industry. Motivations to
seek work in construction then, could morph from the strict purpose of ad hoc survival to
more elaborate considerations of possible futures and social advancement, within an
individual’s lifetime.409
The experiences of Palestinian citizens who worked in construction during the
first two and a half decades of the state, shaped their attempts at homemaking (and
remaking) in various ways. The dire financial need which drove workers constituted an
obvious material connection between the two realms. Meanwhile, rhetoric emphasizing
the crucial role Palestinians played in Israel’s construction industry to reinforce their
claims of belonging to the land, and its belonging to them, constituted an ideological and
affective connection. Through a repurposing of the state’s and Zionism’s idioms, these
rhetorical uses challenged both Palestinians marginalization under the new state and the
broader doubts Zionist ideology cast on their connection to the land. The following
sections highlight how the role of Palestinian citizens working in the Israeli construction
industry shaped other processes of homemaking which workers, their families, and their
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communities engaged in - the making of homes away from home and the use of expertise
gained in construction work to build and refashion Palestinian homes.

In Search of Home, In Search of Shelter
Throughout the economic ebbs and flows of Israel’s first decades, in construction as
elsewhere, the unequal distribution of government resources and economic activity drew
a relatively clear occupational map: very little work was available in the centers of
Palestinian life within Israel.410 Employment required workers to travel, often far away.
This was particularly true in construction, where in 1961, 81% of Palestinian employees
commuted to work.411 The poor infrastructure and barely existing public transportation in
many Arab locales meant that the problem of Palestinian “commuters” (mutanaqilun),
was often a major preoccupation in the pages of the Communist Party’s al-Ittihad, the
period’s major Arabic-language newspaper.412
Among the difficulties that lacking infrastructure, transportation and movement
restrictions imposed upon Palestinian workers was the need to find a place to stay near
places of employment, which were either too far or too dangerous to travel to and from

410

See Haidar, On the Margins, Chapter 5.
Haidar, On the Margins, 94.
412
See, for example: al-Ittihad, January 17, 1963, 2; al-Ittihad, March 27, 1964, 5; al-Ittihad, May 22,
1964, 6. See also: Haidar, On the Margins, 110-112; Khalidi, The Arab Economy, 141-145. Both Khalidi
and Haidar discuss these patterns as “mobilities” rather than migration, indicating perhaps how such
patterns anticipated the “circular mobilities” which Naama Blatman-Thomas describes among middle-class
Palestinian citizens in Israel who have moved to the Jewish-Israeli city of Karmiel. Naama BlatmanThomas, “Commuting for Rights: Circular Mobilities and Regional Identities of Palestinians in a JewishIsraeli Town,” Geoforum 78 (January 2017): 22–32.
411

211
on a daily basis. To do so, workers made and inhabited multiple kinds of shelters.413
These ranged from housing for livestock, through the construction sites of homes-in-themaking of which they were the first inhabitants, to grave-like pits in the open field,
shared apartments and leased rooms in family homes. This section explores these various
forms of shelter as recounted by interviewees, and the range of physical and emotional
experiences they engendered: dehumanization alongside politicization, the tolls and
wages of passing alongside the threat of exposure, fragile intimacies alongside the
alienation of being cast as a racialized threat, isolation alongside solidarity. The section
further explores questions of visibility and invisibility, both as conditions forced upon
Palestinian workers and as strategies workers employed.414
When Ahmad Yusuf Masarweh describes the sleeping arrangements in Zikhron
Ya‘akov, where he began working in 1952 at the age of 13, he refers to “reserving a room
in a hotel before you go.” He clarifies, “that is, you check in which cowshed your friend
is sleeping.” Then the tone of his description shifts rapidly,
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I was fourteen, thirteen, fifteen, it was the first time I had the honor of getting to
know headlice. You get a job, you dwell in the cowshed, you wake up at five in
the morning, water the garden, collect the eggs from the coop, hitch the mule to
the wagon, and that’s just the yard work. Until you actually start moving to the
fields, it doesn’t count [as work], what counts is when you first lift the hoe
(turiye) until you put it down…
After that, that’s when I started understanding what the French Revolution was
about, and the exploitation, through having experienced it on your [own] body.
You can’t understand if you haven’t been through that experience. It remains
[only as] things that are said. But going through it, at [that] age… [When you’re]
working and you doubt you’ll be paid. And what’s more you’re enslaved
(meshu‘abad), you’re a tool. You have to [work] from five till six-seven at night.
And then you go to Tel Aviv, and there it’s only construction, or gardening.415

Ahmad, a lifelong political radical, narrates his politicization at a young age as
rooted in the felt experiences of exploitative labor: from the difficulty of work itself –
measured by employers strictly according to the particular physical activity of using the
hoe; through the impact the sanitary conditions of the cowshed “hotel” had on his body
(“it was the first time I had the honor of getting to know headlice”); to the insecurity of
whether you will be paid for your labor. These physical hardships reduced Ahmad in his
own eyes to a “tool”, enslaved, and not in control of his own body. Revolutionary
politics, he seems to argue, can only be truly understood through experiences like these.
Otherwise “it remains [only] things that are said.”
After leaving Zikhron Ya‘akov – an episode he narrates as an escape - Ahmad
lived in Yakum, a kibbutz on the Mediterranean coast, for a brief but formative period.
He arrived in Yakum at the invitation of the short-lived “Pioneer Arab Youth” movement
(No‘ar ‘Aravi Halutzi), an initiative for Palestinian youth established by the Shomer
Tza‘ir (“Young Guard”), a socialist Zionist movement, at the time still committed, at
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least outwardly, to a bi-national vision for the fledgling state. At Yakum, Ahmad and
three other teens who arrived with him were given Hebrew names. Ahmad became
“Tzvi.” He and fourteen other Palestinian teens lived on the Kibbutz, studying, working,
and eating with their Jewish peers. Yet, Ahmad noticed that while Jewish teens studied
for five hours a day and worked for three, Palestinian teens studied for three and worked
for five. While supposedly a result of the groups’ different funding sources, the message
the arrangement relayed was clear to him: Palestinians were considered better served, and
better utilized, dedicating their time to physical labor rather than to learning.416
Although he left Yakum disillusioned with the movement, Ahmad’s experiences
there were crucial to his ability to navigate the next episode of his life in Tel Aviv. When
he first arrived in the city to look for work, he continued presenting himself as “Tzvi,”
passing as Jewish. His ability to do so successfully no doubt depended on the cultural and
linguistic skills and the manners of behavior and comportment he acquired at Yakum.417
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As “Tzvi,” Ahmad soon exchanged the cowshed “hotels” and the Kibbutz
dormitories for a more hospitable arrangement in Ramat Gan, a city just outside Tel
Aviv. His early experiences there were also a reminder, however, that he, like many
Palestinians who were looking for work in Jewish towns at the time, was still very much
a child. As he describes them, he becomes visibly emotional:
I started going from place to place, I arrived at a house, [there] an older woman, she
takes me on for work. I worked in the yard. She made me food, washed my clothes.
There was a pot over a fire [in which she washed the clothes]. She looked for work
for me, gave me tools…. [Later] I went and wrote a letter to her, [telling her] who I
am.418

That living arrangement, and the ongoing ties with the family he stayed with were
at times more fragile, at least from Ahmad’s perspective, than he initially makes
apparent. The woman’s daughter (who later also became a lifelong friend), was at the
time a captain in the Israeli army: “When I was working in the garden, the daughter
came, a captain, that’s real military. I was shaking, I couldn’t respond, you have to think
of a situation of terror. I had no idea [what to do], I was ‘Tzvi’ then.” Ahmad’s fear of
having his true identity exposed by an army officer was well-founded. Even though he
was a minor, as a Palestinian from ‘Ar‘ara, without a permit, his presence and
employment in Ramat Gan were deemed unlawful under military rule. Being caught
would have risked his ability to financially support his family. It could also lead to costly
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fines and even the imprisonment of an adult family member who might be demanded to
serve a sentence on Ahmad’s behalf.419
After the 1967 war, the woman who took him into her home, Ms. Levin, sought
out Ahmad (who had previously revealed his identity to her) to discuss her disillusion
with Zionism in the war’s wake. They remained in contact until Ms. Levin passed. When
Ahmad describes their final conversations, the impact of her attitude towards him when
he was a young teenager is evident,
… I was in touch with this woman until the end of her days, she has a daughter in
Ma‘agan Mikhael [a kibbutz on the Mediterranean coast]. [I] came there [to meet
her], and she told me, “Ahmad, what do you want? I’m done [i.e., I am about to
die].” I tell her, “That’s your business, but my business is that I can’t forget. You
making me a sandwich, washing my clothes, and looking for a job for me. That
was a home (ze haya bayt). It was a refuge from the jungle.”
Nimrod: It was an alternative to sleeping in the fields.
Ahmad: No! No! The attitude (yaḥas) [i.e., the way she treated and related to
Ahmad] first of all. An attitude that just wasn’t there.420

Ahmad was emphatic in correcting my misunderstanding. I had suggested his
gratitude towards Ms. Levin was perhaps largely a product of the typically harsh
alternatives he had for staying at her home. The kinds of temporary dwellings he found in
a Zikhron Ya‘akov cowshed, or later in the fields outside of Tel Aviv. What made Ms.
Levin’s house a home for Ahmad, however, was first and foremost the kindness and care
she had shown him. “The jungle” from which Ahmad sought refuge was defined not only
by its often-inhumane physical conditions, but also by the terror and the invisibility it
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forced upon Palestinian workers. Since he had come to that “jungle,” Ms. Levin was the
first person to see Ahmad as a full human being, deserving of her kindness, affection, and
care. When he revealed his identity to her, Ms. Levin told him she had already realized he
was Palestinian long before. Unlike at Yakum, where the identity of “Tzvi” was forced
upon him, he could be Ahmad with her.421
Other experiences of such living arrangements demonstrate the various shades of
fragile intimacies they fostered. At thirteen, Munir Qa‘war left agricultural work in
Giv‘at ‘Ada in 1953 and set out to find work in the Tel Aviv area. In Jaffa, he found work
and a home of sorts:
I went and found work there in Jaffa with some Bulgarian man. He had thirty-four
sheep and he wanted someone to take them out to pasture….
He had a woman, and they told me, you’ll get fifty Pounds a month and we’ll give
you food. And the woman would, the Bulgarians would make these red peppers
filled with burghul…. And we weren’t familiar with this, but I grew used to it
since [laughs]. And this woman, I mean, she loved me, loved me so much. Even
as a child, I mean… her love entered my heart.
…I worked there, maybe for three weeks or a month [each time], before coming
home. And my mom, my mom is here [in Kafr Qar‘] and she’s crying and saying,
“how do you manage son?” And I tell her, “Listen, this is what I want, to work.
And that’s that.”422
Assuming an adult role by refuting his mother’s concerns while recalling the care
of the Jewish woman he worked for, hints at the role the latter was fulfilling for Munir
when he was away from home. But there were also components in the relationship which
seem to have made Munir somewhat uneasy, as he moved between the roles of child and
adult:

In this sense, Ms. Levin had provided Ahmad with a “homeplace” as hooks defines it – a humanizing
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Munir: So, you see, back then there weren’t showers like there are now. And there
was a warehouse by the [house], and when once a month I wanted to go back
home, she would boil water, the woman, and bring it to me, and she would say,
“Listen, I want to help you [bathe].” And I tell her, “No, I’m a big boy already, I
can do it myself, even my mother doesn’t help me.” And I, I’m sorry, I mean,
there are people who think, I mean, that this was maybe related to sex…. I didn’t
know what sex was. But I knew, when I grew up, that the woman’s intention was
good. Her intention wasn’t, god forbid, that she would, with a child, ummm,
something. She wanted to help me because she loved me, I mean, as a child. She
loved me as a child. Because her whole behavior wasn’t a behavior of, of…
Nimrod: It was motherly behavior?
Munir: Yes, [the behavior] of a mother. Of mother and child. That’s what I tell
them.423

Munir speaks of this episode in his relationship with this significantly older
Jewish woman who was both his employer and functioned as a surrogate mother to him,
as though the suggestion that there may have been a sexual component to it sullies a
connection he remembers as “pure.” The episode itself, meanwhile, demonstrates yet
another layer of the emotional and physical vulnerability young Palestinians experienced
in their attempts to provide for their families. It also shows how fraught questions of
masculinity and sexuality could become for young Palestinian men working away from
home.
Munir’s vulnerability contrasts with common Jewish Israeli perceptions of the
masculinity and sexuality of Palestinian workers engaged in physical labor in Jewish
localities, as essentially threatening.424 Shawqi Khoury recalls working as a plasterer in
Beit Oren, a kibbutz not far from Haifa,
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Shawqi: I don’t remember exactly how we got to Beit Oren, me and a relative.
We worked as plasterers. We had a reputation as excellent plasterers. We went
there, we started working in the kibbutz, and they gave us food, a place to sleep,
showers, everything was fine. We worked there for some time, and they were very
happy. One day they show up and say, “the work is done, go home.” We went
home, but there was work [i.e., the work wasn’t done]. And I didn’t know [the]
reason [they told us to go]…. Thirty years later I meet the construction
coordinator of Beit Oren at the Party [Mapai]. He was a Party member. He
recognized me right away, I didn’t so much. [He said] “Hello! Do you remember
me? I’m Sha’ul who was the construction coordinator at Kibbutz Beit Oren. Do
you know why we drove you out (girashnu) from Beit Oren?”
Nimrod: He said, “drove you out?!”
Shawqi: Yes. I said, “I don’t know, I was still only speaking Hebrew half-and-half
[at the time].” He [Sha’ul] smiles and laughs…. I’m not saying this to [brag], just
to say what happened [Shawqi pauses to clarify]…. He [Sha’ul] told me, “Listen
you were such a handsome guy, all the women in the kibbutz would look.”
[Shawqi laughs] Really! After thirty years! I came to eat bread! I came to look for
girls?!425

For Shawqi, this anecdote is an opportunity to boast a little about his good looks
as a young man (at 88, he still exudes plenty of charisma and charm). What underlay it
however was at once a fear of the possibility of Palestinians and Jewish Israelis forming
romantic relationships, and a perception of the Palestinian worker as a sexual threat and
potential predator, one that needed to be “driven out.” It also placed Shawqi’s concerns in
stark contrast with those of his employers – he was there “to eat bread” not “to look for
girls.”

White Women’s Protection Ordinance in New Guinea. See for example: Jacquelyn Dowd Hall, Revolt
Against Chivalry: Jessie Daniel Ames and the Women’s Campaign Against Lynching, revised edition
(Columbia University Press, 1993); Jock McCulloch, Black Peril, White Virtue: Sexual Crime in Southern
Rhodesia, 1902-1935 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2000); Ann Laura Stoler, Carnal Knowledge
and Imperial Power: Race and the Intimate in Colonial Rule, second edition (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 2010 [2002]), Chapter 3; Anna Clark, Desire: A History of European Sexuality, second
edition (Routledge, 2019), Chapter 9.
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This cultural fear of the sexualized Palestinian man in the Jewish city is also
referenced in “I Am Ahmad,” the pathbreaking short docudrama which Ahmad
Masarweh and several partners made based on Ahmad’s experiences in Tel Aviv’s
construction industry. As Ahmad’s character is walking on a Tel Aviv street behind a
young Jewish couple, a man and a woman – in a scene which, as Yosefa Loshitzky points
out itself places Ahmad as a looming threat, despite the film’s generally empathetic and
sympathetic approach to its protagonist – we hear his internal monologue (in the voice of
Ahmad Sabr Masarweh):
At night in a strange city, you are alone. You know that no one [there] cares about
you. That they absolutely don’t want you here. That they think you are
dispensable, and that it would be best if you go somewhere [else]: to Canada, or
to America. Just as long as you’re not here – in their streets; in their homes; in
front of their women.426

“Ani Ahmad/Ana Ahmad (I am Ahmad),” directed by Avshalom Katz, written by Ram Loevy,
Avshalom Katz and Ahmad Yusuf Masarweh, produced by David Ernfeld and Ram Loevy (David Ernfeld,
1966), film. The concern with such “predatory” patterns among Palestinian men in Jewish spaces, strongly
reminiscent of colonial fears, dates to the Mandate and has ample representations in Israeli film and
literature. Examples from the Hebrew press include discussions about one, ‘Abd el-Majid, a Jaffan
Palestinian who was briefly a suspect during the inquiry into Hayyim Arlosoroff’s murder in 1933 after he
was bribed to falsely confess his guilt. Right-wing Hebrew newspapers reported on ‘Abd el-Majid’s
supposed habit of “looking for and chasing Jewish girls in Tel Aviv.” See: Hazit ha-‘Am, March 2, 1934, 1;
Do’ar ha-Yom, March 4, 1934.
Beginning in the late 1950s violence between Jews and Arabs within Israel was often portrayed as
revolving around the rumored pursual of Jewish women by Arab men. Ha-‘Olam ha-Ze, cultivating its
generally sensationalist line, marked such violence in the town of Rishon Le-Tzion in 1962 as “only the
beginning” of a wider phenomenon awaiting to erupt. Arab workers working in Jewish cities, the
newspaper claimed, were the unwitting “explosives” that would eventually set many more cities alight.
Here again, the seamline between Mizrahi Jewish women and Palestinian Arab men was deemed
particularly problematic, compounded by the problem of Arabs “passing” as Jews. See: Ha-‘Olam ha-Ze,
“Rishon Le-Tzion ve-Hal’a,” October 24, 1962, 6-7, 10. For other examples, see: Ma‘ariv, October 27,
1959, 4; Ora Shamir, “Pogrom,” Kol ha-‘Am, 3 September 1965, 3; Yosef Ben-Meir, “Alfei Tzeirot
Yehudiut Ovdot be-Ohalei ‘Arav… (Thousands of Young Jewish Women are Lost in the Tents of
Arabia…),” ha-Tzofe, 28 November 1969, 5. For discussions of cinematic and literary representations of
the theme, including the treatment of the “desirous Arab” in “I am Ahmad,” see: Yosefa Loshitzky, Identity
Politics on the Israeli Screen (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2001), chapter 7; Yochai Oppenheimer,
Me‘ever la-Gader: Yitzug ha-‘Aravim ba-Siporet ha-‘Ivrit u-ha-Yisraelit (1906-2005) [Barriers: The
Representation of the Arab in Hebrew and Israeli Fiction, 1906-2005] (Tel Aviv: ‘Am ‘Oved, 2008).
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When work took individuals to “mixed” cities such as Acre or Haifa, or even
areas of Tel Aviv close enough to Jaffa, workers could at times rent a room or an
apartment, usually from Palestinian owners who had managed to hold on to their
property. Bring enough men together and you could rent an apartment, as Shawqi Khoury
recalls doing in Acre in 1955.427 Ibrahim Shamshoum rented a room in Jaffa with six or
seven other people in the late 1950s: “There was no kitchen. We cooked in the room, we
ate in the room, and we slept in the room. And early in the morning we would go to work
in construction.”428 When Lutuf Suleiman (b. 1950) of Bu‘ineh was fourteen and a half,
he worked in sewage construction in Haifa. He and others rented rooms in the homes of
Palestinian families in the city’s Wadi Salib neighborhood.429
Renting an apartment or even a room was not always an option, however. In
Jewish cities and towns, where most construction took place, finding property owners
who would agree to rent rooms to Arabs could be extremely difficult. Of the narrators,
only one reported even having tried to do so - Ahmad Masarweh - who through trials and
tribulations, eventually found some success. As will be discussed below, Ahmad
eventually made creating spaces for himself and other Palestinians in Jewish cities,
particularly Tel Aviv, a political cause. Before turning to his public struggle, however, it
is important to look at what alternatives he and other workers had to endure.
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Hidden in Plain Sight
Multiple narrators reported living on-site during construction – making them effectively
the first residents of the homes they were building for others. Despite finding a job earlyon with Solel Boneh, in the years immediately following 1948 Shawqi Khoury also took
on work privately. In 1955 he worked in the northern cooperative settlement, ‘Avdon,
with fifteen other men from Fassuta. Since none had a permit to work there, they risked
the journey to ‘Avdon only once every two weeks, riding in the back of a truck covered
in a canvas sheet, as though they were cargo. Living conditions at the ‘Avdon site
evolved as work progressed:
You asked where we would eat? Where we would sleep? …Eating, I organized
my people from Fassuta. Each one would bring food. We took burghul, we took
lentils, we took all sorts of things. And I told them, guys, instead of each one
cooking, I’ll cook, I know how. I would cook for fifteen people. We made a
wooden table, and they [the workers] would come like soldiers in the army: each
one would take his portion….. We would sleep under the open sky (taḥat kipat
ha-shamaim)…. In the field, on the same site. Until you build one house, place
the roof tiles, and go inside…. To shower, we would stand on a rock, open the
hose and shower like that. That’s how it was. It was like that in several places,
and then it started to get better.430

Shawqi and his peers created what he remembers as a positive living space in
‘Avdon. The invocation of a military-style order in speaking of the eating arrangements
also indicates the decidedly masculine models he viewed their time there through in
retrospect. However, the relative freedom experienced in a fledgling, remote settlement
was difficult to obtain in a Jewish urban context. There matters of class and racism could
encroach on workers’ attempts to use the worksite as a temporary home. The sort of
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invisibility forced upon Palestinian workers in these contexts was qualitatively different
to that which Shawqi and his peers employed on the back of the truck en route to ‘Avdon
and back. It was no longer merely a tactic to evade the persecution of the military
administration and its regulations. Rather it was the product of broader social pressures
requiring that Palestinian workers, as racialized and therefore hyper-visible subjects,
“disappear” at the end of the workday, reappearing only once the next shift began.431
When Ibrahim Zahalqa first worked in construction at the age of twenty, he was
employed as a plasterer in a complex of sixteen-story tall buildings in northern Tel Aviv.
Ibrahim describes the living arrangements there:
I would sleep on site, but the person we worked for there, he would say, “look, the
people who live here in Neve Avivim, these are aristocratic people,” I mean,
“these are big people (anashim gdolim) and they have a lot of money, and they
want to live where even looking [i.e., even what they see] won’t disturb them.
And [while] you’re sleeping here, we don’t want you to go outside so that they
will see you. [If] you sleep here, stay in the rooms or go somewhere where they
can’t see you.” It was really like that…. Before, there were Druze [workers] there,
and they [the neighbors] saw them, and made sure they were driven out.432

The fate of the Druze workers made it clear to Ibrahim and his colleagues that it
was in their interest to do as their employer and the “aristocratic” neighbors demanded.
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Two theorists of the hyper-visibility of the racialized, and particularly the black body, are Franz Fanon
and George Yancy. Helen Ngo notes that in the thinking of both Fanon and Yancy such hyper-visibility,
particularly of black men, is “usually bound with associations of danger and violence,” as in Yancy’s
discussion of the “elevator effect” and in Fanon’s description of his encounter with a “little white boy”
terrified by Fanon’s blackness. In both, the result of this sense of hyper-visibility as threat is an alienation
from one’s own body. Without drawing a facile equation between the experiences of blackness in the
colonial metropole or the United States and that of Palestinian-ness in Israel/Palestine, it is nonetheless
important, in my view, to acknowledge their similarities, particularly in order to draw upon the critical
insight of the many scholars of race who focus on blackness. Ngo, The Habits of Racism, Chapter 2;
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2008), especially Chapter 5.
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They made themselves, as best they could, invisible. Of course, such “invisibility” could
only have been tenuous at best. Throughout the day, their work was extremely visible,
audible and otherwise an assault on the senses, as anyone who has lived close to a
massive construction project will attest. The neighbors in Neve Avivim were willing to
accept the presence of Palestinian workers only during working hours. Otherwise, they
wanted Ibrahim and his coworkers to be hidden in plain sight.433
Ibrahim and his coworkers at Neve Avivim were hardly the only Palestinian
construction workers rendered hidden in plain sight. Arguably the entire phenomenon of
construction work’s “Palestinianization” was (and remains) dependent upon the work of
Palestinians in Israel’s construction industry being invisible in various ways: physically,
legally, and culturally. All the while, the products and processes of their work, even their
own physical presences in Israel’s essentially segregated landscapes, were often hypervisible. Accordingly, as in other structures of “invisible labor” in which work and
workers are “hidden in plain sight,” some of those seeking to overturn this regime of
invisibility engaged in what Timothy Pachirat has called “the politics of sight”:
“organized, concerted attempts to make visible what is hidden and to breach, literally or
figuratively, zones of confinement in order to bring about social and political
transformation.”434

I borrow the term “hidden in plain sight” from Timothy Pachirat’s 2011 political ethnography about a
Nebraska slaughterhouse, Every Twelve Seconds. Timothy Pachirat, Every Twelve Seconds: Industrialized
Slaughter and the Politics of Sight (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2011). For a recent study of a
qualitatively different form of invisibility, defined as “immersive invisibility,” which primarily middleclass Palestinian citizens experience and practice in contemporary Tel Aviv, see: Hackl, “Immersive
Invisibility.”
434
Pachirat, Every Twelve Seconds, 23. “Invisible labor/work,” have for some time now been the object of
considerable study, particularly among sociologists. Originally applied in the 1980s as a concept describing
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In early 1960s Israel, Ahmad Masarweh enlisted such “politics of sight” to launch
a public campaign that would make workers like himself and their work visible. He
enlisted private individuals, the controversial Hebrew weekly ha-‘Olam ha-Ze (This
World), and as mentioned above, even made the short docudrama, “I am Ahmad,”
alongside several partners. The experiences Ahmad‘s campaign and the film exposed
reveal the two final types of homes Palestinian construction workers tried to make for
themselves in the Jewish city. The first, the encampment, was often the bleakest and most
physically harsh, hardly deserving of the moniker “home” at all. The second, renting an
apartment or a room in a “Jewish” environment, made the underlying racialization
process driving Palestinian exclusion perhaps most apparent.
During our conversation, Ahmad recalls taking journalists from ha-‘Olam ha-Ze
to workers’ encampments in the area by Wadi al-Musrara/the Ayalon River – where
Highway 20 runs today - which separated Tel Aviv from its easternmost

unpaid work carried out primarily by women and not recognized as labor, the concept has since been
expanded to encompass the unrecognized emotional and habitual components of labor, so-called “virtual”
and production labor carried out remotely and hidden from consumers, the purposeful erasure of workers’
racial/ethnic identities in certain industries, physically sequestered forms of work, and more. Calls for
expanding the concept’s scope have been accompanied by attempts to better define it as an analytic
category. To do so, Erin Hatton has suggested that invisible work/labor be defined as “labor that is
economically devalued through three intersecting sociological mechanisms… cultural, legal and spatial
mechanisms of invisibility – which operate in different ways and to different degrees.” These mechanisms,
Hatton is careful to point out, are “intersectional and mutually constitutive.” There can be little doubt, it
seems to me, that the history of Palestinian citizens’ work in Israel’s construction industry during the period
under study here and beyond, demonstrates the parallel workings of all three mechanisms Hatton identifies.
See: Erin Hatton, “Mechanisms of Invisibility: Rethinking the Concept of Invisible Work,” Work,
Employment and Society, Vol 31, No. 2 (2017): 336-351; Marion G. Crain, Winifred R. Poster, and Miriam
A. Cherry, eds., Invisible Labour: Hidden Work in the Contemporary World (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 2016); Jill Esbenshade, “The ‘Crisis’ over Day Labour: The Politics of Visibility and
Public Space,” WorkingUSA, Vol. 3, No. 6 (March/April 2000): 27-70; Arlie Russel Hochschild, The
Managed Heart: Commercialization of Human Feeling, third edition (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 2012 [1983]); Arlene Kaplan Daniels, “Invisible Work,” Social Problems, Vol. 34, No. 5 (Dec.,
1987): 403-415.
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neighborhoods.435 The newspaper, known for its penchant for the shocking and an antiestablishment editorial line, published a story, “A Jungle in the Heart of the City,”
accompanied by photographs of the encampments. Shalom Cohen, a leftist Iraqi Jew who
was a fierce critic of Israel’s Labor Zionist leadership and co-editor of the newspaper,
painted a shocking picture. The workers lived “in conditions fit for animals…. In the
foul-smelling Wadi Musrara.” Their beds were made, by “spreading rags on the ground;
placing a blanket over the rags; under their head they place their work clothes. In the
winter? They place rusted tins over the blanket.”436
In one part of the encampment, workers lived in cramped, scorching tin shacks
they rented from their Jewish owner. Nine workers per shack. Cohen mentions also a
disused industrial cowshed, whose owner realized that Arab tenants paid much better
than raising cows. This arrangement was deemed illegal for fear of spreading disease –
the article does not mention which disease in particular - and was terminated. The
workers then relocated to the adjacent fields.
The captions that accompanied the photographs in the article (figs. 5.1-5.3)
mapped the geography of the encampment onto the spatial division of a contemporary
middle-class home, complete with guest room, dining room, bedroom, kitchen, and
hallway. They thus explicitly drew a comparison to the kinds of spaces ha-‘Olam ha-Ze‘s
readers likely inhabited, quite possibly even as they were reading the article. Cohen’s

Interview with Ahmad Yusuf Masarweh, ‘Ar‘ara, October 10, 2018.
“Jungel be-Lev ha-‘Ir (A Jungle in the Heart of the City),” ha-‘Olam ha-Ze, July 24, 1963, 10-11. The
article itself does not credit a writer, but Shalom Cohen revealed that he wrote it when referring back to it
in a column three and a half years later, see: Shalom Cohen, “Kor’e Yakar (Dear Reader),” ha-‘Olam haZe, February 15, 1967, 2.
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choice to narrate the readers’ visual tour in this sarcastic manner, was no doubt intended
to throw the severity of the conditions the Palestinian workers lived in into stark relief.

Fig. 5.1 “The Guestroom”
Caption: “The guestroom is a few beds in a field of thorns. The Arab workers sit on the torn mattresses after
work, receiving their friends who come visit them from the other end of the field. During work hours they
leave a teenager here to guard their belongings.”
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Fig. 5.2 “The Dining Room”
Caption: “The dining room of the members of the Galilean ‘Arab al-Sawa‘ed tribe is simply
furnished: some empty sacks are used as chairs. In the center: the morning newspaper fills the role
of the table. The workers cooked the food over a fire in the ‘kitchen’ adjacent to the dining room.
After the meal they will move to the bedrooms – a long line of iron beds, which cover about a
quarter of the thicket of thorns.”

Fig. 5.3 “The Hallway”
Caption: “The hallway
between the different
residential areas is the
bridge of stones and
planks across the foulsmelling wadi.”
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Cohen’s article placed emphasis not only on the harsh conditions but also on
differentiating the genesis of workers’ encampments, like the one he visited, from “tinneighborhoods” (shkhunot paḥim) elsewhere. Unlike elsewhere in the world, the forces
creating Tel-Aviv’s encampments were not economic at all, argued Cohen, but rooted in
a socially upheld racial segregation
Tel Aviv’s jungle is unlike any other…. Those who live there are not starving
unemployed. Rather they are workers who do not earn badly, who work more or
less regularly, and who are in professions for which there is demand. They could
certainly afford to rent a decent room. But they can’t….
No one will rent to them, because they are Arabs. Part of the force of thousands
who work in the hard, physical jobs in Tel Aviv and its surroundings.437

Cohen then relates stories of workers being rejected by property owners once their
Arabness was revealed, or neighbors physically trying to prevent Palestinian renters from
moving in, with “children and mothers” shouting abuse at them. Such scenarios were also
highlighted in “I am Ahmad.” In one scene, Ahmad and a friend, Mahmud, go looking
for a room to rent in Tel Aviv. We are told that they have been rejected in six of seven
apartments they visited. Approaching the seventh, Mahmud suggests they present
themselves with the Mizrahi sounding Hebrew names Avraham Mizrahi and Yosef Malul
of Hevel Lakihsh (the Lakhish Region).438 Ahmad refuses and walks away, while

“Jungel be-Lev ha-‘Ir,” 10-11.
From the mid-1950s until the early 1960s the Israeli government undertook a mass project of settling
primarily Mizrahi Jews in the Lakhish Region. For a recent critical study of the settlement project, which is
also attuned to the racial dynamics that shaped it, see: Smadar Sharon, “Kakh Kovshim Moledet”.
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Mahmud enters the apartment. A shot of Mahmud’s arm opening a window from the
inside seems to indicate that as “Avraham,” he may even have been able to rent it.439
Following the 1963 article in ha-‘Olam ha-Ze, Ahmad Masarweh’s public
campaign seemed to have gained some traction. Government officials discussed the
question of establishing a government-run company to build accommodations for
Palestinian workers in Jewish cities and officially decided to do so in January 1965.440
However, by February 15, 1967 when Shalom Cohen dedicated his regular column to the
film “I am Ahmad,” the government’s initiative had dissipated. “Perhaps because the
problem was almost completely solved,” Cohen writes, “[n]ot by building cheap
accommodations but by the recession.” “The first to be hurt,” he clarifies, “were the
scores of Arab workers, concentrated mostly in construction. Due to lack of work, they
went back to their villages and stayed there.”441
A “politics of sight” of the sort Ahmad and his partners sought to enact in their
campaign, has, as Timothy Pachirat reminds us, both “possibilities and pitfalls.”442 In
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The practice of passing as Jewish is also highlighted elsewhere in the film, when Ahmad Sabr
Masarweh, the voiceover narrator, relates the story of another Palestinian worker, Jamal, who after being
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Pachirat’s study of a Nebraska slaughterhouse, he points out how within the
slaughterhouse a vantage point of total visibility exists alongside internal
compartmentalization and sequestration which hide “repulsive practices” even at the very
site on which they take place. Moreover, “[e]ven when intended as a tactic of social and
political transformation,” Pachirat points out, “the act of making the hidden visible may
be equally likely to generate other, more effective ways of confining it.”443
In the case of the Israeli construction industry’s exploitative employment of
Palestinian workers, it was an event external to the industry, the 1967 war, which
generated conditions even more conducive for such concealment. Shortly after the war,
the Israeli construction industry began absorbing non-citizen Palestinian subjects from
the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip as workers. The latter rapidly eclipsed
Palestinians with Israeli citizenship in their share in the industry’s workforce. Their
exploitation within the construction industry and in the Israeli labor market in general,
took place on an even greater scale, its concealment abetted by even greater degrees of
physical, political, and social separation and new forms of racialization.444
West Bank and Gaza Strip Palestinians were devoid of citizenship and of the
social rights and protections which Palestinian citizens had gradually won over the
previous decades. In one of the tragedies of Palestinian twentieth-century history, just as
the latter were gradually relieved of the restrictions of Israel’s internal military
administration – which, as noted above, were a key component in pushing Palestinian
citizens in Israel to seek exploitative “informal” employment in the construction industry
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– the former were placed under a new form of military rule. The encounter of West Bank
and Gaza Strip Palestinians with the Israeli labor market was shaped, with even greater
intensity, by much of what shaped the participation of Palestinians with Israeli citizenship
in the Israeli labor market in the period covered here – land expropriation, dedevelopment, restrictions on movement and employment.445 From the standpoint of
Jewish Israeli public opinion, Palestinians from the occupied territories were several
degrees further removed than Palestinian citizens of the state. “Israeli Arabs” (or “the
Arabs of Israel”), as the official terminology of the state came to refer to Palestinian with
Israeli citizenship, remained a suspect population and remained discriminated against, to
be sure, but the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza Strip were more foreign and
more suspicious still.446
Ahmad’s campaign was as personal as it was political. Like several of the other
narrators, he spent a considerable part of his life as a political and public figure. Unlike
most of them, however, Ahmad’s political and social circles were often centered in Tel
Aviv and around figures on the Jewish radical left.447 The list of names he mentioned in
our conversations could serve as a veritable who’s who of radical Jewish politics and

Yael Berda, Living Emergency: Israel’s Permit Regime in the Occupied West Bank, (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 2017); Sara M. Roy, The Gaza Strip: The Political Economy of de-Development, third
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culture in 1960s Tel Aviv. I understand his attempts to fight not only for the visibility of
Palestinian workers and their rights, but specifically for spaces for them in the Jewish
city, as tied to his own sense of belonging to Tel Aviv. At one point during our first
conversation, he stated, “I’m a Tel Avivian (ani Tel Avivi).”448
Of the rich textual and audio-visual archive his activism generated, one
apparently inconsequential item embodies this personal-political nexus of Ahmad’s
homemaking efforts best. On the bottom of page four of the December 20, 1967 issue of
ha-‘Olam ha-Ze, a small nondescript ad (fig. 5.4) reads in Hebrew: “Arab youth. Works
and studies in Tel Aviv. Looking for a room. Call during work hours for Ahmad
Masarweh, Tel. No. 33264, Tel Aviv.” I asked Ahmad about the ad, which he had not
mentioned in our conversations, during a phone call. He explained: “I was tired of being
rejected by apartment owners. I thought that being explicit might be the best option, just
saying it – “Arab youth” - and seeing what happens.”449
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Ahmad’s refusal today to consider a politics of separation in Israel/Palestine is also rooted in this
experience. He uses a Yiddish expression to express this refusal, driving the point further still: ‘I don’t
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Fig. 5.4 “Arab youth working and studying in Tel Aviv looking for room.”

Remaking the Home
Palestinian citizens in Israel incorporated in the first decades of the state into the
construction industry were forced to make multiple forms of homes away from home.
They transformed construction sites and fields into temporary dwellings, wrestled with
the tensions and contradictions of making themselves at home in effectively segregated
Jewish cities and towns, sometimes even found surrogate families. The fragility of
Palestinian existence within Israel during those decades, meanwhile, meant that all these
homes away from home could were hanging on a thread. At the same time, uncertainty
and grief in the wake of catastrophe and the host of restrictive policies limiting
Palestinian citizens’ ability to build, work, and move, meant that they also needed to
make their own homes and communities anew. This remaking was in part a matter of
building better lives and better opportunities for themselves and their families, often
through funding education with construction work’s wages, as discussed above. It was
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also, however, a material process of physical building and rebuilding in the face of
poverty and state restrictions.
As part of a broader strategy of “Judaization,”450 Israeli state policy, which both
the military administration and the planning organs of the Ministry of the Interior
enacted, actively sought to limit Palestinian construction which could expand villages’
built areas onto lands expropriated by the state. An effective ban on such expansion,
which annulled previous British planning legislation, was instituted in 1955 by the
Regional Planning Committee for the Northern District and then expanded in January
1957. Later that year, the Regional Planning Committee partnered with the military
administration to author new local plans for Palestinian localities. These plans defined
areas for high-density and low-density construction of dwellings, all within the scope of
the existing built areas. The plans were intended to further – and it was hoped, more
effectively - curtail villages’ territorial “expansion,” and to encourage internal migration
to urban centers as village centers became oversaturated. Moreover, until the late 1960s,
most Palestinian localities had no state-recognized local council (Hebrew: mo‘atza
mekomit), and accordingly, no locally devised construction town-planning, nor the ability
to grant permits for construction.451
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Policy in the Galilee.”
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Yair Bäuml, “Israel’s Military Rule over its Palestinian Citizens (1948-1968): Shaping the Israeli
Segregation System,” in Israel and its Palestinian Citizens: Ethnic Privileges in the Jewish State, eds.
Nadim N. Rouhana and Sahar S. Huneidi (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 118; Yosef
Jabareen and Hakam Dbiat, Adrikhalut ve-Orientalizm ba-Aretz [Architecture and Orientalism in the
Country] (Haifa: ha-Merkaz le-Heker ha-‘Ir ve-ha-Ezor, 2014), 261; Bäuml, Tzel Kahol Lavan, 142-145;
Rassem Khamaisi, Mi-Tikhnun Magbil le-Tikhnun Mefateah ba-Yishuvim ha-‘Aravi’im be-Israel [From
Restrictive Planning to Developmental Planning in Arab Localities in Israel] (Jerusalem: The Floersheimer
Institute for Policy Studies, 1993), 8-12.
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These policies did in fact achieve the intended overcrowding of Palestinian towns
and villages. However, they were unsuccessful in preventing Palestinian citizens from
building both within the localities’ built-areas and beyond them. To the extent that
construction permits were granted in Palestinian localities, they intentionally did not meet
the population’s needs. The result, rather than being the hoped-for migration of younger
Palestinians to urban centers, however, was the emergence of self-constructed, permitless homes both within and beyond the village centers, as well as a distinct architecture.
Workers, their families and their communities pooled their resources and the
experience, skills, and knowledge workers had gained largely through construction work
in the Jewish sector, to craft their own homes. Unable to pay for hired labor, work was
done voluntarily by members of the community, thus bridging the technical and material
gaps between “traditional” practices of communal building - of the sort captured in a by
now famous photograph from the Matson Collection (fig. 5.5) - and the housing
emergency in which the Palestinian citizens in Israel found themselves.452

For studies of “traditional” Palestinian construction methods and house types, see: Tawfiq Canaan, The
Palestinian Arab House; Ron Fuchs, “The Palestinian Arab House and the Islamic ‘Primitive Hut,”
Muqarnas, Vol. 15 (1998): 157-177. Recent works move from the “traditional” to newer methods and call
particular attention to the reliance on self-construction among Palestinian citizens in Israel in the decades
following the Nakba. See: Jabareen and Dbiat, Adrikhalut u-Orientalizm ba-Aretz, especially Chapter 6;
Allweil, Homeland: Zionism as Housing Regime, 1860-2011 (London and New York: Routledge, 2017),
Chapter 7; Abed Badran, Space Design, Making and Tectonics in Palestinian architecture in Israel:
Impacts of the Israeli Project (PhD diss., Cardiff University, 2017).
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Fig. 5.5 “Building Stone House in Village in Hill Country.”
Stenograph of communal building practices in early 20 th century Palestine. Photographer Unknown,
Matson Collection, Library of Congress.

Perhaps the epitome of such communal construction efforts was the moment of
casting the concrete for a new home’s roof. Even narrators who did not invoke communal
construction methods otherwise, almost invariably referred to such practices when I
presented them with a copy of the chapter discussing construction workers’ songs from
‘Ali al-Khalili’s Aghani al-‘Amal wa-l-‘Umal fi-Filastin (Songs of Work and Workers in
Palestine). No one recalled the sort of elaborately crafted songs that al-Khalili discusses
from the construction sites they worked on (“No one had the time to sing!” Lutuf
Suleiman remarked). However, all narrators paused when they read the first line of the
limekiln song “Wali‘ al-Latun (Fire up the Kiln).” “We say wali ‘al-baṭon [fire up/pour
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the concrete],” Ibrahim Zahalqa said, “so that people don’t tire, everyone starts saying:
‘wali‘ al-baṭon wali‘, wali‘ al-baṭon wali‘’ [Ibrahim chants].”’453
As with the communal building practices of the past, many described such
communal construction, particularly the casting of concrete towards a structure’s
completion, as cross-generational and cross-gender. Shawqi Khoury also immediately
recalled the chant: “This one I know!” He exclaimed and began singing. He then
remembered how both men and women would carry buckets of concrete up ladders to
pour it (although when he built his house in Fassuta in 1955, he points out, “there were
enough men, so we didn’t have women”). Ahmad Masarweh too began singing, ‘the
workers [here] wouldn’t take wages… the neighbors, the workers would come and when
we would cast the roof, they would say “wali‘ al-baṭon, wali‘.”’454
While such practices invoked a connection to traditional building practices, narrators
also described workers utilizing their expertise in newly acquired professions –
formwork, ironwork, electrical work, plumbing, and more. In describing the process,
Muhammad Abu Ahmad of Nazareth once again shows his penchant, perhaps cultivated
through years of fulfilling roles in the Histadrut, for subverting and laying claim to
Zionist tropes. He recalls a representative of the Histadrut’s Culture Department, who

‘Ali al-Khalili, Aghani al-‘Amal wa-l-‘Umal fi-Filastin [Songs of Labour and Labourers in Palestine],
second edition (Beirut: Dar Ibn Khaldun, 1980 [1979]), 88-89; Interviews with Ibrahim Zahalqa, Kafr Qar‘,
October 7, 2018 and Lutuf Suleiman, Bu‘eine, October 19, 2018. Basma Fahoum has called my attention to
another variation of this song, wali‘ al-babour. This iteration refers to al-babour, an Arabicization of the
Turkish “vapur”, which itself was adopted from the French or English, “vapour” or “vapor”. In this
instance, al-babour extends beyond meaning a steam engine, and refers to any kind of engine or gas
stove/burner. The song was sung by children in anticipation of the starting of an engine or gas stove.
“Wali‘…,” is thus revealed to be at a sung juncture between carbon-hungry systems - limekilns, motor
engines, stoves and concrete.
454
Interviews with Ahmad Yusuf Masarweh, ‘Ar‘ara, October 10, 2018, Shawqi Khoury, Tarshiha,
October 21, 2018 and Sadeq Dallasheh, Bu‘eine, October 19, 2018.
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invoked mutual assistance (‘ezra hadadit) as a uniquely Zionist organizational principle.
Muhammad responded:
I told him, listen, for us [Palestinians] this mutual assistance was natural. With
you it’s planned. You used your brains [to figure out] what is good for the society
in Israel…. But for us it’s natural. He said, “How do you mean?” I said that when
someone wants to build a house in our neighborhood, the people from the
neighborhood who do excavations come and do the excavation for the
foundations for free. When they’re done, everyone who is a form worker
comes…. Then the ironworker comes…. Casting [concrete], everyone comes,
everyone gathers “there’s a concrete pouring at Nimrod’s, yalla, everyone come!”
Everyone comes and helps during the concrete casting. When the concrete’s done,
who’s a plasterer in the neighborhood? The plasterer and two others come, in twothree days they finish the plastering, volunteers. Same thing for an electrician,
plumbing, carpentry. He asked me, “Is it really like that?” I said, “What do you
think, that the Israeli state built our houses? You the Jews had your houses built
for you; we built our own. That’s mutual assistance (‘ezra hadadit).”455

This communal pooling of skills served to introduce new construction techniques
and materials, as well as new spatial arrangements and architectural forms to Palestinian
homes within Israel. Studies of post-1948 Palestinian architecture have examined these
changes and given the new forms various names: Yosef Jabareen and Hakam Dbiat’s,
“post-traumatic architecture,” Yael Allweil’s “ṣumud (steadfastness) architecture,” and
Abed Badran’s “crush and transform.” They document the same material and spatial
shifts workers and their families described in my conversations with them: a move away
from stone construction to reinforced concrete, and the increased division of the home
into spaces defined according to function, in place of the “traditional” single-space
home.456
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Interview with Muhammad Abu Ahmad, Nazareth, October 20, 2018.
For the single-space village house, see: Jabareen and Dbiat, Architecture and Orientalism, 246-253;
Allweil, Homeland, 88-92; Fuchs, “The Palestinian Arab House,” 158-162. For the characteristics of new
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Where workers’ testimonies diverge from architectural scholarship is in their
ability to animate and claim the agency that drove these adaptations, which otherwise
appear to be driven primarily by abstract concepts and forces, or forever awaiting their
absent planners and architects.457 Ibrahim Shamshoum holds great pride in his record of
construction in ‘Arrabe and in the architectural and technical innovations he introduced to
the city’s (then still a village) built environment, starting with his own home:
When we travelled to the city we became aware of the developments in
construction, and we wanted to implement them in our town. For example, if I
was building a house, building a beautiful house in Haifa, or in Tel Aviv, or in
Jerusalem, I wanted to have a beautiful house here as well. I mean, I, when I built
my house, [then] for the first time, I thought that the boy should have a room, the
girl should have a room, [there should be] a parlor, a bedroom, a kitchen, a
bathroom. Before there wasn’t that [kind of construction in ‘Arrabe], very little.458

Ibrahim repeatedly referred to the expertise he and others gained while working in
Tel Aviv and elsewhere as khibra, knowledge learned through experience. When he
brought this expertise with him back to ‘Arrabe, its application was not limited just to
introducing internal divisions to a home which was until then frequently constructed

“types” of architecture which emerged in Palestinian villages in Israel in the wake of 1948, see: Jabareen
and Dbiat, Architecture and Orientalism, 288-300; Allweil, Homeland, 208-213; Badran, Space Design,
Making and Tectonics, 389-419. Of the three works, only Jabareen and Dbiat’s makes mention of the
preponderance of “skilled local manpower in the construction industry,” which they list among the
“advantages” of what they have termed the “post-traumatic model” of Palestinian housing.
457
In this sense, these narratives allow us to follow Farha Ghannam’s suggestion that we examine the
construction of modern built environments as the product not only of “planners and political figures,” but
also of what she calls, following Michel de Certau, “the ordinary practitioners of the city.” Although
Ghannam’s research focuses on the Cairene metropolis and on forced migrations driven by development
economics, there are notable similarities in the practices and perceptions of what constitutes “modern”
housing among the residents of the northeastern Cairo neighborhood of al-Zawiya al-Hamra and the
individuals I interviewed. Farha Ghannam, Remaking the Modern: Space, Relocation, and the Politics of
Identity in a Global Cairo (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), esp. Chapters 2 and 6.
458
Interview with Ibrahim Shamshoum, ‘Arrabe, October 12, 2018.
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around one shared space, but also to technical aspects of the work. “We learned to make
concrete bands, how to make columns, how to cast a roof,” he explains,
I was one of the first to have such a house and I transmitted the knowledge which
I learned to our town. I mean, I’m not an engineer, but I have more experience
than an engineer in building houses, in homes. I’ve seen many very beautiful
things [i.e., buildings] when I was working in construction and I carried many
things in my head (naqalt be-rasi ktir shaghlat) which we [then] used in
‘Arrabe.459
Ibrahim’s approach to his role in changing ‘Arrabe’s built landscape, portrays him
and others like him as the active and purposeful transmitters of innovations they “carried”
with them as they moved between segregated locations. Still, it is important to note that
although Ibrahim emphasizes the ideas he “carried in his head,” which could be
understood as emphasizing an abstract intellectual contribution, these could not be
separated from the embodied skills and capacities he and others acquired and transmitted.
And yet, precisely because the process of building a home relied upon communal
support and the skills, knowledge, and workforce collectively at their disposal,
construction required another resource which poverty and the military administration
rendered invaluable: time. Construction workers with relatively stable jobs which
allowed them to be home every day, found themselves working a “second shift” on a
regular basis. “When we started working for Solel Boneh,” Shawqi Khoury says, “you
would work a regular eight hours. After eight hours I would go back [home] and help
people build for another five or six.”460 For these workers, the first shift of the day was as
a salaried worker, often working on one of the massive housing projects the Israeli state
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Interview with Ibrahim Shamshoum, ‘Arrabe, October 12, 2018.
Interview with Shawqi Khoury, Tarshiha, October 21, 2018.
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carried out to house Jewish immigrants during the decades after 1948. The second began
once you arrived back home. It was dedicated to building your home and community
anew in the wake of the Nakba and in the shadow of ongoing dispossession and
marginalization.
Moreover, unlike the first shift, which saw Palestinian men working in an almost
entirely masculinized construction industry, the second shift also fostered the defiance of
these increasingly rigid gendered boundaries. Palestinian women were integral to the
(re)construction work carried during on the second shift. And although many women at
the time were not employed in salaried work, they were engaged in multiple forms of
unpaid labor both in and outside the home. It was their second shift too.461
William Andraos (b. 1943), from Tarshiha, began working for Solel Boneh in
1960. Our conversation was conducted in the presence of his wife, their daughter in law,
and Anis and Leila Khoury, who introduced me to William. This format, between an
interview and a family gathering, seemed less than ideal, but the dynamic between the
Andraos couple, who go by Abu Jamil and Umm Jamil, ended up producing some of the
most fascinating narratives I was able to take part in.462 After Abu Jamil described how

With the “second shift,” as with “invisible work/labor,” I am making use of a term originally coined
within feminist sociology. Arlie Hochschild originally developed the concept of the second shift to describe
how American women remained responsible for most labor at home (the work of child-rearing, care, and
other forms of “housework”) despite their dramatic incorporation into the US workforce. Examining
primarily middle-class working women, Hochschild observed that rather than this change fostering a more
egalitarian household within which labor was shared, many women found themselves working two “shifts”
on a daily basis – one as salaried employees, the second at home. Hochschild’s work is focused on what she
refers to as the “stalled revolution” in the late twentieth century American home and the development of
American capitalism. The Palestinian case clarifies, however, that similarly institutionalized second shifts
which were driven by discrimination, have arisen in drastically different historical circumstances and in
different forms. Arlie Hochschild and Anne Machung, The Second Shift: Working Families and the
Revolution at Home, third edition, (New York: Penguin Books, 2012 [1989]).
462
See “The Narrators” section above.
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difficult work was and decried the waning of his physical strength, Umm Jamil
interjected:
Umm Jamil: Listen, after work, after four, he would come back home, when we
were building the house here…. [A]fter he would come back, at four thirty I
would cook, he would eat, drink a cup of coffee and then start working [again],
everything by hand, I helped him.
Abu Jamil: We built this building, me and my wife.
Umm Jamil: This whole building, this house, he built.463

While Abu Jamil clearly sought to share the credit for building their home, Umm
Jamil seemed hesitant to emphasize her role. Our conversation then moved onto the
specifics of the construction of the Andraos home, from details regarding the flooring, to
the time certain tasks took. Anis and Leila also interjected occasionally, explaining that
“this was how things were done” that is, cooperatively and voluntarily, in contrast to how
they perceived commercial construction in Tarshiha took place now. Then Anis, who had
worked under Abu Jamil at Solel Boneh in the late 1960s, brought the conversation back
to the Andraos couple’s joint work. This time, with both Anis and Abu Jamil gently
insisting on discussing the construction process as one which the Andraos couple shared
in, Umm Jamil was more forthcoming about her experience as well. As she spoke, she
increasingly underscored how her role in their home’s construction defied the otherwise
distinct gendering of construction work:
Anis Khoury: He and his wife [built the house].
Abu Jamil: Me and my wife.
Umm Jamil: I’m his assistant [Umm Jamil uses the term ‘ozer, the Hebrew word
for a male assistant].
Nimrod: That’s really interesting. Tell me what you did, when you were building
the house together?
Umm Jamil: I did every task… In our roof we have this beam…
463

Interview with Abu Jamil and Umm Jamil Andraos, Tarshiha, October 22, 2018.
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Abu Jamil: A hanging beam…
Umm Jamil: Over on that side it used to be very high, so I would dress up like
that [i.e., like a male worker], with pants and everything, and I would go like this
with my stomach [Umm Jamil mimics dragging herself on her stomach] and grab
it [the beam] from above, and after that he would do the formwork.
Nimrod: So, you did everything? You were assistant form maker, assistant
ironworker [I continued using the male gendered term for assistant]?
Umm Jamil: I did more than a young man! [Umm Jamil laughs] I had to!
Abu Jamil: I would tell her, make this for me… She would make the sand, the
gravel, sand and cement. I would mix it, she starts handing it to me, and I would
cast the pillars. Me and her. Me and her…
Umm Jamil: the kids were [about] ten years old, the little one was still little, the
other was older. I would give them a small bucket and tell them, “help me, do like
this [Umm Jamil mimics pouring sand]. Once you’ve done ten each, I’ll give you
a popsicle.”464
Umm Jamil’s initial use of the masculine-gendered Hebrew term for assistant,
‘ozer, could be understood as a slip of the tongue, or as reflective of the perceived
improbability of gendering the role female. However, understanding her use of the term
as a “mistake” itself seems improbable once her description turns to her physical
experience of the work – wearing a male worker’s clothing, crawling on her stomach to
grab the ceiling beam – and culminates in the claim that “[she] did more than a young
man!” Rather, Umm Jamil’s gender reversal in the narration reflects her keen and playful
awareness of how she and Abu Jamil had defied the gendered division of labor.
Her description of how the couple’s children participated in the construction as
well, allows her to segue into clarifying that for her too building the house was a second
shift job. Already a mother of three when they began construction, she recalls doing
housework during the day (“all by hand… hard tasks”), making dinner and “then after
four… ‘ozer binyan [Umm Jamil laughs, having invoked the reversal again].” Thus, it
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was not only the skills Abu Jamil learned at Solel Boneh, or the help of other community
members that allowed the Andraos family to build their home despite meagre means.
Umm Jamil and Abu Jamil’s temporary suspension of the gendering of construction as
masculine labor, and Umm Jamil’s willingness to take on physical tasks she herself saw
as masculine, was crucial.
Narrators frequently described the emergence of these homemaking practices
primarily in terms of financial necessity. However, in its defiance of state policies which
sought to curtail Palestinian construction, building homes in the second shift was already
a political act. This was made amply clear when the state stepped in via its military
administration, and actively targeted Palestinian construction for demolition. In such
instances, construction workers’ skills could place them opposite the state, at the
frontline. Ibrahim Shamshoum, recalls one such event in ‘Arrabe which almost cost him
his life:
One day, in 1957, they [the military administration] destroyed a house here in
‘Arrabe, saying that it was built without a permit. And we wanted to build it, my
friends and me. The entire Party [i.e., the Communist Party members in ‘Arrabe]
and I were able to gather the whole village and we decided to help them build it
[the house]. That same day we started building it again, we built it that same day
and when we started casting the concrete, the police, the Military Police came,
and they beat me nearly to death. To the point, that my mother was told that day,
“Ibrahim is dead” (Ibrahim mat).465
Interview with Ibrahim Shamshoum, ‘Arrabe, October 12, 2018. The intense violence of the military’s
reaction that day meant that the episode received considerable coverage from the Arabic and Hebrew
communist press in particular. This has also allowed me to find its exact date –July 1, 1957. On July 2,
1957, a day after the events, both al-Ittihad and the party’s Hebrew language publication, Kol ha-‘Am
(Voice of the People) reported what had taken place in ‘Arrabe on their front pages. Both newspapers also
placed the military’s violence in the context of the oppression of the military administration in general and
of specific events. Al-Ittihad’s subtitle for the article stated that the police behaved with “intense brutality
that evoked the dreadful memory of Kafr Qasim (bi-waḥshia baligha ba‘athat dhikrat kafr qasim alrahība).” Al-Ittihad, July 2, 1957, 1; Kol ha-‘Am, July 2, 1957, 1. The Hebrew daily Ma‘ariv meanwhile,
reported on the police force’s arrival to ‘Arrabe, following “several warnings,” without mention of the
police’s violence, nor of any arrests. Ma‘ariv, July 2, 1957, 3.
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While this was the worst violent beating Ibrahim suffered during his many years
of activism, it was hardly his first time being arrested for defying or challenging policies
he viewed as unjust.466 Nor was it the last time the military administration tried to curtail
his building activities in ‘Arrabe. In 1964, the administration prevented him from
completing the construction of his own house, he says, for a period of “a whole year,
twelve months (sineh tameh, tnashar shahr).” Finally, after a year had passed, Ibrahim
called forty or so his “groups of comrades” (jama‘at rifaqi). “We cast the roof in four
hours,” he laughs.467

Fig. 5.6 Ibrahim Shamshoum and friends gathering around a cement mixer during the construction
of Ibrahim’s house, 1965. Photo courtesy of the Shamshoum family.

Ibrahim and several other Communist Party members in ‘Arrabe were arrested multiple times for
organizing a protest against the “education tax” which the Israeli state levied solely on Palestinian citizens.
Interview with Ibrahim Shamshoum, ‘Arrabe, October 12, 2018; Kol ha-‘Am, October 11, 1955, 2. For
more on the “education tax”, see: al-Haj, Education, 62-64.
467
Interview with Ibrahim Shamshoum, ‘Arrabe, October 12, 2018.
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Conclusion
The incorporation of many Palestinian men into a nascent Israel’s construction industry
was overdetermined by an array of historical events and processes stemming from the
Nakba and the subsequent policies of the Israeli state. Economic distress, land
expropriation, restrictions on employment and movement, and curtailment of educational
and professional prospects, all meant that Palestinians were left with little choice as to
where to seek employment. The construction industry’s absorption of so many
Palestinian men desperate to find work was part of the industry’s racialization, whereby
physical labor gradually became dominated first by Mizrahi Jews and then by Palestinian
Arabs, as Jews of European origins moved into managerial positions and professionalized
occupations.
Unsurprisingly then, the history of this incorporation from the perspective of
Palestinian construction workers is one of dangerous and difficult work, harsh living
conditions, and child and teenage labor. It is also a history of their encounter with their
own racialization - of being cast as a threat, sexually and otherwise; being forced to hide
in plain sight; and experiencing the dangers and humiliations of segregation. At the same
time, however, through the narratives of workers and their families, other facets of this
history emerge. A history of personal and communal ingenuity, of relationships built and
of remarkable capacities to adapt – materially, culturally, and socially – not merely in
order to survive harsh conditions borne of oppression, but also to find ways to challenge,
change, and overcome them. Not only by refusing to let go of your home and your
homeland, but of constantly finding new ways to remake and reclaim it.
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CONCLUSION
This dissertation’s inquiry ends in 1973 not because the phenomena it explores – the ties
between the history of construction and the formation of a racialized social hierarchy in
twentieth-century Palestine/Israel – suddenly unraveled. If anything, following the Israeli
occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip as a result of the 1967 war, those ties were
drawn tighter still. Palestinians from the occupied territories, devoid of citizenship and
subject to military rule, were swiftly incorporated into Israel’s workforce in the following
years. If roughly 6 percent of the Palestinian workforce in the West Bank and Gaza Strip
worked in Israel by 1968, by 1974 nearly a third of the workforce did so. By 1975,
Palestinians from the occupied territories constituted nearly 30 percent of the entire
workforce of the Israeli construction industry.468 Stripped of the gains which Palestinian
with Israeli citizenship had made as workers in the decades prior to 1967 and of even the
most basic protections of citizenship, non-citizen Palestinian subjects were, and remain,
an extremely vulnerable population. Precarity and racialized devaluation remained bound
together with construction work, and, as Leila Farsakh has shown, inextricably linked to
Israeli state policies of expropriating Palestinian lands and limiting Palestinian economic
development, this time beyond the so-called “Green Line,” which demarcates Israel’s
internationally recognized borders.469
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Yael Berda, Living Emergency, 20; Farsakh, Palestinian Labour Migration, 125, 209.
Farsakh, Palestinian Labour Migration, Chapter 5. As Farsakh notes, in her study of the Gaza Strip’s
“de-development” under Israeli rule, Sara Roy has also called attention to this relationship between Israeli
government aims to gain control of Palestinian lands and dispossess Palestinians, and the latter’s
incorporation into Israel’s labor force as exploited migrant laborers. Roy, The Gaza Strip. Several scholarly
and cinematic works examine the experiences of Palestinian laborers working across the “Green Line.”
See: Avram S. Bornstein, Crossing the Green Line Between the West Bank and Israel (Philadelphia:
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Nor has this outsourcing of exploitative practices been restricted to the noncitizen Palestinian labor force. If, before 1967, Israel excavated much of its building
stone from under the feet of the Palestinian citizens who remained in the state, in the
decades since it has come to rely on the stone reserves of the occupied West Bank.
Unburdened by environmental and health and safety regulations which exist within
Israel’s de jure boundaries and aided by the state, Israeli quarrying in the West Bank has
caused environmental devastation. The growing international demand for Palestinian
stone, paired with often limited access to their own agricultural lands, the dire economic
straits in the West Bank, and the neoliberal economic policies of the Palestinian
Authority, have led some Palestinians to “carve their own land,” as architect and critic
Yara Sharif has put it, to support themselves and their families.470
Indeed, an attempt to trace all the ways in which construction work, the ability to
build (and increasingly, to demolish), and even the business entities populating the
construction industry, remain part and parcel of the colonial, exploitative structure the
erection of which this dissertation has narrated, would likely furnish an infuriating and
tragic laundry list. From the Israeli Right’s notion that construction in illegal settlements

University of Pennsylvania Press, 2003); Malon 9 Kokhavim [Nine Star Hotel], directed by Ido Haar (2006;
Israel/Palestine; Eden Productions), DVD; Suad Amiry, Nothing to Lose but Your Life: My 18-Hour
Journey with Murad (Doha: Bloomsbury Qatar Foundation, 2010); Mutasalilun [Infiltrators], directed by
Khaled Jarrar (2012; Palestine/Lebanon/United Arab Emirates; Dubai Media and Entertainment
Organization), DVD; Ross, Stone Men, Chapter 5. Nowhere have Palestinian construction workers been
more crucial in recent decades than in the building of illegal Israeli settlements in the occupied territories.
See: Matthew Vickery, Employing the Enemy: The Story of Palestinian Labourers on Israeli Settlements
(London: Zed Books, 2017).
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was the “proper Zionist response” (tguva tziyonit holemet) to all manners of perceived
Palestinian and international encroachments on Israel, held and acted upon since the late
1970s; to the disastrous equations of demolition endorsed by current Israeli leadership,
whereby the homes of Palestinians within Israel built without a permit are demolished to
appease popular rightwing anger at government demolitions of structures in illegal
settlements in the West Bank, under the guise of “equitable enforcement.” Looming over
these trajectories, the ongoing preponderance of injury and unsafe work in Israel’s
construction industry – particularly in “wet work” jobs in which Palestinians constitute
the overwhelming majority – raises the question of how certain lives and bodies become
less valuable than others.471 A question which I hope this dissertation has done some
work to address, even as the topic of work accidents proper has remained outside its
scope.
But perhaps, in the spirit of this dissertation’s final chapter and the relationship
between construction in the material sense and as metaphor, it would be better to
conclude with an example of how the history this dissertation has examined is shaping a
Palestinian politics presently seeking to build a fundamentally different future in
Palestine/Israel. Since the 2015 Israeli elections, the Joint List – a coalition of Palestinian
and Palestinian-led parties – has reintroduced the promise of foundational change into
Israel/Palestine’s increasingly stagnant and bleak political landscape. Bringing together
the socialist Hadash party, the liberal-national Balad, and other smaller Islamic and
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secular parties, the Joint List presented, for the first time since 1948, a united Palestinian
political front within Israel.472
Formed partially in response to a law which sought to effectively disenfranchise
most Palestinian citizens in Israel by raising the percentage of votes required to win a
place in the Israeli Knesset, the state’s parliament, the party won thirteen seats in its first
elections in 2015, making it the country’s third largest party. After internal differences
between its constituent parties and the List’s dismantling led to disappointing results in
the April 2019 elections, the List was reformed in July of that year.473 In the subsequent
parliamentary elections, in September 2019 and March 2020, the Joint List won thirteen
and fifteen seats, respectively. Viewed alongside the steady shrinking of the Zionist Left
into political insignificance, the explicitly non-Zionist Palestinian List’s ability to
repeatedly receive the third highest number of votes, an unprecedented achievement, has
the potential to radically transform parliamentary politics within Israel.474
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The rise of the Joint List in Israel’s politics has placed the history of construction
work and the construction industry in the political limelight in two important ways –
through policy demands and biography. In recent years, parties on the Israeli Right have
made a motto of the “enforcement” of building regulations – a euphemism for increased
house demolitions in Palestinian towns within Israel, and controls and restrictions on
Palestinian locales’ and citizens’ economic and social development. In response, the Joint
List’s leadership has repeatedly raised the banner of regularization of so-called “illegal
construction,” the freezing of all demolition orders in Palestinian localities and the
annulment of legislation intended to intensify “enforcement.” In doing so, the List has
insisted on the explicitly political and racist nature of an issue which Jewish Israeli
politicians and public discourse have tended to associate with Arab “lawlessness” (even if
this association is often accompanied by a wink).475
Two of the Joint List’s leaders, Ayman Odeh and Aida Touma-Sliman, both of
the communist wing of the socialist Hadash party, have publicly emphasized the role
construction work has had in their own personal biographies. In interviews, on the
podium of the Israeli Parliament, even in a profile of Odeh’s in the New Yorker, Odeh
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and Touma-Sliman, both the children of construction workers, have claimed this aspect
of their respective biographies as formative. Odeh’s meteoric rise onto the national and
international stage, in particular, has marked him as a unique, potentially generational
leader. A self-stylized follower of Dr. Martin Luther King, his and Touma-Sliman’s
political visions stands in stark contrast to the increasingly explicit nationalist and racist
tenor of mainstream Israeli Zionist politics.476 They are the children of the structure of
racialized inequality and domination, the building of which this dissertation sought to
cast light on. The structure itself still stands, taller and more imposing by the day. It has
never been more urgent to bring it down. Tomorrow is today.
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APPENDIX I
Identity Card/Mahmoud Darwish, trans. Denys Johnson-Davies477 (1964)
Write it down.
I am an Arab
And the number of my card is fifty thousand
I have eight children
And the ninth is due after summer.
Does that anger you?
Write it down.
I am an Arab
Working with comrades of toil in a quarry.
I have eight children
For them I wrest the loaf of bread,
The clothes and exercise books
From the rocks
And beg for no alms at your door,
Lower not myself at your doorstep.
Does that anger you?

Write it down.
I am an Arab.
I am a name without a title,
Patient in a country where everything
Lives in a whirlpool of anger.
My roots
Took hold before the birth of time
Before the burgeoning of the ages,
Before cypress and olive trees,
Before the proliferation of weeds.
My father is from the family of the plough
Not from highborn nobles.
And my grandfather was a peasant
Without line or genealogy.
My house is a watchman's hut
Made of sticks and reeds.
I have made some small alterations to Denys Johnson-Davies’ original translation. I replaced the
recurring word “record” for sajjil, with the phrase, “write it down”; the recurring question “What’s there to
be angry about?” for “fa-hal ṭughḍib?”, with “Does that make you angry?”; and I have inserted, in brackets,
the omitted line “Love communism” in the fourth verse.
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Does my status satisfy you?
I am a name without a surname.
Write it down.
I am an Arab.
Color of hair: jet black.
Color of eyes: brown.
My distinguishing features:
On my head the 'iqal cords over a keffiyeh
Scratching him who touches it.
My address:
I'm from a village, remote, forgotten,
Its streets without name
And all its men in the fields and quarry.
[Love communism]
Does that anger you?
Write it down.
I am an Arab.
You stole my forefathers' vineyards
And land I used to till,
I and all my children,
And you left us and all my grandchildren
Nothing but these rocks.
Will your government be taking them too
As is being said?
So!
Write it down at the top of page one:
I don't hate people,
I trespass on no one's property.
And yet, if I were to become hungry
I shall eat the flesh of my usurper.
Beware, beware of my hunger
And of my anger!
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